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 Introduction 
 
 
1. Thematic introduction 
 
The central objective of representative democracy is to encourage and mobilize citizens 
to participate in politics and ensure representation which will best serve their interests 
and maximize their welfare (Kitschelt 2000; Lijphart 1999; Downs 1957). Political 
representation, legitimacy and accountability are secured through elections (Przeworski et 
al. 1999). All these aspects are crucial in establishing a functioning democracy. Quality of 
government and a properly functioning democracy ‘hinges on how good citizens are at 
making their politicians accountable for their actions’(Adserà et al. 2003:445). Thus, 
elections are an essential mechanism to hold representatives accountable for their 
political in/activities. They provide ground for electors to judge retrospectively, using the 
past performance ‘as an indicator of the future’ (Chappell and Keech 1985:10). According 
to Key, the voter acts ‘as an appraiser of the past events, past performance and past 
actions’ (Key 1966:61). Retrospective voting allows citizens to analyze and weigh the actions 
and political outcomes of political representatives, before casting the vote in their support or 
against them. It is based on the premise that ‘voters evaluate parties based on their 
achievements in the office’ (Ecker et al. 2016:335). In this light, elections can be seen as a 
mechanism to reward or sanction good and/or bad political performance (Hobolt et al. 2013).  
The relationship between elections and accountability is particularly complex in ethnically 
divided societies. Democracy and institutional capacities within these societies are often 
designed to accommodate ethnic divisions, aiming for representation, much more than for 
10 
 
 
 
accountability (Lijphart 1999, 1977, 1975; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Thus, many 
empirical studies witness the existent threat for the performance voting model and democratic 
stability, which is caused by ethnic cleavages and politicization of ethnicity (Lindberg and 
Morrison 2008; Chandra 2007; Horowitz 1985). Unlike in societies which are characterized 
by a homogeneous ethnic makeup, in ethnically divided societies, democratic representation 
becomes additionally challenged through the existing ethnic differences. This is even 
exacerbated when ethnicity is ‘politicized’ and perceived as an important factor which plays a 
decisive role in the political process (Weber et al. 2015). 
However, so far, academic research on voting behavior in ethnically divided societies 
focused predominantly on ethnic voting, which aimed to ensure ethnic representation 
(Huber 2012; Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Chandra 2007; Birnir 2006). Research on 
performance voting is scarce to find in these electoral contexts. Similarly, political 
accountability is a rather neglected concept. Instead, greater importance is given to 
‘expressive voting behavior’, which puts the ethnic identity on the pedestal. Ethnic 
identity becomes a crucial factor which explains ethnic voting, labeling elections in these 
societies as an ‘ethnic census’ (Horowitz 1985). According to Horowitz’s ‘expressive 
voting thesis’, voters cast a vote in order to express their identities as part of an ethnic 
group. Further factors which attracted vast academic attention when inspecting the 
presence and perpetuation of ethnic voting were institutional incentives (Huber 2012; 
Blais 2006; Reilly et al. 1999; Blais and Carty 1990) and fear of domination by different 
ethnic groups, i.e. concern that the other ethnic group may grow more powerful, in so far 
citizens aim to defend their group status and assure adequate political power of one’s 
own group by the act of voting. (Stojanović 2014; Hulsey and Mujkić 2009; Caspersen 
2004). Ethnic cleavages were shown to affect political accountability in a negative way, 
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assuring malfunctioning governments to retain support of the electorate (Hulsey 2010; 
Hulsey and Mujkić 2009).  
While there are lots of studies on ethnic voting and success of ethnic parties as a result of the 
above mentioned factors ( Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Chandra 2007; Birnir 2006), there is 
a scarcity of those addressing the link between economic performance and incumbent’s 
success (economic voting) in ethnically divided societies (Wimpy and Whitten 2017; Bratton 
et al. 2012). Additionally, instrumental or strategic voting behaviour, as analyzed by Chandra 
(2009), was not split by sub-groups as looked upon in this research, to find additional 
evidence of patronage driven voting patterns by public officials and lack of such voting 
incentives for minority ethnic groups. Economic voting, as a performance based voting, is 
rather investigated in more advanced democracies, where voting behavior is rather evaluative 
in nature than expressive, meaning that ethnicity is rather irrelevant or ethnic differences are 
non-existent (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2012; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007; Lewis-Beck 
and Paldam 2000; Chappell and Keech 1985). However, to understand a broader picture of 
causalities which influence the voting behavior in ethnically divided societies, it is relevant to 
ask if ethnic voting, as a consequence of ethnic alignment and strategic voting of the 
electorate, is really cemented in these societies? How influential are economic factors on 
voting outcomes? Are voters evaluating the economic performance of the government or do 
they manage to get exculpated even in cases of mal-performance and non-responsiveness? 
Does personal economic hardship and/or unemployment as a public concern matter when 
casting a vote? What role does patronage, as a sub-form of clientelism, play in societies with 
ethnic cleavages and for whom? These exploratory and explanatory questions will be the 
focus of this dissertation.  
The remainder of the introduction will discuss in more detail factors which influence ethnic 
voting patterns, main research gaps evident in the existent literature, the relevance of this 
dissertation and its contribution to the scholarly discourse. This cumulative dissertation 
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consists of four separate studies. Each of these studies addresses a separate research question, 
ultimately aiming to fill one specific research gap. This introductory section does not provide 
the full overview of prior research, considering that literature reviews are also given by each 
of the separate studies. 
 
2. Overview and summaries of the dissertation studies 
 
This section provides extensive summaries of the four dissertation studies. An overview with 
key aspects of the studies is given in Table 1.  
 
The four parts of the dissertation are as follows: 
 
(1) Divide and rule: Economic voting in ethnically divided societies - The case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina; 
(2) A ‘less ethnic’ jobless voter: The effect of unemployment on turnout and electoral 
success of ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
(3) Closer to the state, closer to the polls? The different impact of corruption on turnout 
among public employees and other citizens; 
(4) No benefits, no vote: The link between political patronage and turnout in an 
ethnically divided society. 
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First study 
 
The first study builds on the academic literature that investigates how the economy influences 
voting behavior. To date, studies of economic voting have predominantly focused on the 
cases of established and advanced democracies, where economic issues are often of central 
importance for the general population. Much less attention has been paid to the distinct 
experience of ethnically divided societies, despite their inherent suitability as a test-case. 
Ethnically divided societies are frequently characterized by the prevalence of ethnic parties 
and ethnic voting patterns, even in the face of significant and publically-recognized economic 
challenges. But to what extent do ethnic voting patterns supersede economic voting? Is there a 
relationship between unemployment rates and voting behaviour in multi-ethnic societies? This 
study analyses whether unemployment affects both voter turnout and incumbents’ vote share 
in a context in which it has not been analyzed before: divided ethnic societies (with 
consociational features), which aims at fair representation of different ethnic groups, but 
provides further incentives for political participation along ethnic lines. By looking at an 
ethnically divided society, with different levels of ethnic divisions, this study seeks to test the 
economic voting theory in a new context where ethnicity is a salient issue, ethnic 
representation of primary importance and the whole political system is envisaged to 
accommodate ethnic divisions, rather than to ensure accountability through economic 
performance voting. This study argues that economic voting does exist in ethnically 
divided societies and that unemployment mobilizes citizens to vote, rather than making 
them withdraw from the political process. However, it expects ethnic diversity to affect 
the magnitude of the economic vote and level of turnout. Accordingly, the focus of this 
study lies in showing that (local) ethnic divisions moderate the relationship between voters’ 
evaluation of the economy (measured through local unemployment rates) and their choice 
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between voting and abstention, as well as between voting in favor or against incumbent 
parties. Obtained results show that even within an overall most likely context for ethnic voting 
(in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a selected case study), voters in ethnically more homogeneous 
municipalities vote economically. Voters in ethnically heterogeneous municipalities, by 
contrast, vote on the basis of ethnic concerns (which is not assessed empirically).  
 
Second study 
 
The aim of the second study is to undertake a deeper inspection of demonstrated research 
findings, which show a weak link between government performance and voting behavior in 
ethnically divided societies. Ethnic issues contaminate the electoral process in such 
contexts and change the purpose of elections. Therefore, elections often do not serve as a 
mechanism of ensuring political accountability. Rather, they revive ethnic intolerances 
and cleavages, allowing ethnic parties to ‘monopolize’ the electoral competition. The 
presence of ethnic politics and ‘politicized ethnicity’ (Weber et al. 2015) makes the 
citizens ‘hostages’ of a political system, where elections mainly serve the goal of solely 
guaranteeing ethnic representation, despite government’s performance and independent 
of citizens’ positive or negative evaluations of their past actions. These circumstances 
account for the lack of threat of losing political functions, which would otherwise control and 
discipline politicians to be more responsive towards the needs of the citizens and make them 
accountable in case of bad evaluation of their performance. Thus, political accountability is 
found to be more complex to achieve in ethnically heterogeneous democracies, where 
ethnicity serves as a political tool and the party system in place is based on ethnic 
divisions. How is political accountability modified by political context, where ethnic 
divisions are highly salient, gives impulse to this study. Research examining performance 
voting in societies with prevailing ethnic issues, are rather scarce. Hence, this study 
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attempts to examine that link between the evaluation of government performance and voting 
behaviour in a political arena, which stimulates ethnic voting and presents a fertile ground 
for the success of ethnic parties. Besides testing political accountability in an ethnically 
diverse setting, this study aims to show that government evaluations have different effect on 
voting for main ethnic parties among unemployed citizens and the rest of the population. By 
inspecting this economy-vote link, this study additionally touches upon the economic voting 
scholarship on the micro level. It shows that personal economic hardship affects the link 
between government evaluation and vote for main ethnic parties (egotropic voting). Even in 
this political context, unemployed citizens may perceive economy as another salient issue 
and their voting behavior can signal different ‘issue importance’ (Fournier et al. 2003). By 
relying on individual level data available in the European Values Survey (2008) and testing 
the above-mentioned assumptions on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this study finds 
signs of accountability in the context of an ethnically diverse setting. Obtained results show 
that evaluations of government performance affect the likelihood of voting for governing 
ethnic parties only among the unemployed, whereas they are not shown to have any effect 
among the rest of the population. Ultimately, this finding signals the presence of egotropic 
(personal) economic voting in an ethnically divided society. 
 
Third study 
 
The third contribution of this dissertation concentrates on voter turnout and its scarcely 
examined link with corruption. In addition to shortage of this research, the existing evidence 
is inconclusive, with some studies reporting corruption as positively related to turnout and 
others reporting a negative relationship. This study argues that the relevant question is not 
whether corruption has a positive or negative effect on turnout, but for whom. It is 
16 
 
 
 
hypothesized that the effect of corruption on the likelihood to vote depends on individuals’ 
employment sector. Public employees have different incentives to vote in corrupt settings 
since their jobs often depend on the political success of the government. Hence, while 
corruption dampens turnout among ordinary citizens, public employees are more likely to 
vote in highly corrupt countries. Previous literature on voting behavior of public sector 
employees does not consider this key factor that can eventually modify the costs and benefits 
of voting for this sector of the population: the level of corruption in a country. The low quality 
of democratic institutions in corrupt settings allows for patronage recruitments, which are 
likely to influence the voting decision of public sector employees. In corrupt countries, the 
allocation of public sector jobs is often based on patronage instead of meritocracy: public job 
positions are distributed by the incumbent party or candidate (the patron) in exchange of 
political support. Public employees (the clients) have incentives to maintain in office the 
patron that has appointed them. Since their jobs are tied to the political success of the patron, 
they are expected to vote for the incumbent party or government. Implicitly, this also entails 
that they will be more likely to turn out to vote. The empirical evidence is partially consistent 
with our expectations. Our results show that the turnout differential between the two 
examined categories indeed grows, as the perceived level of public-sector corruption 
increases. However, while corruption is shown to have a demobilizing effect among those 
who are not public employees, public employees are not found to vote more in highly corrupt 
countries. They remain equally likely to vote regardless of corruption levels. 
 
Fourth study 
 
The fourth contribution aims to improve the understanding of patronage in ethnically divided 
societies and examines this phenomenon on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Signs of 
patronage are investigated by analyzing turnout levels of public officials, who are considered 
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to be patronage-beneficiaries and minority ethnic groups. This study sheds light on the 
neglected side of political participation in a context where ethnic fragmentations are present 
and where political patronage has a solid ground to be practiced,  namely voter turnout. It 
argues that patronage in ethnically fragmented societies specifically leads to implications with 
regard to turnout of two population sub-groups: public sector employees and ethnic 
minorities. Presence of political patronage in the form of public sector job distribution, has 
thus a different impact on citizens who are linked to the state via their employment and 
dependent on the political success of the governing political party. Public sector employees 
are therefore considered to be more incentivized than other citizens when it comes to voting.  
By contrast, if one’s job stability and employment prospects do not depend on the ruling 
political party, one may decide to stay out of the electoral process and abstain. Furthermore, 
this study argues that members of minority ethnic groups do not have the same incentives to 
turnout in elections as majority group members, due to the preferential redistribution of 
patronage benefits to co-ethnics. Ethnic divisions are considered a suitable precondition for 
patronage practices. If ethnic divisions are strong, it is easier for the patron to target his co-
ethnics. Thus, material benefits are more likely to be distributed towards majority ethnic 
groups, whose political parties enjoy electoral advantages due to the majority status of the 
group they represent. Accordingly, they are less likely to be distributed towards minority 
ethnic groups, whose scarce prospects to obtain patronage benefits result often in abstention. 
By introducing patronage as a potential causal mechanism for different turnout levels of 
public sector employees and minority ethnic groups, this study challenges common 
explanations in the literature which suggest that ethnic attitudes solely ensure high turnout in 
divided societies. Additionally, it contributes to the research on political patronage by 
focusing on its link with voter turnout, not only vote choice. Having observed that turnout is 
higher for public officials and lower for minority ethnic groups, such findings are interpreted 
as manifestations of patronage practices. Qualitative evidence obtained through expert 
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interviews provide further validation of the expected incentives for patronage-beneficiaries 
(public employees) and lack of such incentives for non-beneficiaries, when it comes to their 
vote intention. 
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3.  Theories and determinants of voting behaviour 
 
This dissertation focuses on three theories of voting behavior, namely: theory of ethnic voting, 
instrumentalist theory and theory of economic voting. It explores these theories to the extent 
to which they explain vote intention and vote choice of the electorate in ethnically divided 
societies and broader (Study 3). All these theories include factors which account for a certain 
voting behavior. The following section inspects in greater detail each of the three theories and 
their implications. 
 
3.1. Ethnic voting and its determinants 
 
 
Extensive research exists with regard to determinants of ethnic voting (Chandra 2007; Birnir 
2006; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Hoffmann and Long mention the basic 
ones on which there is scholarly agreement in the literature, which to a large extent predict 
voting along the ethnic dimension. Ethnicity and patronage present these two factors for 
which consensus was reached to have an impact on ethnic voting (2013). Besides ethnicity 
and patronage, anxiety and animosity towards different ethnic group members and 
institutional factors (Reilly et al. 1999; Blais and Carty 1990) are considered two additional 
factors that affect if citizens cast a ballot and for whom (Caspersen 2004). 
 
3.1.1. Ethnic voting as an  ‘expressive act’ 
 
Among the various determinants of ethnic voting, the literature identified ethnicity to strongly 
influence vote choice in ethnically heterogeneous democracies. ‘Ethnicity is a significant 
predictor of party support’, for ‘ethnic ties based on kinship and family, language and dialect, 
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tribal customs and local communities, as well as shared religious faiths, have long been 
regarded as playing a critical role in party politics’(Norris and Mattes 2003:1,2)  The theory 
which refers to social identities as an influencing factor on voting behavior and support for 
certain political parties, also famous as the ‘cleavage theory’, was put forward by Lipset and 
Rokkan in the late sixties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). It was extended by Horowitz, to include 
the influence of ethnicity on party systems and voting patterns. He set forth the ‘expressive 
voting hypothesis’ (1985), which was further elaborated by other scholars (Ferree 2006; 
Ferree and Horowitz 2010). They claimed that voters basically use their votes to declare their 
affiliation towards a certain ethnic group. It is perceived that voting on the basis on one’s own 
ethnic identity shows ‘social solidarity’ (Hoffman and Long 2013:129) and derives ‘psychic 
benefits’ for the voter (Chandra 2007:227). Feree further describes these benefits to imply an 
increase of the voters’ self-esteem.  
Voting in these cases is often regarded as an ‘ethnic census’ (Horowitz 1985, 1991, 2001) or 
‘ethnic head count’(Ferree 2006), it is a sign of allegiance to an ethnic group and affirmation 
of one’s own identity. Ishiyama explains the severe consequences of such voting: 
‘This in turn gives rise to ethnic parties, which according to this perspective, through 
the process of ethnic outbidding, leads to the hardening of ethnic positions, reducing 
the possibility of ethnic accommodation and ultimately leads to the dissolution of 
incipient democracies’ (Ishiyama 2012:761). 
 
Scholars agree that identity voting draws away from ‘interethnic accommodation’ (Ishiyama 
2012:761). There is, thus, consensus that ethnicity matters and influences voting and politics, 
in general, but as Norris and Mattes note ‘the relevant question is how much influence can be 
attributed to ethnic cues when compared with other structural factors such as urbanization, 
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age and education, and compared with political attitudes, such as evaluations of government 
performance’(Norris and Mattes 2003:2). 
 
3.1.2. Ethnic voting as an ‘expression of fear and anxiety’ 
 
Another common explanation for ethnic voting behavior is fear of domination (Stojanović 
2014), emphasized perception that the group’ status needs to be defended (Caspersen 
2004) and adequate political power of one’s own group assured, which could otherwise, 
by voting non-ethnically, be jeopardized (Hulsey and Mujkić 2009). According to 
Hoffman and Long: 
...‘strong in-group attachments are reinforced by negative evaluations of out-group 
members, which may produce ethnic fear, anxiety, and animosity. Voters will 
select co-ethnics to avoid what they perceive to be the negative consequences of 
governance under another ethnic group. This may produce voting for co-ethnic 
candidates or block voting in multiethnic coalitions’ (2013:129). 
Referring to the fear of domination, Stojanovic (2014) explains ethnic voting by using the 
prisoner’s dilemma argument. Mujkic and Hulsey call it ‘Dilemma of Ethnopolitical Prisoner’ 
(2009:143). Stojanovic selects the Bosnian case to argue that even non-ethno-nationalist 
voters vote for ethno-nationalist parties, not because they are driven by ethno-nationalist 
feelings and persuasions, but because they ‘ended up in a rational-cognitive trap which 
resembles the prisoner’s dilemma game’(Stojanović 2014:11). He refers to this behavior as a 
‘typical collective action problem’ (p.2), suggesting that citizens in ethnically heterogeneous 
democracies may even favour to vote non-ethnically and to evaluate government’s 
performance before casting a vote, but rationally it is considered a very precarious option. It 
could potentially put under threat the collective ethnic group status. This explains to a large 
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extent why ethnic parties mostly benefit from such political climate, because ethnic rhetoric 
manages to assure voters that politics should be led by ethnic divisions and not based on 
interest politics and performance (Hulsey and Mujkic 2009). 
Moreover, perception of ethnicity being under threat is a common explanation for ethnic 
voting, if the ethnic group is a minority or is not given proper institutional protection. 
Thus, ‘political empowerment via co-ethnic representatives’, as a degree to which ethnic 
groups can impact decision making processes, does also play a role when it comes to 
voting and vote choice, specifically (Just 2017:2). 
Ethnic voting is thus a matter of ‘social environments’ and the focus on the ‘power-threat’ 
hypothesis, explains voting along ethnic lines as a response to a perceived threat by the other 
ethnic group (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000:574). 
 
3.1.3. Institutional incentives promoting ethnic voting patterns 
 
Classical explanations on voting behavior in ethnically divided societies give reason to 
predominantly expect the presence of ethnic voting patterns.  Beside the above mentioned 
explanations which incentivize ethnic voting, the literature identified that the character of the 
institutional design is furthermore a valuable mechanism for explaining the ethnic voting 
decision. With respect to this significant factor, literature embraces consociationalism and 
electoral systems with proportional representation (PR), as causes which promote ethnic 
voting and encourage ethnically based political mobilization (Rokkan 2009; Wilkinson 
2006; Reilly et al. 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998). According to Wagner and Dreef, PR 
systems ‘facilitate ethnic minority representation in parliament in proportion to each 
community’s share of the population as a whole, and so creates the basis for an inclusive 
system of democratic governance’(2014:290). Scholars agree that by ‘prescribing’ PR 
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electoral systems, this model promotes ethnic voting patterns (Reilly 2012; Rokkan 2009; 
Wilkinson 2006; Reilly et al. 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998). Still, they argue that the 
success of the above mentioned factors, as tools for managing ethnic divisions, depends 
on how the political elites will collaborate and on their willingness to share power and 
cooperate in the grand coalition. Political elites are not always ready to compromise and 
reduce tensions caused by ethnic differences and cleavages. This is often neglected when 
power-sharing is implemented. 
 The consociational model of democracy has been of great prominence with respect to the 
favorable design of institutions it entailed for ethnically divided societies. Consociationalism 
is thus often viewed as a phenomenon which settles ethnic differences (Lijphart 1969; 
1975, 1977). It became one of the most popular solutions, which was exported to many 
countries after suffering an ethnic conflict. The concept of consociational democracy was 
put forward by Arend Lijphart (1969), who proposed it as a most suitable fix for deeply 
divided societies. According to his consociational approach, the political power rests on 
ethnic groups, which are ‘basic units on which political structure is built’ (Caspersen 
2004:569).  
Electoral systems have an important role in influencing political stability, especially if it 
is fragile, as it is the case in post-conflict societies. Reilly notes that: 
 
‘Variations in electoral procedures can also play a key role in determining whether 
the locus of political competition evolves along extremist or centrist lines, and 
hence in developing moderate and broad-based political parties’ (2002:119). 
 
The influence of consociationalism and PR electoral systems, has received vast criticism for 
cementing ethnic divisions and legitimizing ethnic voting (Horowitz 1985). Truth is that in 
ethnically divided societies, accommodating ethnic differences and establishing peace 
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have often been achieved through consociational arrangements. Power-sharing, as one of 
its features, is envisaged to enable all ethnic groups to enjoy political representation. In 
turn, what is assured are peaceful coexistence and inter-ethnic cooperation. Many 
examples witness, though, how this ‘quick fix’ (Reilly 2002:123) implies risks of creating 
even greater ethnic divisions and democratic instability. As also noted by Dixon: 
 
‘Consocionalists seek to avoid conflict between primordialist actors from different 
groups by reducing contact between them, and this leads to a preference for the 
segregation of groups’ (2011:108). 
Consociational elements can thus be perceived to contaminate the electoral process and 
change the purpose of elections, leading to the lack of political accountability. Many 
scholars have agreed upon the shortcomings of such a model, by admitting this concept to be 
useful in the first stages of transition to peace, but lacking potential in consolidating the peace 
process (Jarstad 2008; Stojanovic 2008; Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Bieber 2005). In the 
various cases where consociationalism was implemented, it mostly succeeded in ending 
conflicts, but having cemented ethnic divisions, it put ethnicity on a pedestal, undermining 
other factors which influence electoral mobilization. The greatest criticism of 
consociationalism which caught academic attention, came from Donald Horowitz, who is 
a proponent of the integrative model of solving ethnic conflicts. As an opponent of the 
concept of consociationalism and belonging to the centripetalist scholars, Horowitz 
(1985) argued that these elements of consociationalism not only incentivize ethnic 
representation, but also fuel ethnic exclusion and undermine the potential for integration. 
It is considered that ‘the centrifugal competition for group allegiance is an enormous 
constraint on compromise across group lines’ (Reynolds 2002:21). In most cases (i.e. in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina) this was shown to be exactly like opponents to 
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consociationalism envisaged. Power-sharing fostered ethnic voting patterns and gave 
little chance for non-nationalist political parties to enter the political sphere (Hulsey 2010; 
Manning 2004). This, among other consequences, further implied destabilization of 
democracy and lack of political accountability.  
 
3.1.4. Patronage driven (instrumental or strategic) ethnic voting 
 
Empirical evidence on ethnic voting further link it to the phenomenon of political patronage. 
Political patronage is analyzed within the theoretical framework of the instrumentalist theory 
(Kopecký et al. 2016; Stokes et al. 2013; Chandra 2009; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). It is 
understood in more narrow terms to refer to ‘political appointments’ in the public sector 
(Kopecký et al. 2016:418). Political parties, thus, ensure benefits for loyal voters who, in turn, 
promise them their political support (Hidalgo and Nichter 2016). Clientelism, as a broader 
concept which incorporates the phenomenon of political patronage, has received vast 
scholarly attention in the context of ethnically divided societies (Gisselquist 2014; Isaksson 
and Bigsten 2013; Alesina et al. 1999). Ethnic divisions are shown to make it easier for the 
patron (political party) to target his co-ethnics. Clientelism and ethnic favouritism, thus, go 
hand in hand and patronage, as its subgroup, works better when ethnic divisions are 
salient (Ahlerup and Isaksson 2014; Chandra 2007). This means that patrons distribute 
public goods (i.e. public sector jobs) more easily towards co-ethnics, suggesting a 
disproportional allocation of these goods among the ethnic groups (Ahlerup and Isaksson 
2014). Political patronage, therefore, shapes voting behavior in ethnically divided societies, 
where such circumstances and insufficiently developed institutional mechanisms allow for 
electoral advantages of ethnic parties to be exchanged for patronage gains. Chandra refers to 
such voting behaviour as ‘calculated’ or ‘instrumentalist’. In her view: 
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‘Voters in patronage democracies are instrumental actors who use their vote primarily 
to secure individualized benefits from those who control the state apparatus. [...] These 
voters expect to obtain greatest access to both types of benefits from elected officials 
belonging to their ‘own’ ethnic group. Having their ‘own’ man in power increases 
voters’ access to the material goods and services allocated by the state. At the same 
time, the acquisition of political power by a co-ethnic is a source of psychological 
satisfaction to the extent that it raises the status of in-group members in relation to 
neighbours and peers from less well represented ethnic categories’ (Chandra 2009:23). 
By following this path which analyzes political patronage as an ‘electoral strategy’, my aim is 
also to show the negative impact is reflects on the democratic process, per se. Political 
accountability is put under risk, as vote intentions and vote choices become interest 
dependent, and to a lesser extent the consequence of a programmatic linkage between voters 
and political parties. Clientelism (and political patronage) ‘serves to sustain a political 
monopoly’ (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:184). Kitschelt and Wilkinson found that the 
linkage between citizens and political leaders in ethnically divided societies is scarcely 
programmatic, but rather clientelistic. They explain it like this: ‘support the incumbent party 
and receive transfers in forms of jobs,  income supplements, credit and the like, or opt for the 
opposition and receive none of the desirable benefits’ (p:184). Ultimately, they state that the 
prudent strategy of the voter would certainly be to vote for the incumbent, even if he/she is 
reluctant to do so, unless the voter is not dependent on public sources of income and/or public 
goods, which is not often the case in such settings.  
With regard to ethnic voting, political patronage enables us to understand that ethnic votes are 
often not manifesting loyalty to the party or citizens’ satisfaction with its performance, but it 
is frequently a threat of losing the patronage benefit which inhibits defection. Drawing on the 
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Indian case, Chandra already predicted that in ‘patronage democracies’ a high degree of 
dependence upon the state is associated with higher electoral participation: 
‘There should be a positive relationship between the degree of dependence of voters 
upon the state and turnout rates. Within patronage democracies, therefore, we should 
expect individuals dependent upon the state for their livelihood to turn out in higher 
rates than individuals who, [...] are less dependent’ (2007: 54). 
Following this rationale, the present research looks at the voting behavior of public employees 
and minority ethnic groups, since their voting behavior is considered to be malleable 
according to their patronage interests (benefits).  
 
4. Consequences of ethnic and patronage driven voting behavior for   
    political accountability 
 
 
Voting based on ethnic affiliation and political patronage is shown to generate the ethnic 
voter (Chandra 2007; Horowitz 1985), implying consequences for political accountability. 
In more advanced democracies, elected political representatives usually represent the 
interests and preferences of the citizens. At least, voters elect them with this purpose. 
Accordingly, voters’ evaluations of the government’ performance are usually mirrored in 
their political decisions whether to vote or not and their vote choice. If political 
representatives do not satisfy voters’ preferences and needs, voters’ disenchantment can 
lead to their removal from office. According to Sundström and Stockemer, ‘through 
elections, citizens can choose their representatives, control their governments and make 
their preferences heard’ (2015:4).  It is as simple as that. The question of accountability is 
central to empirical research in any democracy.  
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Unfortunately, this simplistic story line does not hold for all democracies. If we take 
under observation ethnically heterogeneous democracies, which are primarily designed to 
accommodate ethnic divisions, where ethnicity is politicized and the party system in 
place is based on ethnic divisions, such accounts neglect political accountability (Hulsey 
2010; Hulsey and Mujkić 2009; Caspersen 2004). Many empirical studies showed the 
success of ethnic parties, regardless of their performance (Chandra 2007; Birnir 2006). 
The reason why government evaluation is of lesser importance in ethnically divided 
societies is not the presence of ethnic diversity. Scholarly evidence demonstrates that it is 
the ‘politicization of ethnicity’ (Weber et al. 2015). It is precisely when ethnicity is 
considered a key element of politics, on which the political and institutional structure is 
built on. Ethnic identity, than, becomes more easily the driving force of electoral 
behavior. Furthermore, as explained in the previous section, patronage practices and 
ethnic favoritism have better prospects when ethnic divisions are salient. The calculus of 
voting as of pro- or against the incumbent, is not as simple as in other, homogeneous 
democracies. From previous research on ethnic voting and electoral mobilization based 
on patronage incentives, one can conclude that performance voting is not predominantly 
in place in ethnically divided societies. In these contexts voters are shown to evaluate 
parties based on ethnic belonging or patronage prospects, rather than judging their 
achievements in office. 
 
5. Economic voting  
  
Economic voting has been the focus of scholarly attention, which inspected the link between 
economic performance of government and voting for incumbent parties (electoral outcomes) 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
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2000). What is underlined by the theory on economic voting is ‘that voters credit or blame 
governments for their handling of the economy’ (Vries and Giger, 2013:347). In other 
words, it posits that ‘when the economy is doing well, voters will vote for the political 
party in power; but when the economy is performing badly, voters will vote against the 
incumbent party’ (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000:183). Most of the findings build upon 
this ‘responsibility hypothesis’, which has predominantly been empirically confirmed 
(Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Nannestad and Paldam 1994). The economic reasoning is 
performance related, leading to political accountability and ultimately responsiveness towards 
citizens’ preferences.  
Many studies on economic voting moved beyond this ‘reward and punishment’ framework, 
analyzing economic voting in countries with multi-level systems, where potentially different 
responsibility attribution applies.  Referring to Powell and Whitten (1993), Hobolt et al. agree 
‘that complex institutional and governmental structures blur lines of responsibility and make 
it more difficult for voters to assign responsibility and sanction governments on the basis of 
their performance’ (Hobolt et al. 2013:164,165). Different levels of government and coalition 
formations (Anderson 2007), i.e. when there is no clear-cut incumbent government (as in the 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina), add additional complexity towards this research. For such 
cases which are complicated by coalition governments and assume weaker economic voting 
for the coalition as a whole, recent research compared economic voting across every political 
party in the coalition and showed that voters do still engage in economic voting by targeting 
the major party in the coalition, i.e. the party of the Prime minister (Williams et al. 2017; 
Debus et al. 2014).  
Furthermore, even in cases when coalition formations show an obstacle for the evaluation of 
the governments’ economic performance, the literature  found that voters are expected to hold 
the national government accountable for local (municipal) unemployment conditions when 
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local and national economic conditions are correlated, i.e. when unemployment is a socially-
centered and politicized issue, which is the case in high-unemployment contexts, such it is in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Incantalupo 2011), but also in cases where parties in local 
leadership and national government overlap. Besides evaluating the ‘clarity of responsibility’ 
in case of coalition governments, Anderson (2000) and Rowe (2013) refer to the differences 
in economic voting depending on the clarity of alternatives to the incumbent government. 
Lack of alternatives weaken the economic vote, whereas citizens in such contexts mostly 
abstain from voting. 
However, besides the research which links economic performance and vote choice, additional 
strands of research explored the influence of economic circumstances on voter turnout. While 
there is a consensus that vote shares received by the incumbent depend heavily on economic 
conditions, scholars disagree in the effect of economic factors on voter turnout. Notably, two 
rival set of explanations have emerged from the literature. The first set of explanations 
argue that unemployment reduces voter turnout, because economic hardship makes 
citizens less likely to vote (Radcliff 1994, 1992; Southwell 1988; Rosenstone 1982). In 
marked contrast, the second set of explanations contends that economic hardship, and 
especially high levels of unemployment, strongly encourages voter turnout. As citizens 
are more responsive to difficult economic circumstances and negative news, economic 
hardship has a mobilizing effect (Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Fiorina and Shepsle 1990; 
Kernell 1977; Bloom and Price 1975). It is worth noting at this point however, that a 
limited number of studies have asserted that there is no relationship between the 
economic situation and turnout (Arcelus and Meltzer, 1975; Fiorina 1978).  
In the economic voting literature, the individual level on which the political performance 
outcomes are manifested, is called the ‘egotropic’ (selfish) voting level, which refers to 
the voter’s own economic circumstances (or the circumstances of his household). 
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Furthermore, there is the ‘sociotropic’ voting level, that is based on how voters perceive 
the performance of the macro-economy (Nannestad and Paldam 1994). 
Common for most studies on economic voting is their focus on advanced industrial 
democracies in North America and Western Europe  (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2012), where 
the linkage between citizens and politicians is mostly programmatic and economy is the most 
salient issue. In such contexts, the voter evaluates the performance of the political leaders and 
rewards or punishes them according to their actions. Later on, the research was extended to 
economic voting in Southern Europe and post-communist countries, where the presence of an 
economic vote was also determined (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2012; Tucker 2006; Harper 
2000). It found economic voting in these countries to be even stronger than in others, more 
advanced ones, due to less complicated governing coalitions and poor economic 
circumstances (Ibid.). For both of these cases, it can be said that economy is a salient issue 
towards which the electorate is mostly sensitive to. 
What is different in ethnically divided societies is that not economy, but ethnicity is the most 
salient issue, at least for the majority of citizens. Accordingly, the nexus between economy 
and government support is assumed to be further complicated, as voters are shown to support 
political parties independent of their performance, but rather on the basis of their ethnic 
belonging. Greater salience of ethnicity presents a boundary for achieving political 
accountability of the incumbent government, since ethnicity is used for political purposes. 
 
6. Contribution to the scholarly discourse 
 
The contribution of this dissertation lies in improving our understanding of patronage, which 
is subject to the instrumentalist theory of ethnic voting (Chandra 2007). Besides, it is a 
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contribution to our perception and understanding of the scope conditions for the economic 
voting theory, suggesting certain alterations of the theory that facilitate its utilization beyond 
western established and/or advanced democracies, to which it is generally applied. Taking all 
four studies together, the dissertation aims to show that we are eventually wrong to categorize 
democracies strictly into those where voters react to economic performance by holding 
governments accountable and those where voters respond to identity appeals and direct 
material goods. Rather, many different factors, such as electoral frameworks, local contexts, 
issue importance and voter characteristics moderate the relationship between voters’ 
evaluation of the economy and vote choice on election day, leading to variance within, not 
just across democracies1
 
.  
Whereas classical explanations on voting behavior in ethnically heterogeneous societies give 
reason to assume predominantly the presence of ethnic voting, this dissertation dedicates 
greater interest to inspect how economic grievances and political patronage influence voting 
behavior in such societies. This research aims to test if in ethnically divided societies there are 
voting patterns different than ethnic ones. The research design links survey data, macro-
economic indicators and qualitative evidence in order to test the argument about economic 
and patronage driven voting. It assesses the economic voting hypothesis by looking at a least 
likely case where economic voting is expected to occur. The dissertation, thus, reflects in 
greater respect on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (except in Study 3), which is a typical 
case for ethnic voting. Nevertheless, in many aspects it is referred to conditions and 
circumstances, which go beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina and are common for many 
ethnically divided societies, which enables better generalizability of the reached findings. By 
referring to ethnic divisions and consociationalism, as a concept which is in place in many 
divided societies and which incentivizes ethnic voting, it becomes worthwhile to pose the 
                                                          
1 Comment on this PhD Project by Junior Professor Dr. Christina Zuber, University of Konstanz, 17/11/2016 
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same question and expect similar findings for many other countries, which for reasons of data 
constraints were not included in this thesis.  
Many scholars concentrated solely on explaining the ethnic vote, leaving economic voting in 
ethnically divided societies largely unexplored. This may sound plausible, but if we consider 
that voting behavior is caused by a ‘funnel of causalities’, that voters weigh different issues 
distinctively, that besides ethnic belonging, they are sensitive towards economy and 
unemployment, it becomes worthy to look at other factors which go beyond the ethnic 
identity. Such divided societies have often manifested low economic development, which 
should trigger the economic vote. This makes it even more justified to study economic voting 
in such contexts.  
 
7. Case selection  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina presents an interesting case study, where potential alternatives to 
ethnic voting (economic and patronage driven voting patterns) could be tested and the 
presence of political accountability investigated. Why is this so? 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a newly democratized country, held captured by its 
overemphasized ethnic divisions, which are embedded in the institutional framework. 
Considerable scholarly work explained the influence of ethnic identity, state structures and 
institutions on existent voting patterns. The emergence of ethnic parties and ethnic voting 
behaviour in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to a certain extent a legacy of the war, which took 
place from 1992 until 1995 and ended with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, often referred to as the Dayton Agreement. Annex 4 of the Dayton 
Agreement is the country’s Constitution, which in itself froze the ethnic divisions and 
introduced a model of consociational democracy, i.e. power sharing. Ethnic groups in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina have been constitutionally given significance, when described as 
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‘constituent peoples’. The first article of the constitution addresses the composition of the 
country, mentioning that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of the two Entities, the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (hereinafter ‘the Entities’) ’. 
Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs are referred to as constituent peoples (along with Others). 
Ethnic differences are the core standpoint of the fragmented political party system. Almost all 
parties represent and appeal to one certain group. Inter-ethnic party competition does not exist 
in Bosnia. One main reason for that are the implications of the consociational elements. 
Consociational elements, such as defined by Lijphart (proportional representation, grand 
coalitions, segmental autonomy and veto rights) are incorporated in the constitution of the 
country. The political structure of Bosnia is mostly based on ethnicity, cementing ethnic 
divisions and contributing to ineffective governance. Ethnic divisions between Bosniaks, 
Croats and Serbs became visible in the formation of the party system and to this date, they are 
key actors in encouraging ethnic divisions and antagonisms (Kapidzic 2015).  
Having said that, this dissertation finds it worthwhile to pose a research question if the 
importance of ethnic identity does necessarily translate into ethnic voting in ethnically divided 
societies and what role do economic conditions play?  Can we trace signs of retrospective 
voting (evaluating past performance) in such contexts? 
The selected case study is furthermore considered to be suitable for analyzing patronage, due 
to strong ethnic divisions the country manifests between the three existent ethnic groups, 
namely: Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs and for its insufficiently developed institutional 
framework to fight patronage practices. The public sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina makes 
up the largest proportion of employment, for it enables to be referred to it as a ‘patronage 
democracy’, which, according to Chandra (2009), displays extremely unbalanced distribution 
of public and private employment. Furthermore, with patronage democracies, she refers to 
‘democracies in which the state has a relative monopoly on jobs and services, and in which 
elected officials enjoy significant discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs 
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and services at the disposal of the state’ (p.6). All of these preconditions are given in the case 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
8. Status of studies and contribution of co-authors 
 
Study 1: Divide and rule: Economic voting in ethnically divided societies - The case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is single-authored and has received a minor revision decision by 
Politicke perspektive (Political perspectives), a regional journal founded by the Faculty 
of Political Science in Zagreb, Croatia, Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade, Serbia 
and a Serbian Association of Political Studies. 
Study 2: A ‘less ethnic’ jobless voter: The effect of unemployment on turnout and 
electoral success of ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina is single-authored and was 
submitted to Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism. 
Study 3: Closer to the state, closer to the polls? The different impact of corruption on 
turnout among public employees and other citizens is co-authored by Dr. Laura Cabeza 
Pérez, Senior Research Associate at the Cologne Center for Comparative Politics, 
University of Cologne and Stefano Ronchi, PhD candidate at the Research Training 
Group SOCLIFE, University of Cologne and Research Associate at the Department of 
Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute. The study is awaiting the 
publication decision from the International Political Science Review. 
The contributions to the study can be differentiated as follows: 
Sabina Haveric: Development of the research question; review of literature for the 
theoretical framework; partially data preparation. 
Stefano Ronchi: Empirical analysis; discussion and conclusion. 
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Laura Cabeza Pérez: Development of theoretical framework; feedback on empirical 
strategy; data preparation. 
Study 4: No benefits, no vote: The link between political patronage and turnout in an 
ethnically divided society is submitted to Politicka misao: Croatian Political Science 
Review. 
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While it is generally acknowledged that the economy has an effect on voting behaviour, 
there has been little work done on that subject in multi-ethnic societies. Ethnic divisions 
provide incentives for political participation along ethnic lines. This paper investigates 
the extent to which unemployment affects both voter turnout and the electoral success of 
incumbent parties in a multi-ethnic environment. Using data based on national electoral 
results in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the empirical analysis shows that the effect of 
unemployment on voting behaviour is moderated by the level of ethnic division at the 
municipality. Economic voting is present in more homogeneous areas, in which 
unemployment seems to account for more electoral mobilization and less vote for the 
incumbent parties. However, the mechanism is not working in more ethnically 
heterogeneous areas. These findings suggest that ethnic divisions are encouraging lack of 
accountability from the incumbent parties and exculpate them for poor economic 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
‘When you think economics, think elections; 
When you think elections, think economics.’ 
 
(Edward R. Tufte, Political control of the economy, 1978:65) 
 
The fundamental rationale behind elections is simple. ‘Through elections, citizens can 
choose their representatives, control their governments and make their preferences heard’ 
(Sundström and Stockemer 2015:4). Once in office, political representatives are expected 
to respond to citizens demands and address them through appropriate policy outcomes. 
Voters’ evaluations of the government’s performance are usually mirrored in their 
political decisions whether to vote or not and their vote choice. Thus, besides political 
representation, the question of accountability is central to empirical research in any 
democracy. Based on the context, it can be measured along different dimensions. 
Nevertheless, the reward - punishment hypothesis has prominently been examined with regard 
to economic performance. ‘In order to ascertain whether the incumbents have performed 
poorly or well, citizens only need to calculate the changes in their own welfare’ (Fiorina 
1981:5). Hence, the link between economic performance and electoral outcomes, known as 
‘economic voting’, became very popular in research on retrospective (performance) voting 
(Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Rosenstone 1982). Economic voting refers to the influence 
of the economy, at a given time point, on voting patterns. Put simply, it posits that ‘when 
the economy is doing well, voters will vote for the political party in power; but when the 
economy is performing badly, voters will vote against the incumbent party’ (Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier 2000:183). Indeed, there is a firm consensus within the academic literature 
regarding the link between high or rising unemployment (as an macro-economic 
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indicator) and ‘anti-incumbent’ voting (Rogers and Tyszler 2012; Bengtsson 2004; 
Anderson 2000; Downs 1957). 
However, while there is a consensus that vote shares received by the incumbent depend 
heavily on economic conditions, scholars disagree on the effect of economic factors on voter 
turnout. Notably, two rival set of explanations have emerged from the literature. The first 
set of explanations argue that unemployment reduces voter turnout, because economic 
hardship makes citizens less likely to vote (Radcliff 1992, 1994; Southwell 1988; 
Rosenstone 1982). In marked contrast, the second set of explanations contends that 
economic hardship, and especially high levels of unemployment, strongly encourages 
voter turnout. As citizens are more responsive to difficult economic circumstances and 
negative news, economic hardship has a mobilizing effect (Fiorina and Shepsle 1990; Kernell 
1977; Bloom and Price 1975). It is worth noting at this point, however, that a limited 
number of studies have asserted that there is no relationship between the economic 
situation and turnout (Fiorina 1978; Arcelus and Meltzer 1975). 
To date, studies of economic voting have predominantly focused on the cases of established 
democracies—and notably, the United States of America (USA) (Lewis Back and Stegmaier 
(2000:184)—, where economic issues are often of central importance for the general 
population.  Much less attention has been paid to the distinct experience of ethnically-divided 
societies, despite their inherent suitability as a test-case. Ethnically-divided societies are 
frequently characterized by the prevalence of ethnic parties and ethnic voting patterns, even in 
the face of significant and publically-recognized economic challenges. But to what extent do 
ethnic voting patterns supersede economic voting? Is there a relationship between 
unemployment rates and voter turnout in multi-ethnic societies? This paper analyses whether 
unemployment affects both voter turnout and incumbents’ vote share in a context in which it 
has not been analyzed before: divided ethnic societies with elements of consociationalism, 
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which aims at fair representation of different ethnic groups, but provides further incentives for 
political participation along ethnic lines. 
In this paper, I argue that economic voting does exist in ethnically-divided societies. 
Appreciative of the fact that deciding for which political party to vote is much more complex 
and voting behaviour is a result of multiple factors, the aim of this paper is to fill in a small 
part of the ‘funnel’, showing that unemployment level influences voting behaviour and 
turnout even in a multi-ethnic context, where ethnic parties form a basis for the political 
system, per se. However, I hypothesize that the effect of unemployment on voting behaviour  
is influenced by the level of ethnic divisions. As such, economic voting patterns should be 
more likely to be discernible in areas characterized by a homogenous ethnic makeup. In this 
scenario, high levels of unemployment should mobilize citizens to turn out to vote against the 
incumbent political parties. Thus, unemployment should have a positive effect on voter 
turnout and a negative effect on vote share for the incumbent parties. In contrast, in 
ethnically-heterogeneous areas I expect the effect of unemployment on voting behaviour  to 
vanish: I predict no economic voting in these areas. This is because voters in areas where no 
ethnic group has majority status are more likely to refrain from punishing incumbent 
politicians for poor economic performance out of fear that the political representatives from 
other ethnic groups may gain relative political advantage. In short, areas characterized by an 
ethnically diverse population are more likely to display ethnic, rather than economic voting 
patterns. Consequently, I expect unemployment rates to have little to no effect on voter 
turnout and vote share for incumbent parties.  
Economic voting in this study is evaluated on the basis of aggregate level data, by looking at 
the link between the unemployment rate, as the country’s macroeconomic indicator, and 
national election results at the local level. The study focuses on the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as a ‘least likely’ case (Rohlfing 2012; Levy 2008) for non-ethnic (economic) 
voting. Building on earlier work (Bieber 2011, 2003, 1999; Horowitz 1985), this paper 
48 
 
 
 
generates insights on the existence of alternative voting patterns in an ethnically-divided 
society. In this way, the paper adds to contemporary scholarship by enlarging the evidence 
base—and in particular, by reinforcing the link between the economy and electoral outcomes 
in  ethnically-divided societies. 
2. Previous research 
Prior research on voting behaviour has shown vote intention and vote choice to differ due 
to disparate resources, interests and incentives on the individual level, related with socio-
economic, political and institutional characteristics at the aggregate-level (Geys 2006; Verba 
et al. 1995). More specific discussion regarding the effects of  economic conditions on vote 
choice emerged within the literature in the mid-twentieth century (Downs 1957). Many 
scholars have argued that voters’ perception of their government’s economic performance 
directly and consistently affects their voting patterns (for an overview see: Lewis-Beck and 
Paldam 2000). The common standpoint is that, voters will cast a vote and reward the 
government if the economy is strong and vote against (punish) the government if the economy 
deteriorates (Rowe 2013). Earlier studies of economic voting have confirmed that incumbent 
governments are held responsible for the success or stagnation of the economy, and are 
accordingly punished or re-elected. As Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000: 211) have argued, 
‘citizens’ dissatisfaction with economic performance substantially increases the probability 
of a vote against the incumbent’. This type of economic voting is known as ‘incumbency-
oriented’ voting (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2013). 
The literature has refined its initial simplistic argument to include two conditions for the 
existence of economic voting. First, the attribution of responsibility to the government for 
economic performance (Nadeau et al. 2002; Anderson 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). 
Second, the existence of political alternatives, which offer citizens the opportunity to express 
49 
 
 
 
their discontent by voting for another party (Anderson, 2000, 2007; Lewis-Beck, 1988). 
According to Williams et al. ‘in the case of cabinets controlled by one party, voters can easily 
identify which party or leader is responsible for the country’s economic situation’, whereas 
‘coalition governments can make it more difficult for voters to assign credit or blame’ 
(Williams et al. 2017:1,3). Different levels of government and coalition formations (Anderson 
2007), i.e. when there is no clear-cut incumbent government, add additional complexity 
towards this research. Thus, with regard to the first condition, many studies analyzed 
economic voting in countries with multi-level systems, where potentially different 
responsibility attribution applies. For such cases which are complicated by coalition 
governments and assume weaker economic voting for the coalition as a whole, recent research 
showed that voters do still engage in economic voting by targeting the major party in the 
coalition, i.e. the party of the Prime minister (Williams et al. 2017; Debus et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, even in cases when coalition formations show an obstacle for the evaluation of 
the government’s economic performance, the literature  found that voters are expected to hold 
the national government accountable for local (municipal) unemployment conditions when 
local and national economic conditions are correlated and when unemployment is a socially-
centered and politicized issue, which is the case in high-unemployment contexts such it is in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Incantalupo 2011), but also in cases where parties in local 
leadership and national government overlap.  
However, the link between economic hardship and electoral turnout has been less studied 
in the literature. The idea that the economy affects voter turnout was initially developed 
by Rosenstone (1982) and Radcliff (1992). In their seminal works, the authors found that 
individual economic downturns have a demobilizing effect on voting behaviour  and 
people are less likely to vote. The withdrawal from the political system is predominantly 
explained by reduced resources, feelings of alienation and greater attention given to the 
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individual’s own personal circumstances. The dominant message conveyed through the 
scholarly literature is that economic hardship has a discouraging effect on citizens, 
making them less active on the political scene.  Later on, further scholarly contributions 
confronted these results with different findings. One of the central developments refers to 
the finding of a mobilizing effect of unemployment on voter turnout. The mobilizing 
effect of economic hardship on electoral participation is partially linked to empirical 
findings which show that voters reactions to negative changes are more intense than 
reactions towards positive changes (Alvarez et al. 2000). This is known as the ‘grievance 
asymmetry’ (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Rowe additionally contributed to this debate 
by claiming that the ‘decision to vote or not is also contingent upon who there is to vote 
for, and not solely upon whether the macro-economy is good or bad, or whether a person 
is better off now rather than six months ago’ (Rowe 2013:806). Lack of alternatives for 
which citizens could cast a vote, could undermine the economic vote and result in 
abstention (Rowe 2013). 
Nonetheless,  the literature on economic voting received an overwhelming empirical 
confirmation for advanced industrial democracies (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2013; 
Rowe 2013; Weschle 2013; Nadeau et al. 2002; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Lewis-
Beck and Paldam 2000; Alvarez et al. 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). So did the 
investigations of the economy and turnout (Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Southwell 1988; 
Rosenstone 1982; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). Even though 
the literature has evolved and covered more and more countries, it has paid almost no 
attention to ethnically divided countries. Research has thus neglected the link between 
economy and vote choice in ethnically divided societies, where ethnicity is a salient issue and 
ethnic representation is commonly a more important aspect than accountability. Similarly, 
little attention has been paid to the relationship between economic hardship and voter turnout 
in such societies. Indeed, ethnically-divided societies represent a least likely case for 
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economic voting patterns, as economic concerns are likely to be overtaken by ethnically-
motivated matters. Representation of ethnic groups and their empowerment through 
democratic institutions often receive priority in these contexts. The aim is to guarantee these 
ethnic groups to peacefully cohabitate without ethnic conflict and not to underestimate, it is 
often the only solution for keeping a divided country together. Moreover, ethnically divided 
countries are under-researched with regard to economic voting due to the fact that government 
responsibility is more easily assigned in two-party political systems than in collective 
governance systems (power sharing coalitions), which are frequently in place in these 
societies which are divided along ethnic lines. This lack of ‘clarity of responsibility’ 
(Anderson 2000) may also account for the limited research. The incumbent government is 
commonly composed of the main and most popular ethnic parties representing each 
ethnic group. This is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but certainly this selected case 
study is no exception. To defect and vote for the opposition, would mean for the voter to 
vote for a less ethnic, multi-ethnic or non-ethnic party. Some authors consider this 
contrast to be more appropriate and precise to measure economic voting, rather than the 
contrast between incumbents and non-incumbents. However, as regards the theory of 
economic voting in classic terms, it is incumbency oriented so that the ‘elector judges past 
economic performance, and on the basis of that assessment votes for or against the political 
incumbent’(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008:303). Lack of alternatives for which citizens 
could cast a vote or present alternatives which the voter does not perceive sufficiently 
ethnic in their nature, could thus undermine the economic vote and result in abstention 
(Rowe 2013). 
 
For these reasons, previous research on voting behaviour  in ethnically-divided societies has 
focused primarily on ethnic voting patterns and existing incentives for such behaviour, such 
as institutional factors (PR electoral systems and consociationalism), strong ethnic 
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identification, ethnic antagonisms, fear and anxiety (Bieber 1999, 2003, 2011; Andeweg 
2000; Bogaards 1998; Barry 1975). To a large extent, ethnic voting has been attributed to the 
presence of the consociational elements, which are embedded in their democratic structures 
(Hulsey 2010; Manning 2004; Caspersen 2004). Arend Lijphard (1977, 1975) coined the 
concept of consociational democracy, as an archetypal interpretation of power-sharing. It aims 
at fair representation of different ethnic groups, but ironically provides further incentives for 
political participation along ethnic lines (Lijphart 1975, 1977, 1997, 1999). Consociationalism 
is envisaged as a guarantee for a solid democratic future, by offering political representatives 
from different ethnic groups equal share of political power: that is to say, proportional 
representation (Touquet 2011). The rigid institutional design promoted by consociationalism 
is mostly visible through highly decentralized state structures. As noted by Touquet, ‘each 
group must legally be represented in a grand coalition government’ (p.452). Public 
administration is also based on the principle of proportionality (Touquet 2011). The whole 
political system is basically built on ethnic divisions and ethnic parties, aiming primarily to 
offer equal representation for each ethnic group. Ethnic voting is consequently mostly 
practiced in such divided societies, due to the fear of underrepresentation of one’s own ethnic 
group and regardless of the government’s economic performance. Thus, accountability is 
perceived to be of second priority in these contexts. Ethnic representation comes first. Many 
consider consociationalism to be a good characteristic because the minorities are given 
collective rights and equal representation in the government (Cohen 1997; Lijphart 1977, 
1999). Nevertheless, proportional representation (as an important consociational feature) has 
been criticized by many scholars for mobilizing voters along ethnic lines (Rokkan 2009; 
Wilkinson 2006; Reilly et al. 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Horowitz 1985) and for 
exculpating incumbent governments for poor performance, including but not limited to the 
aspect of economy.  
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3. An alternative argument  
 
The aim of this paper is to challenge the dominant standpoint that in an ethnically divided 
society there is only ethnic voting behaviour . I argue that in an ethnically divided society 
higher levels of unemployment stimulate more people to vote and despite the inducing factors 
for ethnic voting patterns (i.e. elements of consocationalism), economic voting is present even 
in such societies. Specifically, this article aims to show that the effect of unemployment on 
both voter turnout and vote share for incumbent parties is moderated by the level of ethnic 
divisions at the municipality level. What is expected is that in more homogeneous areas with 
less ethnic divisions, economic voting behaviour  should be more present. Unemployment is 
expected to have a positive effect on voter turnout and a negative effect on the vote share for 
incumbent parties in homogeneous areas. Building upon the ‘responsibility hypothesis’, 
which presumes that the ‘voter observes the economy, judges its performance and alters 
his/her vote accordingly by rewarding or punishing the incumbent’(Lewis-Beck and Paldam 
2000:119), citizens are supposed to hold the representatives accountable for the economic 
downturn and the economic hardship is expected to mobilize them to a higher degree in order 
to express their discontent and punish the responsible ones. 
By contrast, in more heterogeneous areas the effect of unemployment on voting behaviour  
and turnout will vanish. I predict no economic voting in these areas. The reason is that 
economic voting in mixed ethnic communities could lead to an unfavourable zero-sum 
situation. In these areas where no ethnic group is the majority, it is more risky and costly to 
punish the members of government which you hold responsible for the high unemployment 
because this may help representatives of the other group to grow more powerful. 
Consequently, in more heterogeneous areas I expect unemployment to have no effect on both 
turnout and vote share for incumbent parties.  
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4. Case selection 
Following the theory based case selection strategy, Bosnia and Herzegovina was chosen as a 
least likely case for non ethnic (economic) voting. Besides being economically undeveloped, 
institutionally divided and inefficient, religiously and ethnically heterogeneous, it is mainly a 
suitable case study due to the ‘politicized ethnicity’ (Weber et al. 2015), which makes 
ethnicity a cornerstone of politics and the party system, itself (Hulsey 2010; Manning 2004; 
Caspersen 2004). Thus, determining if Bosnian voters evaluate economic performance of the 
incumbent parties or if they rather take primordial alternatives based on ethnicity, poses a 
valuable task. Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered a deeply divided society. Ethnic 
divisions are omnipresent and ethnicity is a salient issue. According to Kapidzic ‘in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina we may talk about segmented multi-party system with three or four party 
subsystems based on ethno-political social cleavages’ (Kapidzic 2015:20). Annex 4 of the 
Dayton Agreement functions as the country’s Constitution, which  sought to freeze ethnic 
divisions and introduced a model of consociational democracy (power sharing). Ethnic groups 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been given constitutional significance, being described as 
‘constituent peoples’. Significantly, ‘a large autonomy for each ethnic group is guaranteed 
through the highly decentralized state structure’ (Touquet 2011:453). The first article of the 
constitution addresses the composition of the country, stating that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 
shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika 
Srpska (hereinafter ‘the Entities’)’. Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs are referred to as constituent 
peoples (along with Others). According to Kivimäki at al. ‘the prime division of the conflict 
appears to be the disagreement on the form of the state, that is, whether it should continue to 
be a unitary state with the borders as they are today, or whether the door to territorial 
secession of the entities and/or ethnic groups should be opened’ (Kivimäki et al. 2012:19). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the ethnic differences are the crux of the fragmented 
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political party system. Almost all parties represent and appeal to one certain group. Party 
competition does not exist in Bosnia across ethnic lines. One main reason for that are the strict 
implications of the consociational elements. Consociational  elements, such as proportional 
representation, grand coalition, segmental autonomy and veto rights are incorporated in the 
constitution of the country and institutionalized.  All the basic state-political institutions in 
Bosnia are structured according to the principle of proportionality and parity (Kasapovic 
2005). By and large, Bosnia is institutionally designed to accommodate ethnic divisions, 
promoting and aiming rather for representation, than for accountability. However, it is 
worthwhile to ask if the importance of ethnic identity does necessarily translate into ethnic 
voting and what role do economic conditions play? Unemployment is a social phenomenon 
and one of the greatest public concerns in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This ‘Unemployment-in-
Context’, as framed by Incantalupo, makes  the Bosnian electorate an interesting target group 
(Incantalupo 2011).  Bosnia and Herzegovina is a newly democratized country, held captured 
by its overemphasized ethnic divisions which are embedded in the institutional framework. 
Therefore, considerable attention has been put on explaining the influence of ethnic identity, 
state structures and institutions on existent voting patterns. By testing the hypothesis of 
economic voting behaviour  in a party system where ethnic parties are dominant and 
institutional factors conducive for ethnic voting behaviour, the empirical analysis of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina deepens our understanding of the role played by consociational elements, 
including other, similar cases in which ethnic voting would also have been more likely to 
assume. Furthermore, the case study under observation allows for the testing of the economic 
voting theory with regard to the level of ethnic divisions within the country. In this way, it is 
possible to identify variations of voting behaviour  and voter turnout on the basis of different 
levels of ethnic divisions.  
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Consociational features like those present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are also present in 
many other countries, which are also facing similar challenges. As a result, this research has 
implications for other ethically-divided societies.  
 
5. Data   
The ideal data set for this study would be a comprehensive survey of individuals immediately 
after an election, in order to gather information on the evaluation of government economic 
performance, whether they had voted, for which party they voted and if they did not, why not. 
However, unlike in many democratic countries, pre- and post-election surveys do not exist in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Funding, resource and access issues have meant that I have not been 
able to gather individual data of the population to provide an accurate, reliable and unbiased 
account of voting patterns. 
In order to overcome the absence of reliable survey data regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and for the purpose of the analysis, I have created a dataset that includes: the 2014 national 
election results disaggregated by municipality; municipal unemployment rates computed with 
data obtained from the Agency for statistics of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics; and data available on ethnic composition of 
municipalities from the 2013 population census in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Whilst recognizing the limitations of drawing inferences about individual behaviour from 
aggregated data (ecological fallacy (Kramer 1983), individual level data are perhaps not 
even necessary for the purpose of this study. Namely, economic factors could have an 
impact on voting behaviour, even if citizens as voters are not aware of those. Ultimately, 
this would hinder them to express their genuine motives at the ballot box. 
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6. Operationalization  
As an indicator of the state of the economy, I use the unemployment rate, broken down by 
municipality. Unemployment is considered to be the most tangible measure of national 
economic performance. Previous research indicates that while voters show to have a limited 
knowledge of the macro-economy, they are relatively well informed on the issue of 
unemployment (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000).  The unemployment rate is calculated as the 
total number of unemployed citizens out of the total number of working age population.  
Official electoral results at the municipal level were obtained from the Central Election 
Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the year 2014. Two variables are 
constructed. The first variable is voter turnout which is operationalized as the percentage 
of citizens who voted out of the percentage of registered voters. The second variable is 
the incumbents’ vote share.  This variable is operationalized as the percentage of votes 
received by the parties that were in office during the previous political term (2010-2014) 
out of the total valid votes. Out of the 65 parties, 24 independent candidates and 24 
coalitions that were eligible to run for general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, six 
political parties were part of the coalition government at that time2
Data from the 2013 census has been used to determine the ethnic composition of the 
population. I estimate the level of ethnic divisions by a variable ranging from 1-3. Value 
, namely: the Alliance  
of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) the Croatian of 
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) the Croatian Democratic 
Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ), and the Croatian Democratic Union 1990.  
                                                          
2 Data obtained through Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina, www.izbori.ba. 
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1 is attributed to the municipality if one ethnic group is the majority representing more 
than 80 percent of the total population; value 2 is endorsed to the municipality if one 
ethnic group accounts for more than 60 percent of the population; and value 3 is used if 
none of the ethnic groups represent a majority in terms of the number of inhabitants. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into 141 municipalities. Nevertheless, as figures on 
unemployment are not available in six municipalities3
7. Results 
, the total number of units of 
analysis is 135. 
Due to the small number of units of analysis (N=135 municipalities), I use bivariate 
analysis for the purpose of determining the empirical relationship between 
unemployment and election results. Table 1 presents the basic descriptive statistics of the 
computed variables, providing a preliminary summary of the data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Istocni Drvar, Kupres, Vukosavlje, Donji Zabar, Istocni Stari Grad and Istocni Mostar 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Unemployment rate 135 1.25 38.00 18.72 6.76 
Turnout rate 135 19.18 76.33 51.03 9.82 
Incumbents’ vote share 135 29.08 97.50 63.39 15.49 
Level of ethnic division 135 1.00 3.00 1.50 .81 
Valid N (listwise) 135     
 
 
The large differences in unemployment rates between municipalities could have various 
causes. They may be a result of the supply side, since in many rural municipalities work 
is in short supply and accessing the job market is for many very difficult. It is even more 
difficult for reasons of patronage practices. Political patronage as a trade of public sector 
jobs in exchange for votes is very common in such ethnically divided and economically 
underdeveloped societies. Thus, not being close to the patron (political party), results in 
fewer employment chances. With regards to the private sector, there are fewer 
opportunities and certainly a mismatch between smaller and bigger municipalities, as 
well as poorer and more developed municipalities, which can account for the existent 
discrepancy in unemployment rates. Political patronage and voter disenchantment are to a 
certain extent also reasons for the different turnout rates. 
As mentioned in the previous sections, unemployment is expected to have a positive 
effect on voter turnout and a negative effect on the vote share for the incumbent parties in 
ethnically homogeneous municipalities. By contrast, in heterogeneous areas the effect of 
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unemployment on voting behaviour should vanish. Therefore, in ethnically heterogeneous 
areas I expect no effect of unemployment on turnout and vote for the incumbent parties. I 
argue that in more divided areas citizens of one ethnic group fear the growing power of 
the representatives of the other group, and so will not punish the incumbent even if the 
economy is struggling. 
The relation between unemployment rate and election results is assessed using Pearson’s 
correlation analysis. Municipalities have been classified in three groups from less to 
more ethnic heterogeneity (see section 6) and correlation coefficients have been 
computed taken each group separately. The results are showed in table 1. The coefficients 
in the first column show the relation between unemployment rate and voter turnout. The 
coefficients in the second column show the relation between unemployment rate and 
incumbents’ vote share. 
Table 2 
Pearson's correlation coefficients for relation between unemployment rate and voter turnout, and for 
unemployment rate and incumbents’ vote share, by level of ethnic division 
 
Level of ethnic division Voter Turnout Incumbents’ Vote Share 
1 (low) 0,207* -0,479** 
2 (medium) -0,132 -0,291 
3 (high) -0,006 0,570** 
 
* p<0,05, **p<0,01, *** p<0,001  
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7.1. Unemployment rate and voter turnout 
 
Starting with the first column of table 2, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the relation 
between unemployment rate and voter turnout is 0,207 for the municipalities with low levels 
of ethnic division. Although the correlation is low, is statistically significant (p<0,05). The 
higher the unemployment rate, the more voter turnout in municipalities with less ethnic 
heterogeneity. I interpret this finding as evidence suggesting that in more ethnically 
homogeneous areas, unemployment has a mobilizing effect. Abstention decreases in 
municipalities with high unemployment rates. However, in municipalities with medium 
and, specially, high levels of ethnic division, the correlation between unemployment rate 
and voter turnout is almost non-existent and the coefficients are not statistically 
significant. In ethnically heterogeneous areas, economic conditions seem to be 
independent from voter turnout. These data confirm my expectations. While 
unemployment mobilize voters in ethnically homogeneous municipalities, citizens in 
more divided areas do not react to economic conditions. 
Another way to identify the type of relation between economic conditions and voter 
turnout is graphically. Figure 1 shows a scatter plot for unemployment rate and voter 
turnout. Trend lines at the different groups of municipalities according to the level of 
ethnic division (low, medium and high) have been added. 
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Figure 1 
Scatter plot for unemployment and voter turnout by level of ethnic divisions 
 
According to Figure 1, expectations regarding the effect of unemployment on voter turnout 
are confirmed. As hypothesized, there is a positive relation between unemployment rate and 
voter turnout with regard to homogeneous areas. As such, unemployment accounts for a 
mobilizing effect on turnout in municipalities where one ethnic group is numerically 
dominant representing more than 80 per cent of the total population. By contrast, the increase 
of unemployment has no effect on turnout in less homogeneous areas, as suggested by the 
almost flat trend lines for medium and high levels of ethnic division. 
7.2. Unemployment rate and incumbents’ vote share 
Regarding the relation between economic conditions and vote share for the incumbent parties, 
the second column of table 2 shows that the relation between unemployment rate and 
incumbents’ vote share also depends on the level of ethnic division in the municipality. The 
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Pearson correlation coefficient is negative and statistically significant for ethnically 
homogeneous municipalities. That means that the higher the unemployment rate, the less vote 
share for the incumbent parties in areas with low levels of ethnic divisions. This goes in the 
direction established by my expectations, which lays out that economic voting exists in such 
ethnically homogeneous areas and incumbent government is accordingly punished for poor 
economic performance with the loss of votes. 
However, this is not the case in ethnically heterogeneous areas, where we observe the 
opposite scenario. I expected no relation between unemployment rate and support for the 
incumbent parties in non-homogeneous municipalities. In the light of the results of the 
Pearson correlation analysis, it is so in municipalities with medium levels of ethnic divisions, 
where the coefficient is not statistically significant. However, in municipalities with high 
levels of ethnic divisions the correlation coefficient between unemployment and incumbents’ 
vote share is statistically significant and has a value of 0,57, which indicates a strong positive 
relationship (p<0,01). Thus, again as initially expected, the higher the unemployment rate, the 
more vote share for the incumbent parties in ethnically heterogeneous municipalities. This 
finding seems contradictory, but may be explained by the concept of political patronage. 
Political patronage was shown to work better when ethnic divisions are more salient (Kurtovic 
2013; Chandra 2007; Weingrod 1968). It creates ‘an instrumental, benefit - seeking voter’ 
(Chandra 2007:13) who is led by patronage benefits and economic security. Patronage 
benefits are mainly measured through public employment. The positive correlation between 
unemployment and votes for the incumbent in heterogeneous areas can intuitively be 
explained by the expectations of the ethnic group members, that the electoral support of the 
incumbent will reward them with patronage benefits. In other words, if unemployment is 
high, the hope for public employment and benefits related with it, makes the citizens close 
their eyes in front of the struggling national economy, as long as a ‘strategic vote’ for the 
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incumbent can help them to improve their own financial security. The scatter plot showed in 
Figure 2 makes easier the interpretation of the relation between unemployment rate and vote 
share for the incumbent parties.  
Figure 2 
Scatter plot for unemployment and vote share for the incumbents by level of ethnic divisions 
 
 
To sum up, analysis indicates that unemployment is positively associated with voter turnout 
only in municipalities with low levels of ethnic divisions, although correlation is low. The 
relation of unemployment and vote share for the incumbent parties seems to be stronger. 
Pearson coefficients are close or even above +/-0.5. In ethnically homogeneous municipalities 
the more unemployment, the less vote for the incumbent. However, the relation is the opposite 
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in municipalities with high levels of ethnic division. In ethnically heterogeneous 
municipalities, incumbents’ vote share increases as the economic situation worsens. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This paper builds on the academic literature that investigates how the economy influences 
voting behaviour, which has to date tended to focus on more developed democracies. By 
looking at an ethnically divided society with different levels of ethnic divisions, this study has 
sought to test the economic voting theory in a new context. It is a context where ethnicity is a 
salient issue, ethnic representation is of primary importance and the whole political system 
was envisaged to accommodate ethnic divisions and avoid further ethnic conflicts, rather than 
to ensure accountability. This political context of an ethnically divided society makes it 
appealing to examine whether voters in these circumstances hold incumbents to account 
for poor economic performance and if there is any relationship between unemployment 
and voter turnout. The paper argues that economic voting does exist in divided societies 
and that the unemployment rate mobilizes citizens to vote, rather than making them 
withdraw from the political realm.   
The results reveal, however, that the effect of economic conditions on voting behaviour  
is moderated by the level of ethnic divisions in the municipality. Economic voting is 
present in more homogeneous areas, in which unemployment has a double effect. On one 
hand, it seems to account for more electoral mobilization (higher voter turnout). On the 
other hand, it decreases vote shares for the incumbent parties. Nevertheless, the results 
are not the same for more ethnically heterogeneous municipalities, in which there is not a 
numerically dominant ethnic group. In fact, in areas in which the level of ethnic divisions 
is high, unemployment rate does not affect voter turnout. In such scenario, the analysis 
has showed even higher support of the incumbent parties as unemployment rate 
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increases. The higher support of the incumbent is assumed to be evident due to reasons of 
patronage benefits these voters may more easily acquire if the incumbent parties 
(representing their ethnic group) are in power. For the incumbent parties such a political 
setting is suitable and according to the concept ‘divide and rule’, this strategy enables 
them not to be responsive of citizens’ preferences and needs, but to be reelected, 
nonetheless. They keep encouraging divisions among the different ethnic groups, in order 
to get exculpated for poor performance. 
Taken together, these results tell a rather sad story. They show that ethnic divisions are 
encouraging lack of accountability from the incumbent parties, which reiterate other 
findings, also using municipality-level data although with a slightly different focus 
(Hulsey 2010; Manning 2004; Caspersen 2004). This study, however, relates to the 
economic dimension. Taking into consideration that governments can be held accountable 
along different dimensions, it may be a sign of accountability along the ethnic dimension. 
Nevertheless, the findings of this study show that the rational calculus of voting as seen 
by Downs (1957) is not entirely applicable in divided societies. Not all individuals do 
vote for the political party that provides them with the highest level of individual 
benefits—that is to say, out of self-interest. Remembering that ethnically divided and 
conflicted societies lack ethnic safety, security and integrity of the state in general, voters 
give importance to these aspects, as  well. 
Despite the fact that the results of this study are inferred from aggregates to individuals 
and are open to ecological fallacy charges, a number of other studies have confirmed the 
analysis of aggregate data as a reliable and accurate method of data collection. Besides, 
individual level data are perhaps not necessary for the purpose of this study, because 
economic factors could be influencing voting behaviour, even if citizens as voters are not 
conscious of those. Ultimately, this would hinder them to express their genuine motives 
at the ballot box.  
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The present research reveals some interesting findings while testing the hypothesis that 
community-level ethnic diversity affects the magnitude of the economic vote and level of 
turnout.  As far as economic conditions are concerned, which this research linked to 
voting behaviour, it used municipality level unemployment data for one time point. By 
expanding the research and looking at unemployment rates over time, the argument 
would be highly strengthened. 
This study has introduced the question of economic voting in a new setting, namely an 
ethnically divided society. It encourages further research on this topic, both in terms of a 
wider pool of case countries, as well as further testing the argument for the same case by 
using different data sources and time series data.   
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Study 2 A ‘less ethnic’ jobless voter: The effect of unemployment on turnout and electoral success of ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Sabina Haveric 
 University of Cologne 
 
Abstract 
Political parties in societies which are divided along ethnic lines often extract electoral rents 
based on the political salience of ethnicity. This is repeatedly the case notwithstanding their 
performance. Thus, the electoral success of ethnic parties can potentially signal lack of 
political accountability. But does this claim hold for the whole electorate? Importance of 
certain issues may vary for different voters, even in such political contexts. Accordingly, this 
paper analyzes whether unemployment is associated with a higher or lower likelihood of 
voting for the main ethnic parties. Beside the vote choice, this study empirically tests whether 
unemployment has a positive or negative effect on turnout in the context of an ethnically 
divided society, where unemployment is of public concern. Based on individual level survey 
data for Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is shown that voters’ evaluations of government 
performance affect their likelihood of voting for governing ethnic parties only among the 
unemployed, whereas it does not have any effect among the rest of the population. Ultimately, 
this finding signals the presence of economic voting based on personal economic hardship. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The central objective of representative democracy is to encourage citizens to participate 
in politics and ensure representation which will best serve the interests of the population 
(Dahlberg and Solevid 2016). Elections are a suitable mechanism for voters to ensure 
political accountability and hold governments responsible for their past actions 
(Przeworski et al. 1999). The principle of accountability serves the purpose of making 
political representatives responsive towards voters’ preferences and needs. In every 
election they are being evaluated by citizens and rewarded or punished, accordingly. 
This, at least, is how political accountability and government legitimacy should be 
warranted in an established democracy. 
However, not all democracies are the same. The context in which accountability is tested, 
matters. Vote choice in ethnically divided societies is often determined by ethnicity. In 
different ways citizens feel incentivized to vote along extremist ethnic lines. The ethnic 
vote may be generated out of fear to put their ethnic group status under risk, out of one’s 
own ethnic persuasion to vote according to personal feelings of ethnic belonging or for 
reasons of institutional encouragement. Ultimately, voting in such societies is often viewed 
as an ‘ethnic census’ and a matter of demographics (Horowitz 1985) In such settings, 
evaluation of government performance does not necessarily play a role when casting a 
ballot. Retrospective voting based on policy outcomes and performance is therefore more 
difficult to achieve in societies where ethnic belonging is a salient issue. In cases where 
ethnicity is politicized, meaning that ethnic practices are additionally encouraged through 
state institutions (Weber et al. 2015), performance voting is even more difficult to be in 
place.  
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Ethnic issues contaminate the electoral process and change the purpose of elections. 
Therefore, elections often do not serve as a mechanism of ensuring political 
accountability. Rather, they revive ethnic intolerances and cleavages, allowing ethnic 
parties to monopolize the electoral competition. The presence of ethnic politics and 
politicized ethnicity makes the citizens hostages of a political system, where elections 
mainly serve the goal of solely guaranteeing ethnic representation, despite government’s 
performance and independent of citizens’ positive or negative evaluations of their past 
actions. These circumstances account for the lack of threat of losing office, which would 
otherwise discipline politicians to be more responsive towards the needs of the citizens and 
make them accountable in case of bad evaluation of their performance. 
The aim of this study is to undertake a deeper inspection of demonstrated research findings 
which show a weak link between government performance and voting behaviour in ethnically 
divided societies. Perpetuation of identity voting  and support ‘for the same guys’ (Hulsey 
2010), that stand for ethno-nationalist claims, signal lack of political accountability. However, 
by relying on individual level data available in the European Values Survey (2008) and 
testing the above-mentioned assumptions on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this study 
finds signs of accountability in the context of an ethnically diverse setting. Obtained results 
show that evaluations of government performance affect the likelihood of voting for 
governing ethnic parties only among the unemployed, whereas it does not have any effect 
among the rest of the population. Ultimately, this finding signals the presence of egotropic 
(personal) economic voting in an ethnically divided society. 
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2. Political accountability through performance voting  
 
Elected political representatives are considered to most adequately represent the interests 
and preferences of the citizens. Voters’ evaluations of the government’s performance is 
usually mirrored in their political decisions whether to vote or not and their vote choice. 
The rationale behind it is that ‘the past is used as an indicator of the future’ (Chappell and 
Keech 1985:10). If political representatives do not maximize citizens’ welfare, they risk 
being sanctioned by not being re-elected. ‘When governments perform well, they are 
rewarded with continued support of the electorate, and when they fail to live up to 
expectations they are removed from office’ (Hellwig 2010:149). Performance voting is 
seen through the prism of the reward-punishment hypothesis and allows citizens to make 
a voting decision retrospectively (Key 1966). According to Key, the voter acts ‘as an 
appraiser of  the past events, past performance and past actions’ (Key 1966:61). Elections 
provide a mechanism to control the elected representatives and to articulate the preferences of 
citizens.  It is as simple as that. The question of accountability and performance voting is 
central to empirical research in any democracy (Vries and Giger 2013; Hellwig 2010; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Adserà et al. 2003; Przeworski et al. 1999). 
Economic conditions at the macro and micro level are most commonly used as measures of 
government performance (Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Samuels and Hellwig 2010; 
Kellermann and Rattinger 2006; Bengtsson 2004; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). Economic 
voting refers to the influence of the state of economy on voting patterns. It builds upon 
the ‘responsibility hypothesis’ which postulates that voters hold the government 
responsible for economic affairs (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 
2000;  Nannestad and Paldam 1994; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). In other words, it posits that 
‘when the economy is doing well, voters will vote for the political party in power; but 
when the economy is performing badly, voters will vote against the incumbent party’ 
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(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000:183). The individual level on which the political 
performance outcomes are manifested, is called the ‘egotropic’ (personal, selfish or 
pocketbook) voting level, whereas the ‘sociotropic’ voting level is based on how voters 
perceive the performance of the macro-economy (Nannestad and Paldam 1994). Economic 
voting has been studied in great detail for decades. It has been viewed as a central point when 
researching political accountability, claiming that the government needs to be rewarded or 
blamed and punished, accordingly, depending on the state of economy. This reasoning is 
performance related, leading to political accountability and ultimately responsiveness towards 
citizens’ preferences.  
Most studies on economic voting focused on established democracies, where citizens perceive 
economy as the most salient issue and respond to economic conditions. Nevertheless, 
previous literature demonstrates that issue importance mediates performance voting (Fournier 
et al. 2003). Individuals evaluate governments’ performance based on the importance they 
give towards this issue. This allows the skepticism of this study to assume that all voters in an 
ethnically divided society vote along ethnic lines. For the unemployed citizens, economy 
might have greater importance, despite the suitable environment for ethnic voting. However, 
the economic voting literature did little to incorporate democracies which are heterogeneous 
in their ethnic composition and where ethnic belonging is the most important public concern. 
This present research aims to confront this shortcoming by exploring if performance related 
voting behavior is present in an ethnically diverse society, i.e. if unemployment affects 
turnout and vote choice in such contexts. Such finding would namely advance our knowledge 
of voting patterns and political accountability in these societies. 
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3. Accountability and voting patterns in ethnically divided societies  
 
Unfortunately, not everywhere do citizens evaluate governments according to their 
performance. Accordingly, the reward and punishment hypothesis does not find 
application in all democracies. Political conditions influence the performance-based vote 
(Hellwig 2010). Thus, political accountability is found to be more complex to achieve in 
ethnically heterogeneous democracies, where ethnicity serves as a political tool and the 
party system in place is based on ethnic divisions (Hulsey 2010; Hulsey and Mujkić 2009; 
Caspersen 2004). In this respect, Feree notes: 
 
‘And even if democracy survives, the unfailing tendency of dominant groups to 
support a single party may loosen the chains of accountability between voters and 
leaders, reducing incentives for politicians to pursue policies in the broad interest 
of the country. Ethnic electorates, in other words, may give their leaders too much 
slack, allowing them to go unpunished for poor decisions and negative outcomes’ 
(Ferree 2004:1). 
Many empirical studies showed the success of ethnic parties, despite their poor 
performance (Chandra 2007; Birnir 2006). The reason why government evaluation 
becomes of lesser importance in ethnically divided societies is not only the presence of 
ethnic diversity. Scholarly evidence demonstrates that it is the ‘politicization of ethnicity’ 
(Weber et al. 2015). It is precisely when ethnicity becomes the cornerstone of politics and 
the crucial element on which the political and institutional structure is built on. In this 
case ethnic identity becomes more easily the driving force of electoral behavior.  
Four standard views theorize what drives ethnic voting and why ethnicity becomes more 
politically salient than performance.  The first view frames that ethnic identity determines 
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ethnic voting, which derives psychological benefits for the voter, for whom ethnicity is the 
driving force of the voting behaviour. The ‘expressive voting hypothesis’ is postulated by 
Horowitz (1985), whereby ethnic voters use their votes solely to register their identity as 
members of ethnic groups. Voting in these cases is often regarded as an ethnic census, it is a 
sign of allegiance to an ethnic group and affirmation of one’s own identity. As noted by 
Ferree, ‘elections become a rubber stamp for demographics, a mere ‘counting of heads’’ 
(Ferree 2004:1).  
The second view emphasizes the significance of institutional factors which are conducive 
for ethnic voting patterns (Blais 2006; Horowitz 1985). This literature embraces 
consociationalism and electoral systems with proportional representation (PR), as factors 
which promote ethnic voting (Rokkan 2009; Wilkinson 2006; Reilly et al. 1999; Sisk and 
Reynolds 1998). Electoral procedures and mechanisms have a crucial role in influencing 
the stability of the political order, especially in post-conflict societies. Reilly notes that 
different variations in electoral procedures do play a key role in determining political 
competition and whether it evolves around extremist or moderate lines (Reilly 2002). The 
influence of consociationalism and proportional representation, which it considers essential 
for divided societies, is agreed to further encourage ethnically based parties and politics 
(Rokkan 2009; Wilkinson 2006; Reilly et al. 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998). It has received 
vast criticism for cementing ethnic divisions and legitimizing ethnic voting (Horowitz 1985). 
Truth is that in ethnically divided societies, accommodation of different ethnic groups 
and establishing peace have often been achieved through consociational arrangements. 
These settlements centre on ethnic groups as crucial constituents of a political system and 
ethnic autonomy as ‘another important consociational feature’ (Caspersen 2004:573). 
Power-sharing is envisaged to enable all ethnic groups to have their political 
representation. In turn, this should guarantee peaceful coexistence and inter-ethnic 
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cooperation. Many examples demonstrate, though, that this solution implies risks of 
creating even greater ethnic divisions and democratic instability. Consociational elements 
can thus be perceived to contaminate the electoral process and change the purpose of 
elections (Andeweg 2000; Bieber 1999; Barry 1975). 
According to the third view, ethnic voting is explained as an act driven by clientelist 
aspirations and patronage practices. Clientelist parties ensure benefits for voters who offer 
them their political support  (Hidalgo and Nichter 2016; Stokes et al. 2013; Chandra 2007). In 
an ethnically divided society, ethnic belonging is considered an important factor for obtaining 
patronage benefits (Chandra 2007). Chandra theorizes about ‘calculated voting’, referring 
to it as a theory of voting in patronage democracy. In her view, voters in ‘patronage 
democracies’ use their vote as an instrument through which to obtain patronage benefits, 
whereby they expect to obtain greatest access to patronage benefits from politicians 
belonging to their ‘own’ ethnic group. Strong ethnic divisions make it easier for the patrons 
to target their co-ethnics. Patronage politics and ethnic favouritism, thus, go hand in hand 
(Gisselquist 2014; Isaksson and Bigsten 2013; Chandra 2007; Alesina et al. 1999). Political 
patronage shapes voting behaviour in such divided societies, where political circumstances 
and insufficiently developed democratic mechanisms allow for electoral advantages of ethnic 
parties to be traded efficiently for patronage rewards. 
The fourth view is closely related to the prisoner’s dilemma argument, as defined by 
Stojanovic (2014). By analyzing the Bosnian case, he argues that even non-ethno-nationalist 
voters vote for ethnic parties, not because they are driven by strong feelings of ethnic 
identification, but because they ‘ended up in a rational-cognitive trap which resembles the 
prisoner’s dilemma game’ (Stojanović 2014:11). He refers to this behaviour as a ‘typical 
collective action problem’ (p.2), suggesting that citizens in ethnically heterogeneous 
democracies may even prefer to vote non-ethnically and to evaluate government´s 
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performance before casting a vote, but rationally it is considered a very risky, zero-sum 
option. It could potentially put under threat the collective ethnic group status. This explains to 
a large extent why ethnic parties mostly benefit from such political climate, because voters are 
convinced to believe that political life should be dictated by ethnic divisions and not based on 
interest, politics and performance (Hulsey and Mujkic 2009).  In the same vein, it answers the 
question ‘Why did they vote for those guys again’, as questioned by Hulsey when discussing 
the challenges and contradictions in the promotion of political moderation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Hulsey 2010). 
 
4. The other side of the coin 
 
How is political accountability modified by political context where ethnic divisions are 
highly salient gives impulse to the present research. Studies examining performance 
voting in societies with prevailing ethnic issues, are rather scarce. This study attempts to 
examine that link between the evaluation of government performance and voting behaviour in 
a political arena, which stimulates ethnic voting and presents a fertile ground for the 
success of ethnic parties. Highly politicized ethnicity, institutional incentives for ethnic 
voting and ethnic outbidding (Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972), as a ‘party 
strategy in ethnically heterogeneous societies to appeal to voters on the basis of their ethnic 
identity’ (Zuber and Szöcsik 2015:784), are accounting for the success of ethnic politics.  
Besides testing political accountability in an ethnically diverse setting, this study aims to 
show that government evaluations have different effect on voting for main ethnic parties 
among unemployed citizens and the rest of the population. By inspecting this economy-vote 
link (Anderson 2007), this study additionally touches upon the economic voting scholarship 
on the micro level. It expects to show that personal economic hardship affects the link 
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between government evaluation and vote for main ethnic parties (egotropic voting). Even in 
this political context, unemployed citizens perceive economy as another salient issue. 
Their voting behavior can thus signal different ‘issue importance’ (Fournier et al. 2003). 
When the economic wellbeing of citizens is neglected by overly present ethnic issues, the 
unemployed don’t feel adequately represented. Political elites in such contexts take 
advantage of ‘ethnic fractionalizations’ (Horowitz 1985). They generate political 
instability, which enables them to remain in office and maintain power over public 
resources. This, eventually, leads to lack of trust in the political process, political change and 
different policy outcomes, for unemployed are expected to abstain more and vote less for 
ethnic parties. Furthermore, since ethnic voting is often related to patronage driven 
motivations (Chandra 2007; Kopecký et al. 2016), the unemployed are expected to cast less 
votes for main ethnic parties (ethnic votes), with the intention to break the patronage chain 
and shift to a merit based system. 
5. Data and case selection  
 
 
 
This paper uses individual level data from the European Values Study (EVS), which was 
conducted in 2008.  Specifically, the employed data refers to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
is considered a suitable case to test the accountability hypothesis. The country’s ethnic 
divisions and high politicization of ethnicity, which emerged after the conflict (1992 - 1995), 
make Bosnia and Herzegovina an appealing case study for this analysis. Main ethnic parties in 
Bosnia, which are often referred to as ‘wartime ethno-nationalist parties’ (Manning 2004; 
Caspersen 2004), managed to monopolize the political arena of electoral competition even 
twenty years after the conflict (Manning 2008), triggering the interest of this study and 
whether this is performance related or not. 
83 
 
 
 
This study made use of the survey data which tackled perceptions of citizens in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina regarding turnout and vote choice. The sample consists of 1512 individuals in 
the dataset. The relevant questions asked were if citizens would vote if general elections were 
held tomorrow and for which political party they would vote for. Among twenty five political 
parties present in the questionnaire, six were treated as main ethnic ones in this study. Thus, 
this study considers ethnic voting as voting for two main ethnic wartime parties from each of 
the three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Touching upon the commonalities Bosnia and Herzegovina has with other ethnically divided 
and newly established democracies, this research allows for generalizability of the reached 
tentative findings. 
 
6. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Politicization of ethnicity in the Bosnian case is manifested through the incorporation of the 
ethnic principle throughout the whole activity of the nation state (Manning 2004). The 
functioning of the Bosnian state, as seen in many other consociational democracies, centres on 
ethnic belonging (Merdzanovic 2017; Kasapovic 2005; Bieber 2003, 1999). The protection of 
ethnic groups is guaranteed through the state apparatus, leaving little space for integrative 
politics and performance-oriented voting behaviour. 
The political history of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been characterized by the coexistence 
and the conflict of three major religious and ethnic segments: Catholic (Croatian), Muslim 
(Bosniak), and Orthodox (Serbian) (Kasapovic 2005). The emergence of ethnic parties and 
ethnic voting behavior in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to a certain degree the legacy of the war, 
which took place from 1992 until 1995 and ended with the General Framework Agreement 
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for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, often referred to as the Dayton Agreement . Beside the 
state and entities, the levels of authority in Bosnia, according to the Dayton Agreement, go 
even further following the division of the country in cantons, cities and municipalities. Ethnic 
groups have been given significance constitutionally, when described as ‘constituent peoples’.  
The constitution itself froze the ethnic divisions and introduced a model of consociational 
democracy, i.e. power sharing (Weller et al. 2013; Manning 2008). As noted by Manning, 
within the constitutional stipulations of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the electoral arena was 
split into ethnic blocks (Manning 2004). In this line, political parties look after votes of a 
single ethnic community, which is in line with the ethnic outbidding theory. 
The continuous support for wartime ethnic parties in Bosnia has been explored by different 
scholars (Stojanović 2014; Kapidžić 2014; Hulsey 2010; Manning 2008, 2004; Caspersen 
2004; Bieber 2004). All of them show little prospects for accountability mechanisms to 
develop and exist, but none of them empirically tests this hypothesis. According to Manning, 
electoral politics in Bosnia has failed to promote substantive political change in the direction 
of moderation. She shows that the wartime ethnic parties manage to stay in office for reasons 
of constitutional provisions which by and large secure the ethno-national dimension. She 
further notes the following: 
 
‘Electoral engineering has done little to undermine the strength of the nationalist 
wartime parties, who have found plenty of room to maintain their electoral appeal by 
preserving the control over economic resources they gained in wartime, and by 
collaborating with one another to prevent the passage of reforms that might undermine 
their ability to exploit ethno-nationalism to win elections’ (Manning 2004:75). 
 
Hulsey (2010) also presents Bosnia and Herzegovina as a classic case of party politics gone 
wrong, where the ethnic cleavages paved the way for success of ethno- parties, no matter of 
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their performance. He notes that because of historic or recent wartime events, Bosnian voters 
are predisposed to vote ethnically, but the ethnic party system is certainly an encouragement 
for such behavior. Due to its centrifugal political competition, the target of political elites are 
demands of their ethnic groups and not ‘centrist votes (centripetal competition) ’, like in non-
ethnic party systems (Hulsey 2010:1140). Caspersen  (2004) notes different support for ethnic 
parties, based on the ethnic composition of municipalities, showing greater extremism and 
voting for ethnic parties in heterogeneous municipalities, rather than homogeneous ones. This 
is explained with greater necessity to defend the group status in heterogeneous municipalities. 
Contrary to the above-mentioned research, this study aims to test the political accountability 
hypothesis for the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by exploring if the evaluation of 
government performance is linked with ethnic voting (voting for main ethnic wartime parties) 
and if unemployment affects the relationship between these two variables. 
 
7. Empirical analysis  
 
In order to observe how voters’ evaluations of government performance affect their likelihood 
of voting for main ethnic parties, I used a logistic regression. The dependent variable in this 
analysis is ‘vote for the main ethnic parties’, created from the answers to the posed question 
on vote choice. It is measured by a dichotomous variable, where 1 implies the vote for main 
ethnic parties specified above, and 0 otherwise. 
The classification of parties was made using the Categorization of political parties and 
electoral lists from Daniel Bochsler4
                                                          
4 Bochsler Daniel, Schläpfer Basil, The Distribution of Ethnic Identities in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina: A 
New Estimation Approach, CIS Working Paper Nr. 81 , 2013 published by the Centre for Comparative and 
International Studies (ETH Zurich and University of Zurich)   
. Voting for main ethnic wartime parties can be 
considered as voting in ethnic terms for the following reasons: Main ethnic parties were the 
protagonists of the war that occurred in Bosnia after its first multi-party elections in 1990.  
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Since then, the political life in Bosnia revolves around these parties (Caspersen 2004). For 
Bosniaks, that is the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), for Serbs the Serbian Democratic 
Party (SDS) and for Croats the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(HDZ). For this reason, Hulsey noted that ‘the Bosnian party system is best viewed as three 
separate party systems, one for each ethnicity’ (Hulsey 2010:1135). Later on, some 
‘challenger ethnic parties’ (Ibid.) appeared, which were initially less ethno-nationalistic, but 
soon changed their political discourse and could hardly be differentiated from the wartime 
ethnic ones. These parties can also be subsumed under the main nationalist ones. For Serbs, 
this is the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), which became one of the 
leading main ethnic parties, the Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990) as another 
challenger main ethnic party for the Croats and the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) 
for the Bosniaks. These parties are referred to as main ethnic ones. They started off and 
remained least willing to compromise on inter-ethnic issues (Caspersen 2004). Notably, there 
are many other parties which can be classified as ethnic5
                                                          
5  See Categorization of political parties and electoral lists from Daniel Bochsler and Schläpfer Basil: Bochsler 
Daniel, Schläpfer Basil, The Distribution of Ethnic Identities in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina: A New 
Estimation Approach, CIS Working Paper Nr. 81 , 2013 published by the Centre for Comparative and 
International Studies (ETH Zurich and University of Zurich). 
, but these six are archetypes, 
standing for clear ethnic lines, lack of inter-ethnic accommodation, plus they form the biggest 
government blocks. Two leading ethnic parties for Serbs, considered as main ethnic, are 
classified as such also for their emphasis of policies and rhetoric based on guarding and 
preserving the existence of Republika Srpska (Serb inhabited entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina), 
which many consider is an illegitimate creation of aggression and genocide. One very 
important feature of these six political parties is their enormous political influence, capacious 
personnel and control over state (entity) owned enterprises. They control a great number of 
government owed enterprises. The fearful population overly encourages their political 
leadership, sacrificing its well being and a possibility for political change for the victory of 
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ethnic identity, strong ethno-nationalist structures and patronage benefits. For the year 2008, 
these political parties were incumbent.6
The main explanatory variable is ‘evaluation of the government’, which is measured on a 
scale from 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good). This variable is complemented by further control 
variables, namely: employment, education, income, importance of religion, importance of 
politics, confidence in political parties, membership in a political party, ideology, gender, size 
of town and age. Logistic regression is applied in this study to test the vote for main ethnic 
parties. In order to show whether voters’ evaluations of government performance affect their 
likelihood of voting ethnically (for either one of the prototype ethnic parties), two models 
were estimated. The first model estimates the effect government evaluation has on vote for 
main ethnic parties among all respondents. The second model adds an interaction between 
unemployment and evaluation of the government.  
Accordingly, this allows the analysis of the link 
between unemployment and vote. 
Table 1. presents the basic descriptive statistics of the computed variables, providing a 
preliminary summary of the data. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Central Election Commission Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at www.izbori.ba. 
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable 
 
Value 
 
 
Vote for the main ethnic party 
 
44.8% 
Government evaluation, on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good) 3.49 
Unemployed 26.7% 
Primary education 11.0% 
Secondary education 76.6% 
Tertiary education 12.4% 
Household income, on a scale from 1(<€150 ) to 7 (€2000 to €2500) 2,6 
Importance of religion, on a scale from 1 (not important) to 4 (very important) 3,04 
Importance of politics, on a scale from 1 (not important) to 4 (very important) 2,22 
Confidence in political parties, on a scale from 1 (no confidence) to 4 (full) 1,73 
Membership in a political party 4,4% 
Ideology - left 16,9% 
Ideology - right 26,6% 
Gender - male 45,2% 
Size of town, on a scale from 1 (<2000 inhabitants) to 8 (≥500.000 inhabitants) 2,67 
Age (mean) 42,1 
 
8. Results 
Before showing results of the logistic regression, I present the inspected difference in voting 
behavior between two groups: the employed and unemployed citizens. What is shown in the 
bivariate analysis, is that unemployed citizens abstain more and vote less for main ethnic 
parties. On the other side, employed citizens vote more for main ethnic parties and abstain 
less. 
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Figure 1 
Voting behavior of employed and unemployed citizens 
 
 
Previous research explained this finding to be due to less education and fewer resources on 
the side of the unemployed population. There is common agreement in the literature that 
education positively impacts political participation. Higher education is associated with 
increased participation (Hillygus 2005). This reasoning, however, does not hold in the 
Bosnian case (Figure 2). When inspecting abstention among unemployed citizens with 
different education levels, I observe that the percentage of abstention is highest among 
citizens with high education levels, followed by medium and low education. Looking at the 
political context, one may find such behaviour even reasonable. In ethnically divided 
societies, where ethnicity is a salient issue, government representatives manage more easily to 
stay in power by focusing on ethnic divisions and fostering further ethnic antagonisms. For 
reasons brought up in Section 3 of this paper, voters keep voting for ethnic parties. The 
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educated ones, though, decide to abstain in order not to legitimize the government and the 
dishonest political process. Education in ethnically divided societies leads, thus, to lower 
participation. Similar rationale was put forward by Croke at al. (2016). Additionally, they 
claim that: 
‘[...] existing accounts of the positive effect of education on participation implicitly 
assume that countries have an institutional environment and a civic culture that might 
be absent in many developing countries’ (Croke et al. 2016:579). 
Instead of reinforcing the ethnic rule, the unemployed, as the most educated ones, decide to 
abstain and refrain from the political process which is not perceived as a genuine arena for 
citizens’ preferences and needs. 
Figure 2 
Percentage of abstention among the unemployed with different education levels 
 
The higher abstention rates among the unemployed can additionally be brought in line with 
previous scholarship, which demonstrated that unemployment reduces voter turnout, as 
citizens withdraw from the political system (Radcliff 1994; Radcliff 1992; Southwell 
0,0 
10,0 
20,0 
30,0 
40,0 
50,0 
60,0 
70,0 
Low education Medium education High education 
91 
 
 
 
1988; Rosenstone 1982). According to Burden and Wichowsky (2014), citizens feel 
alienated from the political process and distracted by personal circumstances. Furthermore, 
political instability is generated by ‘ethnic fractionalizations’ (Horowitz 1985), enabling 
political elites to take advantage of these negative circumstances, as to remain in office and 
maintain power over public resources. Distrust in political change and non-responsiveness 
towards economic insecurities of citizens is expected to drive higher abstention rates among 
the unemployed. Ultimately, since ethnic voting is often related to patronage driven 
motivations (Kopecký et al. 2016; Chandra 2007), the unemployed (as the ones not proximate 
to the patron) are expected to cast less votes for main ethnic parties, intending to break the 
patronage chain and shift to a merit based system. 
I now proceed to the results of the logistic regression. The main results shown in Table 2 
suggest that voters’ evaluations of government performance do not affect their likelihood of 
voting for main ethnic parties. Votes cast by citizens in ethnically divided societies are shown 
not to be performance related. This finding corroborates the previous literature on ethnic 
voting, which is often identity or patronage driven (McEvoy and O’Leary 2013, Lindberg and 
Morrison 2008; Chandra 2007; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972) or a result of 
institutional factors (Huber 2012; Reilly 2012; Reilly et al. 1999).  
The interaction effect indicates, though, that unemployment influences the relationship 
between voters’ evaluations of government performance and voting for main ethnic parties. 
Voters’ evaluations of government performance affect their likelihood of voting for main 
ethnic parties only among the unemployed, whereas the effect diminishes among the rest of 
the population. Additionally to the considerable scholarly evidence, which explains the impact 
unemployment has on voter turnout (Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Incantalupo 2011; Blount 
2002;  Rosenstone 1982), this study shows in what way unemployment has implications for 
political accountability. It demonstrates egotropic economic voting (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 
2000), since the main ethnic parties were incumbent in 2008, when the survey was conducted. 
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The findings show that the voter holds the government accountable for his own (or 
household’s) economic conditions. Such observations can also be analyzed in light of the 
unemployment situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina which has lasted for the whole duration 
of the post-war period and presents one of the main public concerns. The unemployment rate 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina averaged 43 percent from 2007 until 2016, reaching its peak of 46 
percent in 2013.7
 
 The results can thus point to the disappointment of the unemployed citizens 
about their personal economic wellbeing, whereas they shift blame to ethno-centric politicians 
who are interested in maintaining the status quo on which their political power rests. This 
status quo is generating politics of fear and inter-ethnic tensions, praising inefficient 
consociational features and looking away from the crucial social and economic problems the 
general population is facing: no jobs and lack of economic security.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7  Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Table 2 
Logistic regression - vote for the main ethnic parties 
 
Model 1 
 
 Model 2 
(interaction) 
 
Evaluation of government 0,045  0,011  
 (0,038)  (0,042)  
Unemployed -0,646 *** -1,170 *** 
 (0,189)  (0,359)  
Unemployed*Evaluation of government -  0,158 † 
   (0,091)  
Education (Low education is the ref.cat.)     
   Medium education 0,210  0,191  
 (0,293)  (0,293)  
   High education -0,631  -0,642  
 (0,387)  (0,387)  
Household income 0,043  0,034  
 (0,078)  (0,079)  
Importance of religion 0,283 ** 0,279 ** 
 (0,111)  (0,111)  
Importance of politics 0,201 * 0,214 * 
 (0,099)  (0,099)  
Confidence in political parties 0,486 *** 0,487 *** 
 (0,113)  (0,114)  
Membership in a political party 1,310 *** 1,319 *** 
 (0,407)  (0,406)  
Ideology (Centre is the ref.cat.)     
   Left -0,095  -0,082 ** 
 (0,236)  (0,236)  
   Right 0,623 ** 0,606  
 (0,207)  (0,207)  
   No declared -0,340  -0,326  
 (0,223)  (0,223)  
Gender - male -0,038  -0,042  
 (0,162)  (0,163)  
Size of town -0,165 *** -0,165 *** 
 (0,041)  (0,041)  
Age 0,008  0,008  
 (0,006)  (0,006)  
Constant -2,662 *** -2,502  
 (0,636)  (0,642)  
N   829  
Pseudo R2   0.1339  
 
 
Dependant variable: voting for the main ethnic party  
  
† p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001  
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In line with previous research which showed the persistence of ethnic voting and lack of 
political accountability in ethnically divided societies, this study corroborates these findings. I 
find that evaluation of government performance does not influence the vote for main ethnic 
parties (ethnic voting). Unemployment does negatively impact ethnic voting and this effect 
holds for both estimated models.  
The second model which includes the interaction, detects that the effect of government 
evaluation on vote for main ethnic parties is modified by employment. That is, voters’ 
evaluations of government performance are shown to affect the likelihood of voting for main 
ethnic parties only among the unemployed, whereas they don’t show to have any effect 
among the rest of the population. 
For the ease of interpretation of statistical results, Table 3 presents the marginal effects of 
government evaluations. The computation of the marginal effects yields the same result, 
showing that better evaluation of government increases the probability of voting for main 
ethnic parties only among the unemployed citizens. 
Table 3 
 
Average marginal effects of Government Evaluations 
 
Unemployed 0.031 
(0.009) 
* 
Not unemployed 
(Employed) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
 
 
 
Based on the coefficients presented in Model 2, the probability to vote for main ethnic parties 
is plotted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 
Adjusted predictions of unemployment, with 95% CI 
 
 
According to the expectations presented in Section 4, what is observed in Figure 3 is that 
good or bad evaluation of government performance does not influence the vote for main 
ethnic parties among the employed citizens (unemployment=0, flat line). However, 
differences in government evaluations do affect the probability to vote for main ethnic parties 
among the unemployed citizens. This finding signals the presence of performance voting in an 
ethnically divided society. Manifested through egotropic economic voting, such voting 
behaviour allows to note signs of political accountability even in these contexts dominated by 
ethnic issues. 
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9. Concluding remarks  
 
Previous research highlighted the incompatibility of political accountability and ethnic 
heterogeneity, describing such democracies as highly fragile. Political parties in such societies 
tie their electoral fortunes to increased ethnic rhetoric and by appealing only to the ethnic 
group they belong to. This negatively affects political accountability, since voters do not 
punish political actors, fearing that they will lose representatives with whom they identify in 
what concerns ethnic belonging. However, in spite of many research findings which 
demonstrate that due to salience of ethnic issues and regardless of their performance, ethnic 
parties continue to have electoral support, we lack more specific observations if this holds for 
the whole electorate or only for the ones perceiving ethnic issues as most important ones. 
Issue importance is namely considered to impact electoral decisions (Fournier et al. 2003). 
Thus, unemployment is assumed to influence voting behaviour based on more critical 
judgment of governments’ past actions and policy outcomes.  
Thus, the aim of this study is to explore the presence of performance voting in an 
ethnically divided society, which political context incentivizes electoral participation 
along ethnic lines. Assessing governmental performance presents an important evaluative 
mechanism of citizens to ensure political accountability. Yet, the salience of ethnic issues 
often implies ethnic voting irrespective of how incumbents’ achievements in office are 
evaluated. 
As assumed, the indicated results in this study confirm the expectations that voting for ethnic 
parties is not linked to governments’ evaluations. However, this is not the case for the 
unemployed voters. This subgroup of the electorate does hold political representation (main 
ethnic parties) to account for their good or bad governance. Good evaluations mean more 
votes for ethnic parties, bad evaluations are linked with less support. Overall, these findings 
illustrated some new insights by showing that evaluative voting behavior in an ethnically 
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divided society is present. It advanced our understanding of how individuals, based on their 
personal economic hardship and issue salience, show different voting patterns. The abstention 
rate of unemployed citizens is higher despite higher education, which can be perceived as 
‘deliberate disengagement’ (Croke et al. 2016) and defection to other ethnic parties which are 
less ethnic in their nature is observed only among this subgroup of voters. 
Analyzing voting behavior is a complex issue. This complexity is even greater in an ethnically 
diverse setting because the voting rationale is affected by a ‘funnel of causalities’. The 
presented findings in this study should therefore be viewed as tentative conclusions and 
encourage further research. 
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Study 3 Closer to the state, closer to the polls? The different impact of corruption on turnout among public employees and other citizens 
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Abstract 
Despite a vast literature on turnout, surprisingly little research has examined its link with 
corruption. In addition, the existing evidence is inconclusive, with some studies reporting 
corruption as positively related to turnout and others reporting a negative relationship. This 
paper argues that the relevant question is not whether corruption has a positive or negative 
effect on turnout, but for whom. We hypothesize that the effect of corruption on the likelihood 
to vote depends on individuals’ employment sector. Public employees have different 
incentives to vote in corrupt settings since their jobs often depend on the political success of 
the government of the day. Hence, while corruption dampens turnout among ordinary 
citizens, public employees are more likely to vote in highly corrupt countries. Using multilevel 
analysis on data from the WVS in 45 countries, results shows that the differential in voting 
propensity between public employees and other citizens gets larger as corruption increases, 
partially confirming our expectations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a vast amount of literature analyzing the determinants of voter turnout (for an 
overview see Blais 2006). Differences in both individual-level resources and motivations are 
the main factors explaining why do people vote or not (Verba et al.1978), together with socio-
economic, political and institutional features at the aggregate-level (Geys 2006). Yet, citizens 
do also make the decision on whether to vote or abstain based on their perceptions on how 
trustworthy and transparent the whole political system is (Birch 2010). Political corruption 
influences political legitimacy, political efficacy and confidence in the electoral process, and 
as such can play a determinant role in shaping individuals’ voting behaviour. 
Surprisingly, research examining the impact of corruption on voter turnout is rather scarce; 
moreover, previous studies yielded contradictory results. According to most of the existing 
research, corruption has a negative effect on turnout, since it causes alienation and apathy 
among voters (Sundström and Stockemer 2015; Stockemer et al. 2013; Birch 2010; McCann 
and Domínguez 1998). Yet, this finding is not conclusive. First, some studies have found that, 
instead of having a demobilizing effect, corruption does increase turnout (Escaleras et al. 
2012; Kostadinova 2009). Second, the negative effect of corruption on turnout vanishes in 
highly corrupt countries (Dahlberg and Solevid 2016). 
This article argues that if the effect of corruption on turnout is not uniform everywhere, it is 
because not everyone is affected in the same way. We hypothesize that the effect of 
corruption on voter turnout depends on individuals’ sector of employment. Corruption is more 
likely to have a positive effect on turnout among public employees than among ordinary 
citizens. In highly corrupt societies, the practice of delivering or maintaining public sector 
jobs in exchange of political support tends to be widespread (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; 
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Stokes 2005). Thus, the incentives to vote among public employees would be higher in 
corrupt societies since their fortunes are tied to the political fate of the incumbent government 
or the politician who has appointed them. By contrast, corruption is more likely to have a 
negative effect on turnout among citizens who do not work in the public sector and are, 
therefore, less dependent on the state and the political success of the government of the day 
for their livelihoods. By proposing patronage as a possible mechanism contributing to account 
for the mixed results obtained by previous research, this article seeks to bridge between two 
strands of literature: the one that investigates the link between corruption and turnout, and the 
one that focuses on the different voting behaviour of public sector workers. 
We test our expectations using data from the World Values Survey (WVS) to analyze the 
impact of the level of corruption found in a country on individual voting propensity, 
comparing citizens working in the public sector with the rest of the population. We run 
logistic multilevel models on a sample of 56,376 individuals from 44 countries, finding 
empirical evidence that is partially consistent with our expectations. Our results show that the 
turnout differential between the two categories indeed grows as the perceived level of public-
sector corruption increases. However, while corruption has a demobilizing effect among those 
who are not public employees, public employees do not vote more in highly corrupt countries. 
They remain equally likely to vote regardless of corruption levels. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the definitions of corruption and 
explains in what way patronage is linked to it. Subsequently, in section 3 and 4 we provide an 
overview of previous research analyzing the relationship between corruption and voter 
turnout, and the electoral behaviour of public employees, respectively. In section 5 we present 
the argument of this article and the reasons that led us to believe that the effect of corruption 
on turnout may change among public sector employees. Data and methods are introduced in 
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section 6. Section 7 presents the results. The last section concludes with a discussion and 
suggestions for future research. 
2. Corruption and its by-product: patronage 
 
We shall start by defining corruption and its relationship with one of the many practices that 
are common within corrupt societies: patronage in the allocation of public sector jobs. 
The prevailing definition of corruption in the literature relates to ‘acts in which the power of 
public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game’ 
(Jain 2001: 73). Similarly, Thacker describes corruption as ‘an act by a public official (or with 
the acquiescence of a public official) that violates legal or social norms for private or 
particularistic gain’ (2004:300). For Heidenheimer and Johnston, corruption is the 
‘transaction of bureaucratic resources for political purposes and political support’ 
(Heidenheimer and Johnston  2011: 246). These definitions of corruption –and many others to 
be found in the scholarly literature– bring into focus ‘the public sphere in which political 
actors operate’ (Heywood 1997). For the purpose of this article, we also focus on corruption 
within the public sphere. 
By (political) patronage we refer to practices in which a party or candidate distributes public 
sector jobs to citizens who are supposed to be loyal to −and encourage the success of− the 
politician or party that has appointed them (Kopecký et al. 2012; Kopecký and Scherlis 2008; 
Weingrod 1968). Among the main functions of patronage, Sorauf (1960:29) mentions 
‘attracting voters and supporters’. He explains how patronage appointments are often used ‘to 
convert the recipient (and a large portion of his family and friends) into life-long and devoted 
supporters of the appointing party’. Moreover, he states that ‘gratitude for the job will win his 
support for the party [...] and a desire to retain the job by keeping the party in power will 
enforce it’ (Sorauf 1960: 29). 
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Patronage and corruption are two different phenomena. Yet, patronage finds a fertile ground 
in corrupt systems. Kitschelt devotes considerable attention to the widespread, non-ideal 
clientelist linkage between citizens and political elites (Kitschelt 2000). The level of 
corruption in a country is, in his view, considered as an ‘indirect strategy to determine 
prevailing citizen-elite linkage mechanism in a polity’ (Kitschelt 2000: 870). He argues that it 
is highly plausible for clientelist linkages (which incorporate patronage practices) to be 
present if the country scores high on corruption. 
Corruption violates public trust and jeopardizes the quality of democratic institutions. It is 
often described as having a destructive impact on the principles of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability (Johnston 2005). Higher levels of corruption are linked with less democratic 
development and inadequately developed institutional framework (Robinson 1998). 
Government regulations are shown to be more ambiguous and vague in corrupt settings, 
which gives public officials more discretionary power in their decisions (Lambsdorff 2005). 
Lack of efficient democratic institutions and absence of functional sanctioning mechanisms 
for corrupt practices serve as encouragement for patronage appointments. Countries that have 
safeguards against corruption (free media, independent judiciary, etc.) have higher levels of 
meritocracy in the recruitment of public employees. No safeguards against corrupt practice 
means more patronage recruitment and nepotism (Sundell 2012). 
Corruption indices are occasionally used as proxy measures of patronage (Schuster 2016; 
Kenny 2015). Not only higher levels of corruption encourage patronage appointments, but 
when patronage appointments are at place, the risk of corruption increases. Several studies 
have found that recruitment for public sector jobs based on meritocracy decreases corruption 
(Oliveros and Schuster 2017; Charron et al. 2016; Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen 2016; 
Dahlström et al. 2012). When they have been recruited through examinations, public sector 
employees are less inclined to incur in corrupt behaviour (Oliveros and Schuster 2017). 
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3. Corruption and voter turnout: a puzzling relationship 
 
Previous research has suggested that there is a limited effect of corruption on individuals’ 
voting behaviour. Voters do not always punish corrupt incumbent parties or candidates, which 
in most cases manage to be re-elected despite their misbehaviour (Manzetti and Wilson 2007; 
Welch and Hibbing 1997). Nevertheless, prior studies may underestimate the impact of 
corruption on voting behaviour by looking at vote choices of individuals casting a ballot (for 
whom they vote) and neglecting electoral participation (whether citizens vote or not), as 
already noted by others (Costas-Pérez 2014). 
Indeed, research investigating the effect of corruption on voter turnout is rather scarce. In 
addition, it has produced contradictory results. Most studies report a negative effect of 
corruption on electoral participation, showing that high levels of corruption decrease turnout 
rates (Stockemer et al. 2013; Davis, Camp and Coleman 2004; McCann and Domínguez 
1998). It is acknowledged that the presence of corruption delegitimizes the political system 
and its institutional functioning (Rock 2009). This further leads to a situation where citizens 
become disenchanted, sceptical and exhibit stronger voter apathy and distrust towards the 
political system (Kostadinova 2009).  
Yet, this finding is not conclusive. On the one hand, some scholars have found that corruption 
can lead to higher turnout (Escaleras et al. 2012; Kostadinova 2009). Two mechanisms are 
put forward by scholars to explain the positive effect of corruption on turnout. The first 
explanation is that citizens react to growing corruption and hold corrupt politicians 
accountable for their misconduct, which mobilizes them to cast ballots at higher rates. They 
want clean governments and vote in large numbers against corrupt leaders (Kostadinova 
2009). The second explanation which is brought up in the literature in order to explain the 
positive effect of corruption on turnout refers to clientelism, patronage appointments and 
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‘pork barrel politics’ (Stokes et al. 2013). This would imply practices where votes are traded 
for public goods, favours, cash or other benefits, and voters, as well as politicians, would 
benefit from their reciprocal clientelist transactions (Manzetti and Wilson 2007). 
On the other hand, further recent research has suggested that the previous mixed results can 
be attributed to the fact that the effect of corruption on voter turnout is contingent on the level 
of corruption that prevails in a country (Dahlberg and Solevid 2016). Thus, Dahlberg and 
Solevid (2016) found that the negative effect of corruption on turnout is manifested only in 
countries with low to medium levels of corruption. Voters’ perception of corruption does not 
seem to affect turnout in highly corrupt countries, where the likelihood to vote is generally 
lower and potentially driven by different self-interested incentives (Warren 2004), not least 
clientelist exchange (Kitschelt 2000). 
The inconsistent findings of previous research reveal the complexity of the issue, offering 
additional reasons to take the relationship between corruption and turnout under closer 
inspection. This article aims to shed some light on this puzzle. We argue that the relevant 
question is not only whether corruption has a positive or a negative effect on turnout, but for 
whom. In particular, we hypothesize that individuals would react differently to corruption 
depending on whether they work on the public sector or not. 
 
4. On the political behaviour of public employees 
 
Voting behaviour of public employees has received considerable attention in the literature, 
particularly among public choice scholars, which have used the concept of ‘public/private 
sector cleavage’ to describe the different political attitudes of public employees (Blais et al. 
1990). Public sector employees have more left-leaning ideological orientations (Jensen et al. 
2009) and are more likely to support political parties in favour of increasing government 
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spending (Garand et al. 1991). They also tend to be ‘more active in civic affairs’ than the rest 
of the population (Brewer 2003) and, what is more relevant for the purposes of this study, 
they show higher levels of electoral participation (Corey and Garand 2002; Garand et al. 
1991; Blais et al. 1990; Jaarsma et al. 1986; Bennett and Orzechowski 1983; Frey and 
Pommerehne 1982). 
Previous literature suggests two alternative explanations to account for the differences in 
turnout among public and non-public employees (Garand et al. 1991). On the one hand, 
individuals with certain idiosyncratic features and political orientations would gravitate to 
public sector jobs. Public employees are found to have higher levels of education, income, 
interest in politics, political knowledge and social capital (Corey and Garand 2002). In other 
words, they meet the characteristics that are classically associated with electoral participation 
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). On the other hand, public employees would develop 
greater propensity to cast votes once in public employment, for at least two reasons. First, 
their working environment contributes to lower the costs of voting (i.e., making easier the 
process of gathering political information or facilitating the task of voting by granting public 
employees paid time off to vote on the election day). Second, the expected benefits of voting 
are higher for public employees: self-interest would drive the voting behaviour of public 
employees since they ‘can reasonably expect that their votes may contribute to an increased 
level of personal and bureau benefits’ (Corey and Garand 2002: 262). 
A better educational attainment, greater interest in politics or higher levels of civic 
engagement do not totally account for the turnout differential among public and non-public 
sector employees. Public sector employees turn out to vote more, even after controlling for 
their sociodemographic and attitudinal characteristics (Bhatti and Hansen 2013; Corey and 
Garand 2002). Moreover, the policy preferences of public employees change after retirement, 
converging with the preferences of non-public sector workers (Rattsø and Sørensen 2016). 
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This finding clearly challenges the assumption that the higher turnout rate among public 
employees is only due to a ‘selection bias’ in their recruitment, whereby individuals having 
distinct political preferences and being more likely to vote are attracted to public sector jobs. 
Thus, we contend that public employees are not necessarily different from other citizens ‘a 
priori’ or ‘per se’, but that their different political behaviour should be also understood as the 
response to distinct incentives once they enter public employment. 
 
5. Our argument 
 
Besides being mainly centred on the case of the United States, previous literature on the 
voting behaviour of public sector employees does not consider one key factor that can 
eventually modify the costs and benefits of voting for this sector of the population: the level 
of corruption in a country. The low quality of democratic institutions in corrupt settings 
allows for patronage recruitments, which are likely to influence the voting decision of public 
sector employees. Yet, to our knowledge, no research has been done on the impact of 
corruption on turnout of public employees. 
In corrupt countries, the allocation of public sector jobs is often based on patronage instead of 
meritocracy: public job positions are distributed by the incumbent party or candidate (the 
patron) in exchange of political support. Public employees (the clients) have incentives to 
maintain in office the patron that has appointed them. Since their jobs are tied to the political 
success of the patron, they are expected to vote for the incumbent party or government. 
Implicitly, this also entails that they will be more likely to turn out to vote. 
Of course, public employees could punish the corrupt patron by voting for the opposition. 
Indeed, since in most cases the ballot is secret, party officials cannot monitor for whom 
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people vote for, but only whether they show up at the polls (Stokes 2005; Chandra 2004). 
This has led scholars analysing clientelism and patronage to coin concepts such as ‘turnout 
buying’ to refer to a strategy by which parties, interested in mobilizing their potential 
constituencies, reward supporters for going to the polls (Gans-Morse et al. 2009; Nichter 
2008). Thus, Nichter (2008: 31) affirms that ‘much of what is interpreted as vote buying 
(exchanging rewards for vote choices) may actually be turnout buying (exchanging rewards 
for turnout)’. Yet, if patronage recruitments are at place, to vote for an option other than the 
patron would be against the own interest of public employees. As noted by Oliveros, ‘public 
sector jobs (and, importantly, working conditions) enjoyed by supporters will be maintained 
by the incumbent but not by the opposition’ (Oliveros 2017: 3). In any case, this article is 
concerned with the effect of corruption on turnout. It does not test whether public sector 
employees in corrupt countries turn out to vote for the incumbent (as we assume) or for the 
opposition. One thing is certain: to stay away from the polls is probably not the best option for 
public employees if they depend upon the election results for their livelihoods. 
Summing up our expectations, public sector employees, regardless of the level of corruption 
in a country, tend to vote more than the rest of the population, as we already know from 
previous research. What we argue is that this differential in voting propensity would be higher 
in more corrupt countries, where there is a bigger difference in the degree of dependence upon 
election results between the two groups. Drawing on the Indian case, Chandra already 
predicted that in ‘patronage democracies’ a high degree of dependence upon the state is 
associated with higher electoral participation: 
‘There should be a positive relationship between the degree of dependence of voters 
upon the state and turnout rates. Within patronage democracies, therefore, we should 
expect individuals dependent upon the state for their livelihood to turn out in higher 
rates than individuals who, [...], are less dependent’ (Chandra 2007: 54). 
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We expect corruption to have a positive effect on turnout among public employees, since they 
largely depend on the political fate of the government for their livelihoods. Public sector 
employees are expected to vote for the incumbent party or candidate, the patron that has 
appointed them. Implicitly, this also entails that they will be more likely to turn out to vote. 
By contrast, corruption is expected to have a negative effect on turnout among citizens who 
do not work in the public sector and are, therefore, less dependent on the state and the 
political success of the party in office. Thus, as corruption increases, we expect the difference 
in turnout between public sector employees and the rest of the population to grow. 
 
6. Data and methods 
 
This article uses individual-level data from the last wave of the World Values Survey, which 
was conducted between 2010 and 2014 in 59 countries (WVS, wave 6). The WVS is the 
largest cross-national dataset including questions on both individual voting behaviour and 
employment status, the latter allowing to identify public sector employees. Various country-
level variables, such as the ones accounting for corruption and relevant control variables, have 
been merged to the dataset. Missing data on any of these variables have led to the exclusion of 
15 countries from the analysis. Our sample consists of 56,376 individuals from 44 countries.1 
The World Values Survey does not ask if the respondent voted in the last election. However, 
it includes the following question: ‘When elections take place (national level), do you vote 
always, usually or never?’ and we use this question to estimate individual level turnout.2 The 
dependent variable equals 1 when the individual indicates that he/she ‘always’ votes, and 0 
when the individual indicates that he/she votes ‘never’ or ‘usually’. We opt for this 
operationalization because it fits best our theoretical expectations. If the mechanism driving 
public employees to vote is their stronger attachment to parties and politicians, it follows that 
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they would always go to the polls, without missing a single chance to cast a ballot for their 
potential patrons in corrupt systems. People who declared to ‘usually’ vote do not show the 
same attachment, and would probably go voting depending on contingent factors other than 
stable clientelist exchanges. The alternative specification of the dependent variable (‘usually’ 
coded as 1, together with ‘always’) is however used as robustness check.  
We account for the degree of corruption with a country-level variable. Corruption cannot be 
directly measured or quantified in an objective way. All the extant indicators used to compare 
the level of corruption across countries are in fact accounting for perceptions of corruptions 
(Olken 2009). The existent perception-based indicators of corruption proceed from either 
expert assessments or public opinion surveys. Both types of measures have their respective 
values and limitations. Indicators that rely on the assessments of country experts such as 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) or the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are useful to provide a single number synthesising 
the complex and multifaceted phenomena of corruption, but they may pose a problem by 
introducing an ‘elite bias’. While they reflect the views of analysts or business people (usually 
high status informants), these indicators overlook the experience of a more broadly 
representative group of citizens. We opt for using the Global Corruption Barometer, 
conducted by Transparency International and defined by this institution as ‘the only world-
wide public opinion survey on corruption’. Besides reflecting the views of a larger number of 
people, this survey offers an additional advantage for our analysis. Instead of providing a 
general composite index, it allows us to select a narrower, more specific question to measure 
the perception of corruption in the public sector. The Global Corruption Barometer includes 
questions on the level of perceived corruption in general and in different institutions, 
including both the public and the private spheres. It also asks for people’s experiences of 
bribery and evaluations of government’s performance in fighting corruption. There are two 
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questions that explicitly refer to perceptions of corruption in the public sector: ‘To what extent 
do you think that corruption is a problem in the public sector in this country?’ and ‘To what 
extent do you see the following categories in this country affected by corruption? Public 
officials/Civil servants’. Responses to both questions are given on a scale from 1 to 5 (from 
less to more corruption). We use the average country score on the first question as our main 
indicator of corruption, and the average country score on the second question as a robustness 
check. 
The main explanatory variable at the individual-level is a dummy which differentiates 
between public employees (i.e., people working in government or public institutions) and the 
rest of the population included in the sample (i.e., those working in private business, industry, 
non-profit organizations, or in the autonomous or informal sector, and those out of work). 
This variable is dichotomous, having a value 1 for individuals working for the government or 
a public institution, and 0 for the rest of the respondents. 
The literature identifies certain variables that may influence turnout (Blais 2006; Geys 2006), 
and we include them in our statistical models as control variables. At the individual level, we 
control for seven socio-demographic characteristics: gender, education, income, age, 
employment, marital status and size of the municipality. Education compares people who 
have attained primary, secondary or tertiary education to those with no education (reference 
category). Income is based on income deciles originally included in the WVS: it has been 
recoded so that individuals with middle-low, middle-high and high income positions are 
compared with those with low income. As age is expected to show a non-linear relationship 
with turnout, age squared is added to the model. Since the higher turnout levels among public 
employees could be due to the fact that the rest of the population includes people that are out 
of work such as the unemployed and inactive, we include in our models a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 for employed people. Since married people are more likely to vote than 
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those unmarried, we also control for marital status with a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the respondent is married. Size of the municipality indicates whether the respondent lives in a 
town with more than 500,000 inhabitants. We also account for a number of attitudinal 
variables such as ideology (left- and right-leaning persons relative to centrist), party 
membership (dummy), interest in politics (on a 5-point scale from less to more interest) and 
political mobilization (an additive index ranging 0-4, based on the number of political actions 
that the respondent has done: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending peaceful 
demonstrations and/or joining strikes). 
Since there is wide heterogeneity between the countries considered in this study, we include 
the following country-level variables in our models: economic development, degree of 
political rights, type of electoral system and compulsory vote. We control for economic 
development with GDP per capita converted to international dollars using purchasing power 
parity rates (World Bank). The degree of political rights in the country is measured on a scale 
from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest one 
(Freedom House). The type of electoral system is a dichotomous variable having a value 1 for 
proportional systems. Finally, compulsory vote is also included in the model as a 
dichotomous variable. We excluded missing values and ‘don't know’ answers on any of the 
utilized variables, that is, 32,474 cases over a total of 88,850 cases included in WVS wave 6. 
We use multilevel logistic regressions with random intercepts.3 This allows to take into 
account the hierarchical structure of the data, whereas individual observations (N=56,376) are 
nested into 44 countries. Standard logistic models would in fact violate the assumption of 
independent errors, since individual observation from the same country may be dependent on 
each other. In order to capture country-specific variation, intercepts are left free to vary 
randomly across groups. The main focus is put on the cross-level interaction between the 
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sector of employment (individual level) and the level of corruption in the public sector 
(country level), that is the analytical way through which we test our expectations. 
 
7. Results 
 
 
Our main interest lies in checking whether and how the effect of corruption depends on 
individuals’ sector of employment. We expect the perceived level of corruption of a country’s 
public sector to matter differently for public employees and for the rest of the population. 
Corruption should act as a disincentive to vote for most of citizens, while potentially being an 
incentive to turn out to vote for public employees, who remain attached to their patron 
regardless of how corrupt it is, or even benefiting from this. 
As recalled in section 4, turnout of public employees is in general higher. A breakdown of the 
dependent variable allows us to check whether this is observed also in the WVS data. Figure 1 
shows the proportions of respondents that declared to vote ‘never’, ‘usually’ or ‘always’ 
(recall that the former two categories are coded together in our binary dependent variable), 
differentiating between public employees and the rest of the population. Our sample shows a 
higher average voting propensity for public employees: 66% of them declared to always go to 
the polls, against 59% of non-public employees (the difference between proportions is highly 
statistically significant). By contrast, the proportion of those who never vote is lower for 
public employees (11%) than for the rest of the population (17%). 
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Figure 1. Percentages of respondents reporting to vote 'never', 'usually' or 'always', among 
public employees and the rest of the population. 
 
If this simply confirms what highlighted by previous research on voting behaviour of public 
employees, we now take a closer look at how the differential turnout of public employees and 
other citizens varies across countries with different levels of corruption. Appendix 1 shows 
the country sample composition (total observations and share of public employees in each 
countries) and the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest: turnout (total, for public 
employees, and for other people) and the general perceived level of corruption in the public 
sector. Figure 2 plots the difference between turnout for public employees and for the rest of 
the population against the corruption index, for the 44 countries in our sample. Some modest 
bivariate evidence for a differential turnout response to corruption between the two population 
sub-groups does emerge. Although the dispersion is very large, the differential increases for 
higher corruption scores (to the right side of the graph). On average, public employees seem 
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increasingly more likely to vote than other people as corruption increases. The correlation, 
represented by the dotted line in Figure 2, is in any case not significant.4 However, it is 
spurious to many other potential interfering factors. The simple bivariate correlation may turn 
significant when taking them into account. First, the compositional effect of country samples 
can be hiding our main correlation of interest: many other individual-level characteristics are 
also associated with voting behaviour. Second, the countries included in our sample differ 
consistently from each other. Country-specific political, institutional and economic 
characteristics must be also taken into account to get a less biased picture. 
 
Figure 2. Corruption in the public sector and the differential between turnout for public 
employees and for the rest of the population in each country (percentage point difference). 
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Therefore, we proceed to multivariate analysis. Table 1 presents the estimates from 3 logistic 
multilevel random-intercept models. In Model 1 turnout is regressed on the individual-level 
independent variables. Odds ratios show the expected relationships. In line with previous 
research, net of controls, public employees are (15%) more likely to turnout than other people. 
The likelihood to usually go to the polls increases with age (although the correlation slightly 
reverses in late life), with the interest in politics and with the degree of mobilization. It is 
higher for those who see themselves as left- or right-wing relative to the centrists, for the 
employed than for non-employed, for married people than for the unmarried, for those with 
tertiary education relative to people with no education. It is instead lower for those who live in 
big towns compared to those who live in town with less than 500,000 inhabitants, and, 
surprisingly, for party members. Party membership ceases however to be significant if one 
takes out the other factors that are obviously correlated with it - interest in politics and 
mobilization - and when taking into account that being affiliated to a party has a different 
meaning in different countries (i.e. adding a random slope to party membership: see 
robustness check no. 6 in Appendix 2). Gender and income do not seem to affect individual 
voting propensity when controlling for all other characteristics. 
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Table 1. Logistic random-intercept multilevel models of individual-level voting 
propensity on individual- and country-level independent variables: odds ratios and 
standard errors. 
 
N(Obs.) = 56,376;  N(Country) = 44 
 Model 1 S.E. Model 2 S.E. Model 3 S.E. 
Public employees 1.146*** (0.0295) 1.147*** (0.0296) 0.545***   (0.0987)    
Male 1.011 (0.0204) 1.011 (0.0204) 1.012 (0.0204) 
Age 1.030*** (0.0008) 1.030*** (0.0008) 1.030*** (0.0008) 
Age squared .999 *** (0.0000)    .999 *** (0.0000)    .999 *** (0.0000)    
Education (Ref.: No education)  
  Primary 1.051 (0.0447) 1.050 (0.0447) 1.053 (0.0448) 
  Secondary 1.046 (0.0362) 1.046 (0.0362) 1.051 (0.0364) 
  Tertiary 1.306*** (0.0524) 1.306*** (0.0524) 1.314*** (0.0527) 
Income (Ref.: Low)      
  Mid-low 0.977 (0.0287) 0.978 (0.0287) 0.977 (0.0286) 
  Mid-high 1.021 (0.0325) 1.021 (0.0325) 1.020 (0.0325) 
  High 0.997 (0.0586) 0.997 (0.0586) 0.994 (0.0584) 
Left-Right positioning (Ref.: Centre)  
  Left 1.094** (0.0326) 1.094** (0.0326) 1.093** (0.0326) 
  Right 1.170*** (0.0296) 1.171*** (0.0296) 1.172*** (0.0296) 
Party member 0.915** (0.0265) 0.915** (0.0265) 0.913** (0.0265) 
Town>500,000 0.737*** (0.0263) 0.739*** (0.0263) 0.739*** (0.0264) 
Interest in politics 1.376*** (0.0150) 1.376*** (0.0150) 1.375*** (0.0150) 
Mobilization 1.118*** (0.0145) 1.117*** (0.0145) 1.116*** (0.0145) 
Married 1.282*** (0.0285) 1.283*** (0.0285) 1.284*** (0.0285) 
Employed  1.086*** (0.0242) 1.085*** (0.0242) 1.088*** (0.0243) 
Corruption in the Public sector  0.756 (0.1520) 0.726 (0.1450)    
GDP per capita   1.000 (0.0000) 1.000    (0.0000)    
Compulsory vote   2.455*** (0.6020) 2.468***  (0.6020)    
Proportional system  1.175 (0.252) 1.168 (0.2490)    
Political freedom (more to less)  0.738*** (0.0552) 0.736***   (0.0548)    
Interaction: 
Public employee X Corruption 
    
1.199***  
 
(0.0525)    
Variance Components      
Var(country) 0.9559 (0.1033) 0.6926*** (0.0753) 0.6892***   (0.0749)    
AIC 64373.0  64354.9  64339.8  
BIC 64569.7  64596.3  64590.1  
Log-likelihood -32164.5  -32150.5  -32141.9  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Model 2 adds the country-level independent variables. The main effect of the perceived 
corruption in the public sector on turnout is not significant.5 Indeed, previous research found 
mixed evidence with regards to this effect: so do we, insofar as corruption does not seem to 
matter at all when just looking at its general effect among the whole population. The rest of 
country-level variables serve as controls: economic development (GDP per capita) and the 
proportionality of electoral system do not seem to matter, while compulsory vote and the lack 
of political freedom are respectively positively and negatively associated with the likelihood 
of voting. 
In order to investigate the hypothesized interrelation between corruption and the sector of 
employment, Model 3 adds a cross-level interaction between the country-level average 
perceived corruption of the public sector and the dummy for whether an individual works in 
the public sector. The interaction term is highly significant, thus pointing at effectively 
different turnout implications of being a public employee in more or less corrupt countries.6 
To better interpret the interaction in Model 3, Figure 3(A) shows the marginal effect of being 
a public employee for the different scores of country-level corruption observed in our 
sample.7 The effect of being a public employee appears to be conditional on the level of 
corruption in a way that matches with our expectations. The marginal effect is even negative 
(i.e. public employees less likely to vote than other people) in countries with a very low 
corruption score, of around 2 on the scale 1-5. In our sample this is however only the case of 
Rwanda, which we identified as potential outlier. For comparatively low-to-medium levels of 
corruption, there is no significant gap in turnout likelihood between public sector employees 
and other people (the confidence interval of the marginal effect crosses zero). Coherently with 
the hypothesized patronage mechanism, if the public sector is not generally perceived as 
corrupt, public employees and the rest of the population should have the same incentive to go 
to the polls (net of other individual characteristics). The marginal effect becomes significant 
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and increasingly positive in countries whose corruption score is higher than 3.7, which is the 
case for 36 out of the 45 countries included in our sample (cf. Appendix). That is, the turnout 
gap significantly increases in favour of public employees in countries with medium-to-high 
corruption scores. On average and net of other factors, public employees become up to 5% 
more likely to go to the polls relative to the rest of the population (right end of Figure 3(A)). 
The increasing turnout differential revealed by the marginal effect could be due to two 
different patterns. The probabilities for public employees and other people to vote could 
respectively increase and decrease as corruption increases. This is, indeed, what we 
hypothesized (a positive effect of corruption on turnout among public employees and a 
negative effect among the rest of the population). Alternatively, corruption could affect 
negatively the turnout likelihood of both categories, although demobilizing common people 
more than public employees. In order to inspect this, Figure 3(B) plots the predicted 
probabilities of turnout for public employees and for the rest of the population, controlling for 
compositional and country-level factors (Model 3 in Table 1). Predicted probabilities reveal a 
cross-over interaction, which falls closer to the second of the patterns explained above. As we 
expected, corruption appears to significantly demobilize those who are not public employees 
(steeper dashed line in Figure 3(B)). Non-public employees start from a higher turnout 
probability (but, again, empirically this would be only the case of Rwanda), that then 
decreases and goes below the predicted line for public employees as perceived corruption 
increases. Yet, against our expectations, corruption does not have a positive effect on turnout 
among public employees. Public employees seem unaffected by corruption: their likelihood to 
vote stays by and large the same at different corruption scores (almost flat line for public 
employees). However, the result is weaker than it seems. The confidence intervals overlap all 
along the range of corruption scores observed in our sample. In fact, the probabilities of 
voting for the two population sub-groups do not significantly differ, in spite of the significant 
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marginal effect observed for medium-high level of corruption in Figure 3(A). Thus, the 
pattern which emerges from the cross-over interaction has to be taken with extreme caution, 
since non-public employees do not actually show a significantly ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ 
probability to vote than public employees (at a 95% confidence level), at least not in our data. 
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Figure 3. (A) Marginal effect of 'being a public employee' and (B) Predicted turnout 
probabilities for different levels of corruption observed in the sample. Expressed in 
probabilities and with 95% confidence intervals. 
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 Due to the heterogeneous composition of our country-sample, we tested the consistency of 
our findings with a number of robustness checks, shown in Appendix 2. We rerun the 
interaction model in the following specifications: by using the alternative measure of 
corruption presented in section 6 (perceived corruption of public officials/civil servants); by 
taking Rwanda out of the analysis; by using a different operationalization of the dependent 
variable turnout, that considers those who declared to vote ‘usually’ as 1 instead of 0; by 
using country-specific relative measure of education; by splitting the sample into high- and 
low-corruption countries (above and below the median corruption score). Moreover, we 
replicated the results by letting the effects of ‘Public employee’, gender and party 
membership free to vary across countries, in different random slope models. The interaction 
coefficient remains significant in all model specifications, and the pattern shown above holds. 
In sum, our expectations are only partially supported. We expected corruption to have a 
positive effect on the turnout of public employees, and a negative effect for the rest of the 
population. If at all, corruption seems to dampen the likelihood to vote for non-public 
employees only; public employees are not affected by increasing corruption levels. We found 
evidence for the existence of an interaction between the perception of public sector corruption 
and individuals’ sector of employment: the interaction term is significant and passed all 
robustness checks, and the marginal effect of being a public employee becomes significant 
and increases with the corruption score. This potentially reflects a closer attachment to the 
public sphere that makes public employees immune from the discouraging effect of 
corruption on voting, plausibly due to patronage exchanges on which they can better rely in 
more corrupt societies. However, in our country-sample, this does not match with statistically 
significant differences in the predicted turnout probabilities between public employees and 
other people, for any of the observed corruption scores. 
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8. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Research on the relationship between corruption and turnout manifested mixed findings, 
which divided scholars on the question as to whether corruption is associated with a 
mobilizing or demobilizing effect on turnout. A mobilizing effect of corruption on turnout is 
explained mainly by arguments based either on clientelist practices or on the willingness of 
voters to express dissatisfaction and disillusionment. The demobilizing effect of corruption on 
turnout is generally justified with voters’ alienation and apathy. This study sought to take a 
step forward, by showing that previous mixed results are at least partly due to the need of 
acknowledging that corruption leads to different responses among different population sub-
groups. Following the literature on the development of patronage ties in corrupt societies, we 
differentiated between two groups of citizens which have a different set of (dis-)incentives to 
vote vis-à-vis corruption: we compared people working in the public sector to the rest of the 
population. 
Politicization of the public sector is a more common phenomenon in corrupt societies, where 
effective governance is more difficult to achieve and bureaucratic quality is missing. Thus, the 
central argument in this study is that public employees have greater incentives to maintain 
stable political environment and stable political actors. By the act of voting they could pursue 
this aim, which can pay off in terms of future patronage benefits, such as, for example, 
securing their job stability. Hence, we expected them to turn out more to elections in countries 
with a corrupt public sector. By contrast, we expected corruption to have a demobilizing 
effect among the rest of the population, which does not have the same incentives as public 
employees, since patronage appointments are primarily linked to the public sector. 
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Our results only partially meet these expectations. We found that, controlling for a number of 
compositional and country-level factors, the marginal effect of being a public employee (as 
compared to the rest of the population) becomes significant and positive in countries where 
the perception of public-sector corruption is comparatively medium/high. As we expected, 
there is evidence of an increasing turnout gap between public employees and other people as 
corruption increases. However, this is not due to a mobilizing and demobilizing effect of 
corruption between public employees and the rest of the population. Our analyses hint at a 
different pattern. While the turnout likelihood of those who are not public employees is 
indeed negatively affected by corruption, public employees are equally likely to vote in more 
or less corrupt countries. This pattern is to be taken with extreme caution. Although the 
significant interaction revealed an increasing turnout differential between public employees 
and other people depending on perceived levels of public-sector corruption, we did not find 
statistically significant differences in the probability of voting for the two population sub-
groups, for any of the corruption scores observed in our sample. Further research is hence 
required to inspect such interaction more in-depth, uncovering better whether and how public 
and non public employees react differently to corruption. 
Overall, although it does not empirically solve the puzzle of the mixed effect of corruption on 
voter turnout which emerged from previous literature, our study sets out a new route for 
future research. It shows that corruption has different meanings, and provides different 
incentives to different sections of the electorate. Some parts of the population, namely public 
employees, are likely to benefit from corrupt practices like patronage. As a consequence, they 
would not be affected by any demobilizing effect of corruption, which would, by contrast, 
affect other people. Therefore, we suggest that the question is not whether corruption has an 
impact on turnout in general, but rather for whom it does. When the electors are people who 
depend on the state and politicians in their daily life – the case of public employees – 
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corruption may not matter at all (as our results show), or it may even act as an incentive to 
vote. In other words, public employees in corrupt settings have good reasons to remain 
attached to the hand that feeds them. 
The proposed patronage mechanism is however just one out of more possible explanations. 
Public employees who turn out to vote in corrupt societies could in fact do so not only for 
consolidating the political power of their patron, but −by contrast− to express their discontent, 
voting against the corrupt government in office. Although in systems where patronage is 
widespread this could imply biting the hand that feeds them, we cannot exclude this 
circumstance based on the analysis and on the country-sample included in this study. Being 
closer to the public sphere, and hence potentially better aware of corruption dynamics going 
on in the public sector, public employees could actually express their disappointment by 
voting to punish (instead of favouring) the incumbent government they see as corrupt. This 
could be the case especially in consolidated democracies and most economically developed 
countries. In our sample, these countries tend to score relatively high in terms of average 
perceived corruption: citizens would in fact tend to be stricter in their judgement of the level 
of corruption in contexts in which corruption is the exception rather than the rule. 
In order to confirm whether patronage (rather than voters’ disappointment) is indeed the 
mechanism behind higher voting propensity of public employees in corrupt societies, future 
research is encouraged to inspect the relationship between corruption and specific partisan 
preferences of the sub-population at stake. That is, to check whether public employees not 
only turn out to vote, but if they do so to vote for the incumbent, which is arguably a 
necessary condition for the patronage mechanism to hold. Previous findings, that did not 
distinguish between target populations, have shown a rather small effect of corruption on 
incumbent’s vote share (Welch and Hibbing 1997). Therefore, it remains interesting to 
analyze how corruption shapes partisan preferences of different groups of citizens. If public 
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employees resulted more likely to vote for the incumbent government, the argument presented 
in this study would be further strengthened. 
In order to address both the substantive patterns highlighted by our analyses and their 
empirical limitations, further research should also inspect the differential impact of corruption 
on turnout over time, instead of cross-sectionally as done in this article. This could add 
confidence in speaking of a different set of incentives behind the voting behaviour of public 
employees in corrupt societies, beyond any suspect of self-selection in the access to public 
employment and reverse causality. 
Notes 
1. The countries included in our analysis are: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Australia, Armenia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, India, Iraq, 
Japan, Kazakhstan, Jordan, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, 
Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Spain, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Egypt, United States, Uruguay and Yemen. The countries excluded 
due to missing data are the following: Bahrain, Belarus, China, Taiwan, Ecuador, 
Palestine, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Qatar, Singapore, Sweden, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Uzbekistan. 
2. A general problem with self-reported turnout is social desirability: individuals may 
report that they vote when they actually don’t. This could be especially the case 
among public sector employees (see Bednarczuk, 2018). We can only mention this 
problem, but unfortunately cannot influence it. In any case, we found that there is a 
positive and significant correlation between our proxy for turnout and the actual 
turnout rate in the latest election (r=0.501, p=0.001, N=44). 
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3. Estimated in STATA 14 through the xtmelogit command, which is based on maximum 
likelihood estimation with adaptive quadrature. Models have been refitted with various 
integration points to check for the accuracy of estimates. Both level-2 and level-1 
residual errors are assumed to be normally distributed. 
4. Pearson’s correlation index is 0.24 (p=0.11). The country-observation to the left-end 
of the graph is Rwanda, which in fact shows a comparatively very low corruption 
score based on the country-average perception from Transparency International's 
Global Corruption Barometer (cf. Appendix 1). Such very low perceived corruption 
makes Rwanda a potential outlier. If one exclude Rwanda, the bivariate correlation is 
0.21, again not significant (p=0.17). 
5. The main effect of corruption is not significant even before adding step-wise the 
country-level controls (not shown in the regression table). 
6. The AIC and BIC do not unequivocally point at Model 3 as the best fitted model (only 
the AIC has the lowest value for Model 3). Our choice of Model 3 is based on a 
likelihood ratio test comparing the nested models 2 and 3, that allowed us to conclude 
that Model 3 has a better fit (χ2=17.15; p=0.000). 
7. The marginal effect plotted in Figure 2 are average marginal effect, i.e., obtained 
based on each case in the data. We computed the same both holding each control 
variable at its mean and for substantially relevant values (e.g. mean for continuous, 
median for ordinal and mode for nominal variables) and the pattern did not change 
(see Mood, 2010). 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. Country sample sizes and descriptives for the main variables of interest. 
The proportion of turnout is split for population sub-groups: a. proportion over the total 
population; b. for public employees only; c. for the rest of the population. 
Country (N=44) N Share Public 
Employees 
 Turnout  Corruption 
74.8% b. Public employees c. Others 
Algeria 743 26.8% 25.2% 37.7% 20.6% 4.6 
Azerbaijan 1002 46.6% 44.1% 57.2% 32.7% 3.6 
Australia 925 33.1% 95.2% 96.7% 94.5% 3.6 
Armenia 1052 52.3% 75.9% 84.2% 66.7% 4.4 
Brazil 1010 17.6% 86.0% 93.8% 84.4% 4.6 
Chile 634 12.6% 79.8% 92.5% 78.0% 4.3 
Colombia 1431 13.6% 68.0% 75.8% 66.8% 4.4 
Cyprus 886 14.9% 79.5% 85.6% 78.4% 4.2 
Estonia 1321 40.0% 46.0% 54.4% 40.4% 3.7 
Georgia 1106 40.6% 69.5% 78.8% 63.2% 3.1 
Germany 1814 20.3% 74.6% 84.0% 72.3% 3.9 
Ghana 1552 9.2% 68.5% 79.7% 67.4% 4.4 
India 4047 13.4%  61.9% 76.8% 4.2 
Iraq 1016 22.2% 61.7% 70.4% 59.2% 4.1 
Japan 1078 10.8% 60.4% 79.3% 58.1% 4.2 
Kazakhstan 1500 35.6% 51.1% 56.2% 48.3% 3.9 
Jordan 1182 19.4% 49.0% 53.7% 47.8% 3.7 
South Korea 899 16.4% 57.8% 58.5% 57.7% 3.6 
Kyrgyzstan 1343 39.2% 65.1% 68.6% 62.8% 4.6 
Lebanon 878 11.6% 38.4% 47.1% 37.2% 4.6 
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Libya 1640 48.7% 47.3% 48.9% 45.7% 3.5 
Malaysia 1299 13.5% 41.3% 38.9% 41.7% 3.8 
Mexico 1831 13.1% 67.6% 77.5% 66.1% 4.7 
Morocco 825 3.5% 16.7% 41.4% 15.8% 4.6 
New Zealand 507 28.2% 85.8% 86.7% 85.4% 3.3 
Nigeria 1759 10.3% 42.5% 51.4% 41.4% 4.7 
Pakistan 1142 9.7% 37.7% 54.1% 35.9% 4.6 
Peru 993 13.9% 90.9% 92.0% 90.8% 4.5 
Philippines 1161 11.3% 80.5% 80.2% 80.6% 4.4 
Romania 1229 33.4% 71.3% 80.5% 66.6% 4.5 
Russia 1715 48.0% 46.3% 58.7% 34.9% 4.7 
Rwanda 1527 14.6% 53.4% 56.5% 52.9% 2.0 
Slovenia 913 41.7% 55.1% 59.1% 52.3% 4.2 
South Africa 2692 10.5% 57.8% 61.3% 57.4% 4.4 
Zimbabwe 1500 15.7% 37.8% 48.3% 35.8% 4.7 
Spain 874 11.1% 62.9% 77.3% 61.1% 4.5 
Thailand 480 26.7% 80.4% 86.7% 78.1% 4.1 
Tunisia 992 16.9% 19.2% 24.4% 18.1% 4.4 
Turkey 1469 11.6% 80.7% 84.2% 80.2% 4.0 
Ukraine 1500 58.3% 62.6% 66.5% 57.2% 4.6 
Egypt 1523 18.8% 39.8% 56.4% 35.9% 4.1 
United States 2077 18.2% 64.2% 77.2% 61.4% 4.0 
Uruguay 717 16.7% 93.3% 97.5% 92.5% 3.8 
Yemen 592 19.3% 55.7% 42.1% 59.0% 3.1 
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Appendix 2. Robustness checks. Logistic multilevel models of individual-level voting 
propensity on individual- and country-level independent variables: odds ratios and 
standard errors. (Model specifications 0-7b: see legend below) 
 
Robustness checks - Models: 
0=Alternative measure of corruption 
1=Rwanda out 
2=Recodification DV (‘Always’ and ‘Usually’=1; ‘Never’=0) 
3=Education specified as relative to country mean 
4=Random slope on 'Public Employee' 
5=Random slope on 'Male' 
6=Random slope on 'Party Member' 
7a=Countries with below-median corruption score (Corruption<4.2) 
7b=Countries with above-median corruption score (Corruption>=4.2) 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7a 7b 
Public employee 0.797 0.454*** 0.524* 0.537*** 0.454 0.557** 0.527*** 0.444** 0.002*** 
 
(0.128) (0.105) (0.145) (0.097) (0.207) (0.101) (0.096) (0.121) (0.002) 
Male 1.011 1.009 1.018 1.007 1.024 1.015 1.011 0.994 1.027 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.020) (0.021) (0.040) (0.020) (0.032) (0.027) 
Age 1.030*** 1.030*** 1.039*** 1.030*** 1.030*** 1.030*** 1.030*** 1.024*** 1.033*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age2 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999 0.999*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education (ref.: No education)        [Rel. education] 
  
Primary 1.061 1.041 1.110 1.062*** 1.061 1.050 1.054 1.140 1.016 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.062) (0.008) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.078) (0.056) 
Secondary 1.054 1.023 1.088  1.057 1.048 1.051 1.280*** 0.935 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.048)  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.072) (0.042) 
Tertiary 1.328*** 1.275*** 1.413***  1.320*** 1.307*** 1.307*** 1.590*** 1.139*   
 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.074)  (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.101) (0.060) 
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Income (ref.: Low)        
Mid-low 0.982 0.985 1.123** 0.969 0.976 0.981 0.972 0.980 0.990 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.043) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.049) (0.036) 
Mid-high 1.035 1.026 1.158*** 1.014 1.018 1.025 1.011 1.067 1.009 
 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.048) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.057) (0.041) 
High 0.999 0.993 1.022 0.989 0.995 1.011 0.992 1.137 0.950 
 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.083) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.058) (0.117) (0.068) 
Left-Right positioning (ref.: Centre)      
Left 1.092**  1.079* 1.111** 1.096**  1.097** 1.096** 1.098**  1.121* 1.060 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.045) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.054) (0.041) 
Right 1.169*** 1.144*** 1.183*** 1.173*** 1.172*** 1.172*** 1.173*** 1.253*** 1.121*** 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.049) (0.037) 
Party member 0.918**  0.894*** 1.007 0.914**  0.914** 0.914** 0.994 1.033 0.883*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.043) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.061) (0.054) (0.031) 
Town >500,000 0.738*** 0.752*** 0.719*** 0.745*** 0.748*** 0.740*** 0.738*** 0.657*** 0.790*** 
 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.034) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.041) (0.035) 
Interest in politics 1.384*** 1.380*** 1.453*** 1.374*** 1.377*** 1.379*** 1.382*** 1.488*** 1.317*** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.018) 
Mobilization 1.116*** 1.120*** 1.171*** 1.116*** 1.118*** 1.113*** 1.117*** 1.260*** 1.065*** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.030) (0.017) 
Married 1.288*** 1.271*** 1.379*** 1.283*** 1.286*** 1.293*** 1.285*** 1.320*** 1.249*** 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.040) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.047) (0.036) 
Employed 1.101*** 1.095*** 1.270*** 1.084*** 1.111*** 1.078*** 1.088*** 1.086* 1.076*   
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.038) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.040) (0.031) 
Corruption 0.863 0.698 0.782 0.720 0.724 0.758 0.722 0.696 1.100 
 
(0.183) (0.184) (0.178) (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) (0.141) (0.250) (1.411) 
GDP 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000   
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Compulsory vote 2.464*** 2.462*** 2.194** 2.460*** 2.500*** 2.534*** 2.327*** 2.693** 2.220*   
 
(0.617) (0.608) (0.612) (0.603) (0.604) (0.589) (0.569) (0.999) (0.846) 
Proportional 1.144 1.176 1.251 1.158 1.182 1.082 1.159   
 
(0.253) (0.267) (0.304) (0.249) (0.253) (0.222) (0.243)   
Freedom 0.743*** 0.736*** 0.805* 0.738*** 0.735*** 0.759*** 0.736*** 0.806** 0.722*   
 
(0.057) (0.056) (0.068) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.065) (0.092) 
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Public X Corrupt. 1.104*   1.252*** 1.204** 1.203*** 1.264* 1.188*** 1.208*** 1.284*** 4.035*** 
 
(0.048) (0.070) (0.082) (0.053) (0.139) (0.052) (0.053) (0.095) (0.752) 
Variance components       
Var(country) 0.707** 0.697** 0.781* 0.693*** 0.690*** 0.746** 0.697** 0.706* 0.709* 
 
(0.078) (0.077) (0.086) (0.075) (0.076) (0.083) (0.077) (0.117) (0.103) 
Var(x)     0.352*** 0.210*** 0.311***   
     
(0.048) (0.032) (0.052) 
  Var(x, country) 
 
0.851 0.552** 0.731 
  
     
(0.162) (0.115) (0.170) 
  N 55,194 54,849 56,376 56,376 56,376 56,376 56,376 22,596 33,780 
N countries 43 43 44 44 44 44 44 19 25 
Aic 62711.8 62267 40593.7 64353.1 64181.6 64281.5 64252.6 25890.7 38209.4 
Bic 62961.5 62516.5 40844 64585.5 64449.8 64549.7 64520.8 26099.4 38428.6 
Log-likelihood -31327.9 -31105.5 -20268.9 -32150.5 -32060.8 -32110.7 -32096.3 -12919.3 -19078.7 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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 Study 4 No benefits, no vote: The link between political patronage and turnout in an ethnically divided society 
 
Sabina Haveric 
University of Cologne 
 
Abstract 
 
Studies focusing on voting behaviour in ethnically divided societies abound in the literature. 
Existing evidence centered mainly on ethnic loyalties and institutional factors in explaining 
the perpetuation of ethnic voting and vote choice. In contrast, this study considers political 
patronage as an important factor which additionally impacts the voting decision in ethnically 
diverse contexts. To investigate signs of patronage, I analyze turnout levels of public officials 
and minority ethnic groups. By using survey data on Bosnia and Herzegovina, where turnout 
is expected to be high among all citizens due to strong ethnic loyalties and institutional 
encouragement to vote along ethnic lines, I find that turnout is higher for public officials and 
lower for minority ethnic groups. I interpret these findings as manifestations of patronage 
practices. Qualitative accounts of patronage practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
obtained through expert interviews, providing further validation of the expected incentives for 
patronage-beneficiaries (public employees) and lack of such incentives for non-beneficiaries 
(ethnic minorities) when it comes to their vote intention. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Empirical studies on voter turnout in ethnically heterogeneous societies focused 
predominantly on ethnicity, claiming that ethnic belonging positively predicts turnout. 
Citizens in such societies are considered to be loyal towards their ethnic group and supportive 
of ethnic representation. As regards the coexistence of ethnic and national identities, on the 
one hand they are treated as incompatible, as ethnic group belonging is considered to 
negatively impact the loyalty towards the nation state, but on the other hand research puts 
forward that this depends on the ‘model of the interface between national and ethnic identity’, 
bringing up three most prominent models, namely ‘the classical “melting-pot” model, the 
“pluralist” model, and the general “group dominance model”’ (Sidanius and Petrocik 2000:3). 
Still, the importance of ethnicity and ethnic policies often supersedes national issues and 
loyalties. ‘Ethnic identity structures people’s political attitudes and behaviour’ (Just 2017:3). 
In ethnically divided societies, ‘ethnic parties have a ready-made clientele [...] waiting to be 
led’ (Horowitz 1985:308). Therefore, ethnic diversity suggests high turnout rates among all 
citizens. Greater political participation implies increased prospects for co-ethnic 
representatives to be successful  in elections. In order to assure representation of the group 
they belong to, citizens are expected to vote at higher levels and ensure collective advantages. 
Thus, prior research manifested ethnic divisions to positively influence turnout as a collective 
action, fearing the domination of the antagonistic ethnic group (Caspersen 2004). Even in 
circumstances of limited information, ethnic belonging presents a short-cut to identify with 
the political party which represents the interest of one’s own ethnic group and therefore it is 
positively related with turnout (Just 2017; Birnir 2006) 
However, ethnic belonging and fear that the other ethnic group may be growing stronger as 
regards representation are not the only decisive factors, which explain turnout rates in these 
142 
 
 
 
societies. Another important factor is political patronage, as a commonly present phenomenon 
in less developed societies which face ethnic divisions. Research examining political 
patronage in contexts where ethnicity is a salient issue, mostly focused on explaining vote 
choice and pro-incumbent voting  (Chandra 2007, 2009; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). One 
justification given for that is that ethnicity is a good predictor of redistributive preferences of 
elected politicians (Gisselquist 2014; Isaksson and Bigsten 2013; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 
1999). ‘Ethnic competition’, which is according to Bates explained as ‘the striving by ethnic 
groups for valued goods which are scarce in comparison to the demand for them’ (1974:458) 
drives voting behaviour. By favouring their co-ethnics, voters in ethnically fragmented 
societies expect to obtain greater public goods as members of the same ethnic group. The 
same refers to patronage benefits, in the form of redistribution of public sector jobs. 
This study sheds light on the neglected side of political participation in a context where ethnic 
fragmentations are present and where political patronage has a solid ground to be practiced,  
namely voter turnout. It argues that patronage in ethnically fragmented societies specifically 
leads to implications with regard to turnout of two population sub-groups: public sector 
employees and ethnic minorities. Presence of political patronage, in the form of public sector 
job distribution, has thus a different impact on citizens who are linked to the state via their 
employment and dependent on the political success of the governing political party. Public 
sector employees are therefore considered to be more incentivized than other citizens when it 
comes to voting.  By contrast, if one’s job stability and employment prospects do not depend 
on the ruling political party, one may decide to stay out of the electoral process and abstain. 
Furthermore, this study argues that members of minority ethnic groups do not have the same 
incentives to turnout in elections as majority group members, due to the preferential 
redistribution of patronage benefits to co-ethnics. Ethnic divisions are considered a suitable 
precondition for patronage practices. Strong ethnic divisions make it easier for the patron to 
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target his co-ethnics. Patronage politics and ethnic favouritism go hand in hand. Thus, 
material benefits are more likely to be distributed towards majority ethnic groups, whose 
political parties enjoy electoral advantages due to the majority status of the group they 
represent. Accordingly, they are less likely to be distributed towards minority ethnic groups 
(Chandra 2007), whose scarce prospects to obtain patronage benefits result often in 
abstention. By introducing patronage as a potential causal mechanism for different turnout 
levels of public sector employees and minority ethnic groups, this study challenges common 
explanations in the literature, which suggest that ethnic attitudes solely ensure high turnout in 
divided societies. Additionally, it contributes to the research on political patronage by 
focusing on its link with voter turnout, not only vote choice. 
This research uses survey data from Bosnia and Herzegovina to analyze vote intentions of 
public sector employees and minority ethnic groups. It employs a logistic regression to find 
empirical evidence which supports the above stated expectations. The obtained results 
manifest higher likelihood of public officials to turnout in elections, along with lower 
likelihood of minority ethnic groups. Nationalism does not exhibit statistically significant 
associations with turnout, for it shows that ethnic divisions are strong and citizens are more 
likely to be attached to their own ethnic group.  
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the link between 
ethnic/national identity and voter turnout. Subsequently, Section 3 presents the so far 
conducted research on turnout levels of public sector employees. What follows in Section 4 is 
the explanation of the missing link between political patronage and voter turnout. Section 5 
gives greater details on the case selection and case related specifics. Results of the empirical 
analysis are given in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Ethnic versus national identity and voter turnout 
 
Voting based on ethnic attachment is the most common way of political participation in 
ethnically divided societies (Houle 2018; Carlson 2015; Chandra 2007; Bieber 2003; 
Horowitz 1985). Prevalence of ethnic politics was shown to produce high turnout rates and 
elections are seen as an ‘ethnic census’ (Horowitz 1985). Ethnic loyalties are considered as 
one important predictor of voter turnout.  So are national feelings, which are, however, 
frequently restrained when ethnic belonging is a salient issue. De Rooij et al. legitimately ask: 
‘Without a sense of belonging, an emotional attachment and a certain degree of pride in the 
country, why would citizens support governmental policies and participate in politics?’ (De 
Rooij et al. 2012:2). Strong nationalist attitudes are generally manifested in their numerical 
power in the elections - higher turnout, making an impact on the electoral success of 
respective parties. Differences in nationalist attitudes were found to impact the extent to 
which citizens get involved in the voting process, showing higher turnout and greater political 
engagement of the ones who exhibit stronger nationalistic ideas (Huddy and Khatib 2007). 
Huddy and Khatib showed that stronger national identity is increasing political interest and 
involvement, including voter turnout and that stronger ties with the nation secure higher 
obedience and compliance with its social and political norms. They refer to the social identity 
theory, whose major contributors were Tajfel and Turner (1979) which predicts ‘higher levels 
of political involvement among strong national identifiers because of their greater adherence 
to group norms’ (Ibid.:74). Some authors argue that national identity needs to be provoked by 
some specific circumstances (De Rooij et al. 2012). De Rooij et al. refer to certain threats as 
activators, which are considered ‘to raise the salience of in-group/out-group distinctions’ 
(p.7). They point to early scholarship which puts forward that in the presence of a threat, 
individuals will be more likely to participate in politics, ‘assuming that threat would 
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strengthen social categorization and thus strengthen the association between national pride 
and political participation’ (De Rooij et al. 2012:7,8).  
However, in ethnically divided societies ethnic and national identities mainly stand in contrast 
to each other. The nationalist ideology advocates ‘cultural similarity and wide ranging 
integration of all the inhabitants of the nation state, regardless of their ethnic membership’ 
(Eriksen 1991:263). According to Eriksen, ‘the main difference between ethnicity and 
nationalism lies in their relationship to the state’ (Ibid.). He notes that: 
 
‘Unsuccessful nationalisms therefore tend to become transformed into ethnicities 
whose members reside more or less uncomfortably under the aegis of a state which 
they do not identify with their own nationality or ethnic category’ (p.265).  
 
Consequently, in a context of an ethnically divided society, where citizens identify more 
along the ethnic dimension, nationalism can be viewed as rather ‘unsuccessful’, for it is not 
expected to affect turnout rates as described. Citizens identify with their ethnic group and vote 
predominantly along ethnic lines. 
 
3. Turnout of the public sector 
 
Various studies attributed different political attitudes and higher turnout levels to public 
officials (Corey and Garand 2002; Garand et al. 1991; Blais et al. 1990). There is an 
agreement in the literature that public officials turn out more in elections than other citizens 
(Cameron 1993; Garand et al. 1991; Bennett and Orzechowski 1983; Frey and Pommerehne 
1982). This was mostly found to be linked to the ‘bureaucratic theory of government growth’, 
which puts forward the general conception of the ‘budget maximizing bureaucrat’ (Corey and 
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Garand 2002). It postulates that attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats, which are here 
referred to as public officials, are different in what regards the growth of the public sector and 
their own interest within. They favour higher government spending, and as such, expect their 
votes to influence their self-interest and personal benefits. Two additional explanations are 
present in the literature with regards to their higher turnout rates. On the one hand, it is self-
selection, meaning that individuals with certain characteristics and political convictions are 
inclined to select public employment. Furthermore, prior research manifested public 
employees to have better educational attainment, greater interest in politics and knowledge on 
political matters (Corey and Garand 2002). Moreover, their working environment enables 
them to have easier and less costly access to political information than ordinary citizens. 
Likewise, a sense of citizen’s duty, as one of the major psychological variables, is 
considered a powerful predictor of voter turnout (Blais and Achen 2010). It is 
acknowledged to be more associated with public employment, as they are expected to 
demonstrate higher levels of such ethical motivation and to be more ‘civic minded’ 
(Jensen et al. 2009). They are foreseen to have a ‘heightened sense of civic duty’, which 
positively impacts turnout rates (Jensen et al. 2009:712).   
However, prior research manifested that educational attainment, interest in politics and sense 
of civic duty do not entirely explain the difference in turnout among public employees and the 
rest of the population. They are found to vote at higher rates even after controlling for these 
factors (Corey and Garand 2002). Furthermore, their policy preferences are found to vary 
after retirement, coinciding with preferences of the workers not belonging to the public sector 
(Rattsø 2013). This research thus assumes one more rationale for their higher turnout, which 
is context dependent. In less developed democracies, with inefficient institutional framework 
and widespread patronage networks, their higher turnout can eventually be explained by the 
presence of political patronage. In such contexts, there is a dependency of public officials, as 
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‘patronage employees’ (beneficiaries), on political success of politicians (patrons) who hired 
them (Oliveros 2013). If public officials don’t go to the polls, new political elites may come 
in power, take over control of public goods and jeopardize their employment stability 
(government job) through different redistribution of public resources and by favouring their 
party sympathizers. As such, the patronage contract is supported from both sides without any 
control and/or sanction (Oliveros 2013).  
4. The missing link between political patronage and turnout 
 
Political patronage is one important factor which accounts for differences in citizens’ voting 
behaviour. Scholars of patronage democracies see patronage as a sub-form of clientelism, and 
define it as an ‘exchange in which voters obtain public jobs for their services to a candidate’ 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:7). Patronage is usually defined as to include the practice of 
public sector jobs distribution in return for votes and political support. Low quality of 
democracy and inefficient institutional structures make these societies often the greatest 
victims of patronage. High corruption levels and ethnic divisions offer fertile ground for 
patronage to be practiced. A rich body of scholarly literature focused on this phenomenon as 
an important  mechanism which affects voting behaviour in these societies. In patronage 
democracies both voters and political representatives pursue their self-interest in the form of 
patronage benefits. Politicians have the incentives to be re-elected and remain in control of 
public goods. According to Chandra, ‘votes are the most lucrative form how to achieve it’ 
(Chandra 2007:11). Voters obtain benefits from the proximity to the political party in the form 
of public sector jobs, which stability they want to ensure by re-electing the patron and 
renewing the patronage contract.  
Despite the strong scholarly emphasis on identity driven voting behavior, I argue that it is not 
only the ethnic, nor nationalistic attachment, which solely drives voting participation. Voters 
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are to a large extent rational and strategic actors, who want to maximize their benefits with the 
act of voting. If this argumentation is applied in the context of ‘unsuccessful nationalism’ 
(Eriksen 1991) due to highly emphasized ethnic differences, where the quality of democracy 
is rather low and enables patronage networks, voting needs to be additionally analyzed in light 
of benefits which can be obtained through such patronage practices. By following this line of 
reasoning, two categories of patronage beneficiaries need to be distinguished, namely public 
officials and minority ethnic groups. I expect public employees to display higher turnout rates, 
since they are incentivized to use their votes as instruments for obtaining material benefits or 
job security. Public officials are in such contexts considered to be ‘patronage employees’ 
(Oliveros 2013) and thus, a noteworthy target group. The dependency of public officials on 
the state and the incumbent party who is in control of public resources is higher, which 
justifies the prediction of such voting behaviour.   
Furthermore, patronage politics and ethnic favouritism are considered to be strongly related. 
According to Chandra, ‘a common expectation seems to be that a person holding public office 
or other position of power will use his position for the near-exclusive benefit of his ‘own’ 
people, defined by kinship, community or personal loyalty’ (2007:84). Patronage networks 
are therefore considered to have an ethnic dimension. According to Arriola et al. ‘ethnicity is 
politically informative in multiethnic societies because it is the basis on which politicians are 
often expected to channel resources to voters’ (Arriola et al. 2017:1).The ethnic dimension in 
this research is tested by investigating turnout levels of minority ethnic groups in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Minority ethnic groups are considered to be less likely to obtain patronage 
benefits, which leads to predict their lower turnout rates in patronage driven contexts. 
Namely, if voters favour representatives from their ethnic groups and as Ishiyama notes, 
‘express voting preferences as a bloc’, ethnic parties who represent majority ethnic groups are 
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given electoral advantage to further redistribute public goods toward their co-ethnics 
(Ishiyama 2012:761). 
5. Case selection 
 
Following the theory based case selection strategy, Bosnia and Herzegovina is selected as a 
typical case of an ethnically divided society, where ethnicity is highly politicized and ethnic 
divisions are expected to lead to high turnout rates among all citizens.  
This research, however, moves beyond this common focus on ethnicity and refers to an 
additional factor which has potential to influence turnout in a divided society. It centres on 
political patronage as an important intervening phenomenon and its link with voter turnout. 
The selected case study is considered to be suitable for analyzing patronage due to strong 
ethnic divisions the country manifests between three existent ethnic groups, namely: 
Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs and for its insufficiently developed institutional framework to 
fight patronage practices. The population census from 20138
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a case study under observation, is furthermore considered 
suitable given the fact that public sector makes up the largest proportion of employment (32 
%)
 confirmed the changed 
demographic structure and a clear ethnic structure that the two sub-national units have. It 
showed that 92.11 per cent of all Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina live in the 
Republika Srpska and 91.39 per cent of all Bosnian Croats and 88.23 per cent of Bosniaks 
live in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This, therefore, allows for treating Serbs in 
the Federation as a  minority ethnic group, similarly to Bosniaks and Croats in the Republika 
Srpska.   
9
                                                          
8 Popis stanovnistva, domacinstava, kucanstava i stanova u BiH, 2013, www.popis.gov.ba. 
. It can thus be referred to it as a ‘patronage democracy’, which is considered ‘a distinct 
9 European Commission staff working document on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brussels, 2015. 
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family of democracies’ (Chandra 2009:7), since according to the author, a democracy is 
patronage based if it displays extremely unbalanced distribution of public and private 
employment. Furthermore, with patronage democracies, she refers to ‘democracies in which 
the state has a relative monopoly on jobs and services, and in which elected officials enjoy 
significant discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the 
disposal of the state’ (p.6). All of these preconditions are in place in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Furthermore, the country’s complex and fragmented public administration, 
together with the slow democratic consolidation, affect the transparency of the public service 
system.  
The choice of this case study reaffirms as well the requirements for patronage development, 
which were studied in the literature. Namely, scholars manifested patronage to be in place in 
countries with lower levels of economic development and poverty, inefficient political 
development (Stokes et al. 2013; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Calvo and Murillo 2004; 
Wantchekon 2003; Kitschelt 2000; Lemarchand and Legg 1972), but also through historical 
legacies such as the close state-society linkages in post-communist states (Kopecký et al. 
2011). Bosnia and Herzegovina is a post-conflict country with a lower level of economic 
development and with a socialist legacy.  
 
5.1. On the electoral system, public sector and patronage in Bosnia     
       and Herzegovina 
 
The grounds for the electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina were set by the Dayton Peace 
Accords, which is an international agreement incorporating also the country’s constitution. It 
institutionalized ethnicity by mentioning three ethnic groups as different ‘constituencies’, 
namely Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. A decentralized state with sub-national units was created, 
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namely the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, along with an 
autonomous district Brcko. 
The constitution mirrors the diverse ethnic composition of the country, providing them with 
equal opportunities to be represented in the government through instruments of power-
sharing. With the proportional electoral system in place, which enables representation even 
for the smallest political parties, turnout is expected to be high.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered ‘a non-consolidated democracy with a multi-party 
system’ (Kapidzic 2015: 36). Kapidzic further notes how the country’s first political parties 
emerged in the beginning of the nineties, replacing the Communist Party, which was the only 
one permitted in the earlier stages. Ethnic divisions between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs were 
reflected in the establishment of the party system, which favored the formation of ethnic 
parties. The first multi-party elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina noted the success of ethnic 
parties. This showed to have strong effects on the war which took place between 1992-1995 
and the party system after the war. The divided party system after the wartime built on the 
consociational elements which were incorporated into the constitution and the electoral 
system itself,  making ethnicity its main element. Political parties are to date key actors in 
encouraging further ethnic divisions, enabling political competition to take place only within 
ethnic groups (Kapidzic 2015).  
The administrative structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of state and entity level 
institutions (governments), due to the division of the country into two sub-national units, 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.  Besides the two entities, there 
exists also one autonomous district, namely District Brcko. For the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, further subdivisions exist within cantons (ten) and municipalities (seventy nine), 
whereas for the Republika Srpska they include the level of municipalities (sixty three). Public 
sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina is understood to encompass all levels of state government, 
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social, pension and health insurance and public companies. It incorporates institutions of 
legislative, executive and judicial authorities at the state, entity, cantonal and local level, 
public administration and all the activities in which the state, entities, cantons, Brcko District, 
cities and municipalities have power and jurisdiction (i.e. education, social security, public 
ownership). Consequently, public officials are citizens who work for one of the above 
institutions, government agencies, administrations and/or corporations. 
The political architecture of Bosnia and Herzegovina is quite complex. It is perceived as the 
stumbling block of public sector efficiency. The fractions built along ethnic lines are a 
financial burden for the country, as well. Public sector institutions are duplicated and existing 
in parallel settings for diverse territories. As a consequence, the country is faced with vast 
public expenditures and an unreasonably high number of public officials. The World Bank 
report on public expenditures and institutional review (2012)10
Official documents from non-governmental organizations provide evidence on existent party 
patronage networks. According to analyses conducted by the Center for Civil Initiatives 
(CCI)
 addresses the issue of 
excessive growth of the public sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina as one of the main 
challenges for the country, showing that Bosnia has one of the largest public sectors in the 
whole region, which needs to be cut. Due to the recommendations to introduce controls to 
monitor and control staffing in public administration, one may understand that this control is 
not in place.  
11
                                                          
10Document of the World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina Challenges and Directions for Reform A Public 
Expenditure and Institutional Review, 2012 . 
, politicization of the public  sector and assignment of positions according to political 
party affiliations is a considerable problem which  the country faces. By politicization of the 
public office it is considered what Peters and Pierre (2004:160) have explained as ‘the 
substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, 
11 CCI is one of the leading non-governmental organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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rewards and disciplining of members of the public service’. The conducted analysis on behalf 
of the CCI shows how the entire public employment setting captures mainly the interests of 
certain individuals and political parties. Furthermore, according to the expert interview 
‘political and party appointments for important agencies, institutions and public enterprises 
lead to a very low efficiency, idleness, lack of accountability and politicization of the 
service’12. At the same time, the expert notes how ‘evidence from the analysis points to a 
burdensome fact how this practice of politicizing public office significantly distorts the 
internal stability of institutions and contributes to disruptions in the hierarchy of 
responsibility, as party employment means the responsibility to the party, not the institution, 
law and citizens’13. This political party indebtedness, additionally, affects the voting decision 
and turnout, in general. According to the CCI analysis, Bosnia and Herzegovina abounds with 
formal political positions within the public sector at all state levels, that are unofficial 
‘election spoils’. By appointing politically loyal personnel, political parties count on their 
votes in the elections. The fact that employment or advancement in the public sector is 
impossible without party eligibility, is confirmed in the expert interview conducted with the 
director of CCI in Sarajevo14, as well as by personal experiences which were given during the 
campaign launched by the CCI.15
                                                          
12 Expert interview with the director of the Centre for Civil Initiatives was conducted in Sarajevo, in March 
2016. 
 Thus, the aim of the Centre for Civil Initiative is to 
13 Public statement given by the director of the non-governmental organization Centre for Civil Initiatives . 
14 Expert interview with the director of the Centre for Civil Initiatives was conducted in Sarajevo, in March 
2016. 
15 A professor from Tuzla, which is considered a post-industrial regional centre, explains how, after working in 
one primary school for years, she scored the least points in the electoral year. She claims that the selection 
procedure was manipulated in order to make the position available for another, more ‘politically eligible’ 
candidate, whose family ties are linked with the advisor of the prime minister and who is additionally applying 
for the position of the mayor, belonging to SDA (Party of Democratic Action), as the main Bosniak ethnic party. 
Another personal story comes from a female person who states to always be the "second" on the list, explaining 
how ‘second’ means the best, but despite having the best qualifications, the one thing she does not have is 
someone to ‘call’ for her and mention the political linkage. One further example is a competent, but in his words 
not ‘politically eligible’ young person, who scored better for a post in the public service, but was rejected for the 
position, because he didn’t belong to a suitable political party. He claims to have filed a complaint in the court, 
but by offering all relevant documentation, he is asking for advisory help from the CCI; All these reports are 
available at the website of the non-governmental organization CCI under the campaign name ‘Sposobnim, a ne 
podobnim’. 
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influence depoliticization of the public sector. As the main non-governmental body in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, CCI launched a petition demanding the separation of political functions 
from professional positions in public administration, fair employment in healthcare, education 
and public institutions. What triggered the campaign is, in their view, the reality after 
elections, when political leaders and the holders of the most responsible political positions 
share positions in the public administration without following formal criteria, undermining 
competences of candidates and the rule of law. Further official reports, such as the one from 
the  European Commission stated ‘little progress in advancing reforms to reduce corruption, 
which continues to affect the entire public sector and remains most acute in the areas of 
service delivery and access to employment. Political patronage networks are widespread and 
influence all levels of government’.16
Another expert interview which was conducted with an official from the  Center for Civil 
Society Promotion (CCSP) in Sarajevo, reaffirms the above patronage evidence. The focal 
point of the discussion are again  public officials, to whom the expert refers as the broad 
category which is turning out in elections and maintaining the status quo. This is explained to 
be the case due to patronage benefits. Furthermore, the expert  referred to abstainers and  how 
political elites do not mention this population group, whether in their speeches, nor in their 
political programs, even though almost 50 per cent of the population does not take part in 
elections. Political elites, thus, have the certainty in continuing their political power when 
status quo is remained and public officials vote further for ‘the hand that feeds them’.
 
17
 
 
6.  Empirical analysis  
To investigate signs of patronage in an ethnically divided society, which I consider to be 
manifested through higher turnout of public officials and lower turnout levels of minority 
                                                          
16 European Commission BIH Progress Report, 2014. 
17 Expert interview was conducted with one employed official of the Center for Civil Initiatives in January 2017; 
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ethnic groups, I use survey data on Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2013 (Puhalo and Perisic 
2013).  
In order to analyze the link between turnout and public sector affiliation, as well as turnout 
and minority ethnic group status, I employ a logistic regression. The dependent variable is 
turnout, which adopts the value ‘1’ when the respondents say that they will vote if there were 
national parliamentary elections tomorrow, and ‘0’ if they say they will not vote. As 
independent variables, I include in the model public sector employment and ethnic group 
minority status. Public sector employment is a dummy variable which takes on the value ‘1’  
if the person is working in the public sector and the value ‘0’ otherwise (private sector 
employees, unemployed, students, retired, etc.). I expect a positive effect of public sector 
employment on turnout, which means that working in the public sector should increase the 
likelihood of voting (turnout). Ethnic group minority status is also constructed as a dummy 
variable, taking on the value ‘1’ in two situations: if the respondent is a Serb in the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if he/she is Croat or Bosniak in the Republika Srpska. 
I control for two socio-demographic variables, namely age and educational level in order to 
test if the positive effect of working in the public sector on voter turnout will remain 
unaffected. As further control variables which could impact turnout I include in the regression 
analysis party membership, confidence in political parties and nationalism. Party membership 
takes on value ‘1’ if the respondent is a member of a political party (active or non-active) and 
‘0’ otherwise. Confidence in political parties ranges from 1 (no confidence at all) to 5 (full 
confidence). The variable nationalism is a scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high), and it builds 
on 14 different items measuring nationalist attitudes. 18
                                                          
18 Questions included for the estimation of nationalism (ethnicity)  
 It is constructed by adding together all 
1. Since they are less capable than us, members of other nations are constantly working behind our back.  
2.One should be cautious and restrained against members of other nations, even when we appear to be friends.  
3. One should not be mixed with people from different nations through national mixed marriages.  
4. I often feel best within a society in which all members are from my ethnic group.  
5. An offense against my people I perceive as an attack on my own personality.  
6. A feeling of attachment to their own people is one of the most beautiful feelings that a person can have.  
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the items and dividing them by fourteen. Finally, one additional dummy variable is created by 
coding respondents place of residence  as ‘1’ if the respondent is from the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and ‘0’ if he/she is from Republika Sprska. This variable allows us 
to control for the differences between the two territories that make up the country. 
Table 1: Logistic regression for turnout 
 Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Public sector employment 0,585** 
(0,227) 
Minority ethnic group (status) -1,055** 
(0,572) 
Political party membership 1,472*** 
(0,191) 
Confidence in political parties 0,897*** 
0,087) 
Nationalism 0,005 
(0,142) 
Age (30-44) -0,036 
(0,232) 
Age (45-59) 0,284 
(0,244) 
Age (60 plus) 0,638* 
(0,288) 
Education 0,086*** 
(0,036) 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1,000*** 
(0,187) 
N 1225 
R Square 0,368 
Constant -5,243*** 
(0,722) 
 
 
***p<0,001; ** p<0,01; *p<0,05; + p<0,1 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
DV: Turnout 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7. National interests should always be placed before own.  
8. Children should be brought up in the national spirit.  
9. Mankind is one true human community and therefore each division of the nation is harmful.  
10. For a person it is more important to be a citizen of the world than a member of a nation.  
11. It would be the best solution if the whole world was one country with a common rule.  
12. Mankind should aim at the goal of complete abolition of Nations.  
13. One should aspire to adjust the culture of his people to the culture that the whole world accepts.  
14. Conflicts between countries would not exist, if there were no national divisions. 
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Data summarized in Table 1 indicates higher likelihood to vote for employees belonging to 
the public sector. The prediction  regarding the positive relation between belonging to the 
public sector and turnout is confirmed. In the broader context which involves the 
presence of political patronage and politicized public sector, one could interpret this 
finding as a sign of patronage practice. Patronage benefits are considered to be more easily 
obtained by public officials. In the majority of democracies, public officials vote more. Their 
higher turnout has been explained by their lower costs of voting due to the working 
environment and higher benefits, for they are also seen as ‘budget maximizers’ (Corey and 
Garand 2002). Additionally, they are considered to vote at higher rates due to different 
idiosyncratic features, greater sense of civic duty, higher confidence towards political parties 
and by virtue of better educational attainment, which is in line with the self-selection 
hypothesis. Yet, findings of this study stand in contrast to the so far given explanations. 
Results of this study reveal that in the context of an ethnically divided society with existent 
preconditions for patronage practices, turnout of public officials is not necessarily related to 
higher levels of education and more confidence in political parties, since the positive 
relationship endured the inclusion of these control variables. Evidence in this paper report 
that even when controlling for educational attainment, the positive effect of working in 
the public sector on voter turnout still exists. Furthermore, after controlling for confidence 
in political parties, results show that public officials still turn out significantly more than the 
rest of the population. Apart from these two control variables that manifested no influence on 
higher turnout rates for public officials, this study shows that only 14 per cent of the public 
sector employees mention civic duty as the reason for their active voting behavior. This 
contrasts with this well established idea that higher turnout is closely related with higher 
levels of civic duty. Especially, it does not support the argument that public officials turn 
out more in elections because they demonstrate higher levels of civic duty, as an ethical 
impulse, and higher civic mindedness. In the present study, which is a case study of an 
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ethnically divided society with fertile ground for patronage practices, one could relate 
these findings with political patronage. For public employees voting means job security 
and stability. Public officials in patronage driven contexts depend to a high extent on the 
electoral success of the patron. This enforces higher political mobilization due to security 
reasons. The electoral success of the political patron is important in order to maintain 
privileged access to public goods (government jobs) and guarantee public officials as 
‘patronage employees’ security of their posts. Otherwise, if another political party wins the 
elections, patronage allocations would vary and government jobs could be distributed in a 
different manner, favouring party sympathizers of the party which gained electoral advantage. 
The second expectation which relates to the lower turnout of ethnic minorities is also 
confirmed. Table 1 shows that groups which belong to the minority (Serbs in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosniaks and Croats in the Republika Srpska) 
vote less. These findings also suggest patronage to account for the variation. Namely, in 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina where Bosniaks and Croats are the majority, 
following the ethnic ties, more patronage benefits are being directed towards these two 
ethnic groups, which provides more incentives for them to vote. The same applies to the 
Serbs in the Republika Srpska. 
With regard to control variables which were included in the estimations in order to test 
the robustness of the results, expectations were confirmed. Education is shown to have a 
boosting effect on turnout, similarly to age, party membership and confidence in political 
parties. With reference to political party membership, the obtained results reveal a 
significant impact of party membership on voter turnout. Public officials were shown to 
be members of political parties in greater numbers than citizens not belonging to the 
public sector. This difference is apparent and twice as high for public officials, out of 
which 37,8 per cent belong to the political party. However, only 15,3 per cent of citizens 
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not belonging to the public sector is reported to be a member of political party. Following 
the reasoning of Chandra (2007:12), in order to obtain patronage benefits, ‘proximity to 
those who seek state office becomes the principle source of both - material and psychic 
benefits’. In a more general vein, once appointed to the public office, the mutual 
interdependence between the electorate and political parties they belong to grows. Public 
officials serve and contribute to the electoral advantage of the political party, extending the 
patronage network. This, to a  certain extent, explains why party personnel is frequently 
appointed to exercise important public functions.   
An interesting result in the conducted analysis shows that turnout is not driven by nationalist 
feelings. Such behaviour would also not have been expected on the grounds of Bosnia’s 
political context, which encourages ethnic divisions. Nationalist attitudes are usually 
manifested in their numerical strength in the elections (higher turnout), making an impact on 
the electoral success of respective parties. This, however, is considered to be the case when 
ethnic and national identity are not in conflict and when the party system is not encouraging 
ethnic divisions to such a high degree as present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Certainly there 
are more factors which influence this link, which go beyond the scope of this study. The 
effect of nationalism on voter turnout does not display statistically significant associations in 
this empirical study. Contrary to findings in the literature that different nationalist attitudes 
impact the extent to which citizens get politically involved and showing stronger nationalistic 
ideas to positively influence turnout, this study brings to light the finding that nationalism 
does not provide impulse for higher turnout in ethnically divided contexts.  
 
  
160 
 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
The salience of ethnicity on voting behaviour has been of central priority when conducting 
research on political engagement in ethnically divided societies. Ethnic identity has been 
dominant in explaining the perpetuation of ethnic voting. In contrast to vote choice, this study 
focused on turnout as another critical sign of political participation. It considers voting 
incentives to differ for specific groups of voters. Thus, this paper takes under closer 
inspection two population sub-groups, namely: public officials and ethnic minorities. The 
present study analyzed their voter turnout in a context where ethnic cleavages and patronage 
networks are prevailing societal features. Turnout levels of these two groups are employed to 
investigate signs of patronage. Findings confirmed the expected positive effect between 
public sector employment and turnout. Beyond this prediction, an additional assertion that 
minority ethnic groups turn out less in elections, was equally confirmed. Obtained results 
were shown to be robust to the inclusion of the different socio-demographic characteristics of 
the voters. This study considers political patronage and opportunities to gain patronage 
benefits as possible explanations for the shown variations in turnout between the 
aforementioned groups. Public officials in patronage contexts exhibit a strong dependency on 
the electoral success of the patron. This poses a certain pressure on them to cast votes on 
election day due to security reasons. Their turnout levels are considered to ensure electoral 
success of the patron, who in return guarantees them further job security due to privileged 
access to public goods (government jobs). Furthermore, ethnicity presents a short-cut for 
distribution of public goods. If benefits are distributed to ‘own’ people, namely co-ethnics, 
minorities as non-beneficiaries are expected to display higher abstention levels. These 
findings have implications with regards to political accountability, collective representation 
and political legitimacy.  
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However, the suggested patronage mechanism is just one out of many potential 
explanations for the higher turnout of public employees. In fact, another possible 
assumption would be that their greater electoral participation displays their 
dissatisfaction with the incumbent government, for they have better information on their 
achievements due to the working environment. Appreciative of this fact, one needs to 
check whether public employees vote for the incumbent or not, which would be a sine 
qua non for upholding the patronage argument. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Are voters in ethnically divided societies so ethnic in their nature, or do other factors, such as 
patronage, contribute to electoral outcomes which encourage ethnic politics and promote 
ethnic divisions? Is economic voting traceable in these complex settings, where ethnicity is 
the most salient issue and the linkage between voters and parties is clientelistic rather than 
programmatic? Is political accountability beyond reach, since this political context  is claimed 
to generate the ethnic voter who votes for ethnic parties regardless of their performance? Does 
this hold for the whole electorate or does it depend on ‘issue importance’ (Fournier et al. 
2003) for a single voter?  
The aim of this dissertation is to look beyond previous literature  findings, which indicate that 
ethnic heterogeneity negatively impacts peaceful cohabitation, democratic development, 
economic progress and efficient governance (Alesina and LaFerrara 2005; Alesina et al. 
1999). It looks beyond the ‘expressive voting hypothesis’, laid down by Horowitz (1985), 
which suggests that ethnic divisions and consociational features inevitably lead to ethnic 
voting. It looks beyond ethnic representation, which has been found to be the primary role of 
democracy in ethnically divided societies.  
It sheds light on political patronage and its link with voter turnout, it examines economic 
voting, based on economic performance of the incumbent government and moreover, it 
emphasizes political accountability, which was previously shown to be of secondary 
importance in such  ethnically heterogeneous contexts. 
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1. Results 
 
Thus, the first study of this dissertation builds on the scholarly literature that investigates how 
the economy influences voting behaviour, which has to date tended to focus on more 
developed democracies. By looking at an ethnically divided society, with different levels of 
ethnic divisions, this study has sought to test the economic voting theory in a new context. It 
is a context where ethnicity is a salient issue, ethnic representation of primary importance and 
the whole political system is envisaged to accommodate ethnic divisions. This political 
context makes it appealing to examine whether voters in these circumstances hold 
incumbents to account for poor economic performance and if there is any relationship 
between unemployment and voter turnout. This study argued that economic voting does 
exist in divided societies and that unemployment mobilizes citizens to vote, rather than 
making them withdraw from the political realm. Obtained results reveal, however, that 
the effect of economic conditions on voting behaviour  is moderated by the level of 
ethnic divisions in the municipality. Economic voting is present in more homogeneous 
areas, in which unemployment has a double effect. On one hand, it seems to account for 
more electoral mobilization (higher voter turnout). On the other hand, it decreases vote 
shares for the incumbent parties. Nevertheless, the results are not the same for ethnically 
heterogeneous municipalities, in which there is not a numerically dominant ethnic group. 
In fact, in areas in which the level of ethnic divisions is high, unemployment does not 
affect voter turnout. In such scenario, the analysis has shown even higher support of the 
incumbent parties as the unemployment rate increases. Higher support for the incumbent 
is assumed to be evident due to reasons of patronage benefits, which these voters may 
acquire more easily if the incumbent parties (representing their ethnic group) are in 
power. For the incumbent parties such a political setting is suitable and according to the 
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concept ‘divide and rule’, this strategy enables them not to be responsive of citizens’ 
preferences and needs, but to be reelected, nonetheless. They keep encouraging divisions 
among the different ethnic groups, in order to get exculpated for poor performance. The 
results show that ethnic divisions are encouraging lack of accountability of incumbent 
parties, which reiterate other findings, also using municipality-level data, although with a 
slightly different focus (Hulsey 2010; Manning 2004; Caspersen 2004). This study, 
however, relates to the economic dimension. The findings of this study show that the 
rational calculus of voting, as seen by Downs (1957), may also find applicability in 
ethnically divided societies. Individuals may vote for the political party that provides 
them with the highest level of individual (patronage) benefits—that is to say, out of self-
interest. However, remembering that ethnically divided and conflicted societies lack 
ethnic safety, security and state integrity, some voters may give importance to these 
aspects, as  well and vote ethnically despite economic concerns, due to genuine ethnic 
persuasions. 
The aim of the second study is to explore the presence of performance voting in an 
ethnically divided society, which political context incentivizes electoral participation 
along ethnic lines, and is to a great extent negligent of accomplishments of political 
actors. Assessing governmental performance presents an important evaluative mechanism of 
citizens to ensure political accountability. Yet, the salience of ethnic issues often implies 
ethnic voting, irrespective of how incumbents’ achievements in office are evaluated. 
Political parties in ethnically diverse societies, which are additionally characterized by 
consociational features, tie their electoral fortunes to increased ethnic rhetoric and by 
appealing only to the ethnic group they belong to. This negatively affects political 
accountability, since voters do not punish political actors, fearing that they will lose 
representatives with whom they identify in what concerns ethnic belonging. Many research 
findings demonstrated that due to salience of ethnic issues and regardless of their 
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performance, ethnic parties continue to have electoral support. However, we lack more 
specific observations if this holds for the whole electorate or only for the ones perceiving 
ethnic issues as most important ones. ‘Issue importance’ is namely considered to impact 
electoral decisions (Fournier et al. 2003). Thus, in this study I argue that personal (egotropic) 
unemployment (contrary to sociotropic economic voting, which relies on macro-economic 
indicators, as looked upon in the first study) is assumed to influence voting behaviour based 
on more critical judgment of governments’ past actions and policy outcomes. As assumed, the 
indicated results confirm the expectations that voting for ethnic parties is not linked to 
governments’ evaluations. Ethnic parties are given electoral support regardless of their good 
or bad performance. However, this is not the case for the unemployed voters. This subgroup 
of the population (electorate) does hold political representatives (main ethnic parties) to 
account for their good or bad governance. Good evaluations mean more votes for ethnic 
parties, bad evaluations are linked with less support. Overall, these findings illustrated new 
insights by showing that evaluative voting behavior in an ethnically divided society is present. 
It advanced our understanding of how individuals, based on their personal economic hardship 
and issue salience, show different voting patterns. The abstention rate of unemployed citizens 
is also shown to be higher despite higher education, which can be perceived as ‘deliberate 
disengagement’ (Croke et al. 2016). Defection to other ethnic parties, which are less ethnic in 
their nature, is observed only among this subgroup of voters. 
The third study contributed to the scholarly research by examining the impact of corruption on 
voter turnout. Besides the scarcity of this research, previous studies yielded contradictory 
results. According to some authors, corruption has been shown to have a negative effect on 
turnout, due to alienation and apathy among voters (Sundström and Stockemer 2015; 
Stockemer, LaMontagne and Scruggs, 2013; McCann and Domínguez 1998), whereas for 
others, instead of having a demobilizing effect, corruption was shown to increase turnout 
(Escaleras et al. 2012; Kostadinova 2009). Second, the negative effect of corruption on 
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turnout was shown to vanish in highly corrupt countries (Dahlberg and Solevid 2016). This 
study argued that if the effect of corruption on turnout is not uniform everywhere, it is because 
not everyone is affected in the same way. We hypothesized that the effect of corruption on 
voter turnout depends on individuals’ sector of employment. Corruption is more likely to have 
a positive effect on turnout among public employees than among ordinary citizens. In highly 
corrupt societies, the practice of delivering or maintaining public sector jobs in exchange of 
political support tends to be widespread (Kurer 1993). Thus, the incentives to vote among 
public employees would be higher in corrupt societies since their fortunes are tied to the 
political fate of the incumbent government or the politician who has appointed them. By 
contrast, corruption is more likely to have a negative effect on turnout among citizens who do 
not work in the public sector and are, therefore, less dependent on the state and the political 
success of the government of the day for their livelihoods. By proposing patronage as a 
possible mechanism contributing to account for the mixed results obtained by previous 
research, this study sought to bridge between two strands of literature: the one that 
investigates the link between corruption and turnout, and the one that focuses on the different 
voting behaviour of public sector workers. Our results only partially met our expectations. 
They showed that the turnout differential between the two categories indeed grows as the 
perceived level of public-sector corruption increases. However, while corruption has a 
demobilizing effect among those who are not public employees, public employees do not vote 
more in highly corrupt countries. They remain equally likely to vote regardless of corruption 
levels. Overall, although it did not empirically solve the puzzle of the mixed effect of 
corruption on voter turnout which emerged from previous literature, this study set a new route 
for future research. It showed that corruption has different meanings, and provides different 
incentives to different sections of the electorate.  
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The fourth study complements the third one by proposing patronage as a causal mechanism 
for higher turnout of public employees and lower turnout of minority ethnic groups, 
empirically testing it on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This study brought together 
patronage and ethnic favouritism, which are considered to go hand in hand and encourage 
each other. Contrary to the research conducted so far, where the salience of ethnicity has been 
of central priority in explaining vote choice in ethnically divided societies, this study focused 
on turnout as another important indicator of political participation.  Taking into consideration 
that voting incentives for specific groups of voters are higher than for the others, it  closer 
inspected two population sub-groups, namely: public officials and ethnic minorities. Voter 
turnout of these groups is analyzed in a context where ethnic cleavages and patronage 
networks are prevailing societal features. Turnout levels of these two groups are employed to 
investigate signs of patronage. Findings confirmed the expected positive effect between 
public sector employment and turnout. Beyond this prediction, an additional assertion that 
minority ethnic groups turn out less in elections, was equally confirmed. Obtained results 
were shown to be robust to the inclusion of different socio-demographic characteristics of 
voters. This study considered political patronage and opportunities to gain patronage benefits 
as possible explanations for the shown variations in turnout between the aforementioned 
groups. Public officials in patronage contexts exhibit a strong dependency on the electoral 
success of the patron. This poses a certain pressure on them to cast votes on election day, due 
to security reasons. Their turnout levels are considered to ensure electoral success of the 
patron, who in return guarantees them further job security due to privileged access to public 
goods (government jobs). Furthermore, ethnicity presents a short-cut for distribution of public 
goods. If benefits are distributed to ‘own’ people, namely co-ethnics, minorities as non-
beneficiaries are expected to display higher abstention rates.  
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Except in the third study, this dissertation focuses on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Besides being economically undeveloped, institutionally divided and inefficient, religiously 
and ethnically heterogeneous, it is mainly a suitable case study due to the ‘politicized 
ethnicity’ (Weber et al. 2015), which makes ethnicity a cornerstone of politics and the party 
system, itself (Hulsey 2010; Manning 2004; Caspersen 2004). According to Kapidzic ‘in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina we may talk about segmented multi-party system with three or four 
party subsystems based on ethno-political social cleavages’ (Kapidzic 2015:20). Annex 4 of 
the Dayton Agreement functions as the country’s Constitution, which  sought to freeze ethnic 
divisions and introduced a model of consociational democracy (power sharing). Almost all 
parties represent and appeal to one certain group. Party competition does not exist in Bosnia 
across ethnic lines. One main reason for that are the strict implications of the consociational 
elements. By and large, Bosnia is institutionally designed to accommodate ethnic 
divisions, promoting and aiming rather for representation, than for accountability. 
Consequently, considerable scholarly attention has been put on explaining the influence 
of ethnic identity, state structures and institutions on existent voting patterns. By testing 
the presence of economic and patronage driven voting in a party system where ethnic parties 
are dominant and institutional factors conducive for identity voting, the empirical analysis of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina deepens our understanding of the complexity given by 
consociationalism and ethnic heterogeneity. Furthermore, the case study under observation 
allows for the testing of the economic voting theory with regard to the level of ethnic 
divisions within the country. In this way, it is possible to identify variations of voting 
behaviour  and voter turnout on the basis of different levels of ethnic divisions. Moreover, it is 
a suitable case study which allows to test the patronage mechanism due to the low quality of 
democracy, inefficient institutional framework and for reasons of strong and politicized ethnic 
divisions, which offer a fertile ground for patronage practices. There are plenty of societies, 
facing similar, but not less important challenges on their way towards democratic 
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consolidation and on their path trying to accommodate ethnic divisions. As a result, this 
research has implications for other ethically-divided societies.  
 
2. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
Even though this dissertation addressed an important and under-researched topic and in the 
great part of the work referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina as an under-researched case, it 
suffers certain limitations, which I am aware of. 
As regards the first study, which examines economic voting in an ethnically diverse country, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and tests the hypothesis that community-level ethnic diversity 
affects the magnitude of the economic vote and level of turnout, the statistical analysis lacks 
in measurement and methods to test this theoretical argument in a society as complex as 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  However, implementing multivariate analysis was not conducted 
due to the low number of total units of analysis. Furthermore, the ideal data set for this study 
would also have been a comprehensive survey of individuals immediately after the elections, 
in order to gather information on the evaluation of government economic performance, 
whether they had voted, for which party they voted and if they did not, why not. However, 
unlike in many democratic countries, pre- and post-election surveys do not exist in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Funding, resource and access issues have meant that I have not been able to 
gather individual data of the population to provide an accurate, reliable and unbiased account 
of voting patterns. 
The present research reveals some interesting findings while testing the hypothesis that 
community-level ethnic diversity affects the magnitude of the economic vote and level of 
turnout.  As far as economic conditions are concerned, which this research linked to 
voting behaviour, it used municipality level unemployment data for one time point. By 
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expanding the research and looking at unemployment rates over time, the argument 
would be highly strengthened. 
One further limitation could be that the results of this study are inferred from aggregates 
to individuals and are open to ecological fallacy charges. However, in respect to this 
claim a number of other studies have confirmed the analysis of aggregate data as a 
reliable and accurate method of data collection. Besides, individual level data are perhaps 
not necessary for the purpose of this study, because economic factors could have an 
impact on voting behaviour, even if citizens as voters are not aware of those. Ultimately, 
this would hinder them to express their genuine motives at the ballot box19
 
.  
As regards the second study, one of the problems may be the identification of democracy 
and elections with accountability.  Accountability is essential, but it is one among several 
important dimensions. An important aspect of democracy is representation, to the same 
degree as it is accountability. However, the relationship between representation and 
accountability is particularly complex in ethnically divided societies. This is especially 
the case when the institutional design of the country is primarily aiming at 
accommodating ethnic divisions, i.e. when the system is designed aiming for 
representation, much more than for accountability. In this context, reducing political 
accountability to performance might present a challenge.  
The limited resource in ethnically divided (heterogeneous) societies is not only economic 
welfare, but ethnic safety, security and integrity of the state. Safety can thus be seen as a 
more basic need. So, performance in terms of ethnic security, and accountability in that 
sense, is, presumably, as essential and important for citizens in such societies. Ethnic 
voting, by following this logic, is not a sign of lacking accountability. It may signal 
                                                          
19 In what concerns this limitation, the author profited from comments and suggestions of one anonymous 
reviewer, after submitting the manuscript to the journal Politicke perspektive. 
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accountability along the dimension of preventing ethnic conflicts, since governments can 
be held accountable along various dimensions. 20
As regards the third study, the proposed patronage mechanism is just one out of more 
possible explanations. Public employees who turn out to vote in corrupt societies could in 
fact do so not only for consolidating the political power of their patron, but −by contrast− 
to express their discontent, voting against the corrupt government in office. Although in 
systems where patronage is widespread this could imply biting the hand that feeds them, 
we cannot exclude this circumstance based on the analysis and on the country-sample 
included in this study. Being closer to the public sphere, and hence potentially better 
aware of corruption dynamics going on in the public sector, public employees could 
actually express their disappointment by voting to punish (instead of favouring) the 
incumbent government they see as corrupt. This could be the case especially in 
consolidated democracies and most economically developed countries. Although we used 
a relatively large set of 44 countries, the generalizability of our results could gain from 
further empirical research testing the same expectations among an even broader, and 
possibly, more heterogeneous set of countries with respect to corruption scores. 
 
In order to confirm whether patronage (rather than voters’ disappointment) is indeed the 
mechanism behind higher voting propensity of public employees in corrupt societies, 
future research is encouraged to inspect the relationship between corruption and specific 
partisan preferences of the sub-population at stake. That is, to check whether public 
employees not only turn out to vote, but if they do so to vote for the incumbent, which is 
arguably a necessary condition for the patronage mechanism to hold. Previous findings, 
that did not distinguish between target populations, have shown a rather small effect of 
                                                          
20 In what concerns this limitation, the author profited from comments and suggestions of one anonymous 
reviewer, after submitting the manuscript to the journal Politicke perspektive. 
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corruption on incumbent’s vote share. Therefore, it remains interesting to analyse how 
corruption shapes partisan preferences of different groups of citizens. If public 
employees resulted more likely to vote for the incumbent government, the argument 
presented in this study would be further strengthened. 
More research is also required to inspect the differential impact of corruption on turnout 
over time, instead of cross-sectionally as done in this article. This could add confidence 
in speaking of a different set of incentives behind the voting behaviour of public 
employees in corrupt societies, beyond any suspect of self-selection in their recruitment 
and reverse causality. 
The limitations of the fourth study are similar to the third. Higher turnout of public 
employees could in fact be a result of expressing their discontent and voting against the 
government in office. Furthermore, testing the patronage mechanism on one single case 
study is rather difficult and I am aware of that. In order to strengthen the argument, 
additional qualitative evidence was introduced in this study.  
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